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Chapter I  
Introduction 
 
“Wandering Drunk on the Shore” 
Roman authors cared little about the drinking habits of Rome’s general 
population.
1
 There was no Roman Charles Buxton, who in an 1868 jeremiad against 
drunkenness, argued that, “the best thing…for the improvement of the morals of the 
working classes…was the closing of the public houses on the Saturday night” and that 
“undoubtedly the State can do much to lessen the temptation to drunkenness.”2 The 
upper-class Romans declaimed through their silence a rousing “who cares” when 
responding to the habits (drinking and otherwise) of the lower social orders. 
Nevertheless, glimmers of light emerge from that general obscurity and make clear that, 
as in later societies, drinking in quantity was commonplace among Rome’s population by 
the high Classical age.   
This silence on lower-class drinking initially seems especially surprising because 
Roman authors certainly observed and at times criticized alcohol’s effects on their peers. 
As early as the mid-2
nd
 century BCE, a certain Gaius Titius argued for the passage of the 
Lex Fannia, a sumptuary law, because so many men were carrying out business in the 
Forum while drunk.
3
 Cicero likewise inveighed against his opponents by accusing them 
                                                          
1
 Noted by D’Arms (1995: 304-17). 
2
 Buxton (1868: 27, 54).  
3
 Macrob. Sat. 3.16.14-15: describens enim homines prodigos in forum ad iudicandum ebrios commeantes, 
quaeque soleant inter se sermocinari sic ait: ludunt alea studiose, delibuti unguentis, scortis stipati.…inde 
2 
 
of drunkenness and identified such drunkenness as a form of insanity.
4
 Such aspersions 
were not uncommon: Seneca criticized one of Caesar’s assasins, Tillius Cimber, for being 
a violent drunkard, and the young Octavian used Antony’s association with Dionysus as 
an excuse to accuse him of orgiastic drunkenness.
5
 The vast majority of references to 
drunkenness was in reference to upper-class behavior and is usually indistinguishable 
from broader, moralizing observation and criticism. 
Yet the ancient sources are not wholly silent on drinking among Rome’s 
populace. The lengthiest description comes from the 4
th
 century historian, Ammianus 
Marcellinus. Visiting Rome with the emperor Constantius II, he described the frivolity of 
Rome’s upper classes and then offered a precious description of Romans’ propensity to 
drink:  
Ex turba vero imae sortis et paupertinae in tabernis aliqui pernoctant 
vinariis, non nulli velariis umbraculorum theatralium latent…aut 
pugnaciter aleis certant turpi sono fragosis naribus introrsum reducto 
spiritu concrepantes; aut quod est studiorum omnium maximum ab ortu 
lucis ad vesperam sole fatiscunt vel pluviis, per minutias aurigarum 
equorumque praecipua vel delicta scrutantes 
 
But from the throng of the lowest and impoverished class, some stay up all 
night in wine shops, others lie in the shadows of the theaters’ sails; either 
they compete rowdily at dice making a foul-sounding racket by their noisy 
inhalations or in minutely appraising the strengths and defects of the 
horses and charioteers—and they wear themselves out at this with the 
greatest zeal from sunrise to sundown rain or shine.
6
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
vadunt ad comitium ne litem suam faciant. Dum eunt, nulla est in angiporto amphora quam non impleant, 
quippe qui vesicam plenam vini habeant. 
4
 E.g., Verr. 2.5.63.16; Pis. 13; Phil. 2.67.5, 2.105.18, 3.12.6. 
5
 Sen. Ep. 83.12. For Antony’s association with Dionysus and accusations of drunkenness, see Pliny HN 
14.22, Scott (1929: 133-41) and Zanker (1988: 60). 
6
 XIV 6.25. 
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We cannot know the extent to which Ammianus’ rhetoric has exaggerated the drunken 
idleness of Rome’s population, but it has the ring of truth.7 Somewhat earlier, for 
example, he had mentioned civic unrest which had occurred because of a dearth of wine 
(inopia vini), which roused the wine-greedy masses to drunken discords (motus crebri).
8
 
We need not associate that description narrowly with late imperial Rome. The 
first century author Seneca made reference to the debauches of the Roman population as 
part of his broader disapproval of the morals of his age:
9
 
…Voluptatis causa ac festorum dierum vestem mutavimus. Si te bene 
novi, arbitri partibus functus nec per omnia nos similes esse pilleatae 
turbae voluisses nec per omnia dissimiles: nisi forte his maxime diebus 
animo imperandum est, ut tunc voluptatibus solus abstineat, cum in illas 
omnis turba procubuit: certissimum enim argumentum firmitatis suae 
capit, si ad blanda et in luxuriam trahentia nec id nec abducitur. Hoc multo 
fortius est, ebrio ac vomitante populo siccum ac sobrium esse… 
 
We have changed our clothing for the sake of pleasure and holidays. If I 
know you well, having discharged the parts of judgment, you would have 
wished neither to be wholly similar to the freeman crowd nor wholly 
dissimilar. Unless it happens that on these days particularily the soul must 
be enjoined that it alone then should abstain from pleasures, since the 
whole throng hastens into them.  For it will certainly find the strongest 
argument for its constancy in not being led astray to alluring things and 
thence to decadence. This is considerably stronger, to be dry and sober 
while the populace is drunk and vomiting… 
 
In a later letter, Seneca censured the behavior of vacationers at Baiae, asking 
Lucilius why he would want to see drunks wandering the beach (videre ebrios per litora 
errantes… quid necesse est).10 Although Baiae was a pleasure retreat for wealthy 
Romans, not the urban poor, Seneca’s comparison of life at Baiae to one spent in a bar 
                                                          
7
 On Ammianus at Rome, see Matthews (1989: 8-13).  
8
 XIV 6.1. 
9
 Ep. 18.2. 
10
 Ep. 51.4. 
4 
 
(habitare…inter popinas) leaves little doubt that he was equating his peers’ comportment 
with that of the denizens of Rome’s drunken haunts.11   
These “gloomy” haunts (the word is Cicero’s) were a common if not generally 
noteworthy feature of Rome’s urban fabric, a place where “the cheapest of men” whiled 
away the hours.
12
 Horace contrasted his own love of the country life with his bailiff who 
loved the city’s “oily bars and wine taverns” (uncta popina incutiunt urbis desiderium… 
vicina subest vinum praebere taberna).
13
 When Martial praised Domitian for cleaning up 
Rome, he particularly applauded his sweeping away the “dark bars had taken up entire 
streets” (occupat aut totas nigra popina vias).14  
Pompeian architectural remains and preserved graffiti add to that impressionistic 
tableau culled from stray literary references. Though the total number of hospitality 
establishments in Pompeii is debated, the lesser estimate is of ninety-four establishments 
that served food and drink (popinae and tabernae), forty-two that had rooms for lodgers 
and may have served food and drink (hospitium and cauponae), nine lodging houses with 
stables for horses (stabula), and forty-seven of indeterminate function.
15
 Pompeii’s 
estimated population was only 10,000-12,000 people and would have therefore had 
roughly one drinking establishment for every hundred people.
16
 A similar density in 
                                                          
11
 Ibid. See D’Arms (2003: 52) for an introduction to Baiae and its ill-reputed licentiousness.  
12
 Pis. 18: tenebricosa popina.  Sen. Prov.: cum illo tempore vilissimus quisque in popina lateat. 
13
 Ep. 1.14.21-24. 
14
 Epigramm. 7.61. 
15
 DeFelice (2007: 483).  
16
 This is a higher density than any modern city I can find by order of magnitudes: Chicago, a city of about 
2.7 million people has about 1800 active bars (see the list assembled at www.chibarproject.com), a ratio 
of 1:1500 bars/person.  
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Rome would imply a total number of 7,500-10,000 drinking establishments, enough that 
Martial’s image of their taking over whole streets does not seem totally absurd.17  
The Pompeian graffiti provide examples of the activities of those who frequented 
these establishments. The writer of one graffito cursed the innkeeper (copo) who sold 
water while he himself drinks merum (wine mixed the honey).
18
 We learn of a self-
proclaimed body of seribibi—late night drinkers—who frequented one drinking 
establishment.
19
 A certain Festus, for example, commemorated his and his friends’ sexual 
frolics at an inn (Festus hic futuit cum sodalibus),
20
 which reminds one of the late-night 
revels at the deversorium in the Satryricon, all washed down by copious Falernian wine 
(vino etiam Falerno inundamur).
21
  
Excessive drinking led to its own set of problems: Another inscription records a 
guest’s apologies for wetting the bed.22 This inscription might raise a wry smile, but the 
Digest, in fact, preserves an excerpt, in a title dealing with drunken slaves, on drunken 
bed-wetters.
23
 No surprise that when Pliny lamented humanity’s inventiveness at 
discovering new ways to become drunk, it was not restricted to any one class of people.
24
 
The humorous pomposity of the Pompeian inscription that invokes mater Ebria—Mother 
Drunkenness—is the final reminder that drinking, often heavily by our standards—must 
have been a common feature of urban life for all classes, as it was in 18
th
 century France 
                                                          
17
 The projection based on an estimated population of 750,000-1,000,000 people during the 1
st
 two 
centuries CE. See below for further on Rome’s population.  
18
 CIL IV 3948. 
19
 CIL IV 581. 
20
 CIL IV 3935. 
21
 Petron. Sat. 21. 
22
 CIL IV 4957. 
23
 D. 21.1.14.4. 
24
 HN 14.14. 
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where “taverns were the ruin of the peasants.”25 Roman authors largely ignored the fact 
simply because its existence was uninteresting to them.  
A Brief History of Wine’s Diffusion Among the Romans 
By the late Republic (1
st
 century BCE) and into the imperial age, wine drinking 
was a general if unremarked upon feature of life at Rome. Wine’s diffusion through all 
strata of Rome’s population was a lengthy process, much of which is shrouded in 
mystery. Though this process and wine-drinking prior to the high classical age is not a 
topic of this dissertation, the brief description here serves as a reminder that the 
conditions of the upcoming chapters did not arise ex vacuo. 
Romans had, from their earliest days, access to wine and the respective cultures 
that grew up around its consumption both to their north and south.  Both the Etruscans to 
Rome’s north and the inhabitants of Magna Graecia in the south had grown, imported 
and consumed wine on the Italian peninsula well before Rome’s rise as an Italian and 
then Mediterranean power. The Greeks introduced wine-making into southern Italy and 
Sicily. Certainly Corinthian-style coarse wares are common in Magna Graecia from a 
relatively early period, and sympotic culture, imported from Greece, gave wine an 
important place in south-Italian, Greek society.
26
  
 Images of wine appear commonly in Etruscan art, for example, in the art of “The 
Tomb of the Leopard” at Tarquinia from the early 5th century BCE or on an Attic-style, 
black-figure cup by the “Chiusi-painter” showing a detailed tableau of a grape-harvest.27 
Etruscan wine amphorae and coarse ware also attest to their interest in wine: numerous 
Etruscan vessels, presumably for wine, have been discovered at sites within Italy and 
                                                          
25
 CIL IV 5062. Braudel (1981: 236). 
26
 Frederiksen (1984: 73); Forti (1988: 309-11). 
27
 VI, 7.  
7 
 
without, for example, in Ampurias (near Barcelona) and the wreck off Cap d’Antibes 
(Southern France).
28
  
Wine was available at Rome at a relatively early period.
29
 By the classical period, 
Romans believed that Romans knew wine by the early monarchy. Pliny, for example, 
doubted that Romulus knew of wine because he sacrificed with milk but noted an 
injunction of Rome’s mythical second king, Numa Pompilius, against using wine from 
un-pruned vines for religious rites.
30
 We should not of course accept these stories of 
Rome’s imagined early days literally, but Numa’s injunction against “un-pruned vines” 
may reflect dimly remembered days when wine-like beverages must have been 
commonly made from the wild Vitis vinifera sylvestris rather than the cultivated Vitis 
vinifera.
31
  
More refined vines were probably grown by the mid-5
th
 century BCE: there is a 
fragment from the remains of Rome’s earliest codified laws, the 12 Tables, which 
enjoined against removing a beam used for propping vines (tignum iunctum aedibus 
vinea[e]ve [et concapit] ne solvito).
32
 Fabius Pictor, a very early historian of the 3
rd
 
century BCE, told of a Roman matron who was put to death by her husband for stealing 
the keys to the wine-store, and Pliny knew of a similar story of a Roman woman whose 
husband killed her for opening a closed cask of wine.
33
 Both these stories must date to an 
                                                          
28
 Cristofani and Carrieri (1979: 51), Turfa (1986: 67-8, 75).  
29
 On the origins of wine in Italy, see Flobert (1992: 289-300). 
30
 Plin. HN 14. 
31
 It has recently been argued that Vitis vinifera silvestris continued to be cultivated alongside Vitis vinifera 
around Narbo during the Roman period. Bouby, Terral, Figueiral (2010: 129-39). 
32
 For the text, see Riccobono (1941), Crawford (1996) ad loc. VI, 8 for commentary.  
33
 Plin. HN. 14.96. 
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early time, when marriage cum manu, where the bride passed into the power of the 
groom, was practiced, a form of marriage totally obsolete by the classical period.
34
  
Although wine was known generally, used for religious purposes, and drunk by 
the wealthy, it is unlikely to have been so widely available that the general populace 
drank it regularly. This does not mean, of course, that they drank no alcoholic beverages. 
Wild-fruit faux wines can be made, which Pliny enumerated, and Ulpian provided a 
lengthy paragraph of things properly and improperly counted as wines: zythum, camum, 
cervesia, and hydromeli are provided as examples.
35
 Tchernia also described grape-
derived drinks, such as posca and acetum, which were available to a broader social swath 
than wine proper.
36
  
The plays of Plautus, written in the late 3
rd
 and early 2
nd
 century BCE, illuminate 
formerly hidden aspects of the opaque development of wine drinking at Rome. In 
particular, his plays suggest that wine drinking was common and had already generated a 
specific vocabulary relating to its trade and consumption although Italian wine 
production was still in the early stages of development. To be sure, using Plautine comic 
society as an historical source spawns interpretive problems, but these have not proved 
crippling.
37
 The most problematic aspect of his comedies is the extent to which social 
practice in Magna Graecia may have influenced Plautus’ dramatic societies; since wine 
                                                          
34
 Gaudemet (1953) 323-53; Treggiari (1991: 16-7). 
35
 D. 33.6.9. 
36
 Tchernia (1986: 11-19). 
37
 On Plautus’ relationship to contemporary social and economic realities, see Leo (1912) and Fraenkel 
(1960); Watson (1971) used Plautus in reconstructing early (ca. 200 BCE) Roman law.  
9 
 
was certainly long established in Greek Italy before making its way north, his plays may 
exaggerate the degree of wine’s diffusions through Rome’s population.38   
But the vocabulary of wine-commerce in Plautus was remarkably similar to that 
of the high classical period and this may suggest some degree of temporal continuity. 
Many words of Greek origin appear and remained in Latin wine-drinking vocabulary—
the word cadus, of which there are several examples,
39
 lagoenam (equivalent to classical 
lagona),
40
 amphora,
41
 and oenopolium, a word which did not catch on.
42
 This could 
speak to the possibility raised above of south-Italian, Greek influence, but that is 
impossible to determine since all those words save the last were taken over by the 
Romans. Moreover, Plautus already knew the word dolium (a capacious storage vessel) 
as applied to wine, a word not of Greek origin thus suggesting that Roman Latin was 
already developing a specialized wine-vocabulary.
43
  
Highly interesting, not just for the language but also the situation described, is a 
scene in the Asinaria between two slaves, Libanus and Leonida:
44
   
Leon: Eho, ecquis pro vectura olivi rem solvit?  
Lib: Solvit.  
Leon: Cui datumst?  
Lib: Sticho vicario ipsi tuo.  
Leon: …sed vina quae heri vendidi vinario Exaerambo iam pro eis satis 
fecit.  
Lib: Fecisse satis opinor, nam vidi huc ipsum adducere trapezitam      
exaerambum.  
  
                                                          
38
 See Harvey (1986: 297-304) for the importance of understanding south Italy’s Greek societies in 
discussing Plautus’ relationship to contemporary history. 
39
 E.g., Amph. 429, Mil. Glor. 850-852, Stich. 721. 
40
 Curc. 78. 
41
 But not with wine: Cas. 120, Mil. Glor. 823 (of nard). Naevius in the mid 3
rd
 century  already knew the 
word (frag. 124 Bilbit amphora—bilbit is an onomatopoetic verb describing the sound an amphora 
makes).   
42
 As. 200. 
43
 Ernout & Meillet (1979: 181) for a tentative etymology.  
44
 As. 426-434 contains the most interesting details.  
10 
 
Leon: Hey, did anyone pay for the shipment of olive-oil? 
Lib: Yes 
Leon: Who’d he give it to? 
Lib: To Stichus himself, your proxy. 
Leon: …But what about the wine which I sold yesterday to Exaerambus the wine-
trader—has he made good with Stichus?  
Lib: Yeah I think so—I saw Exaerambus himself bringing a banker here. 
 
The situation used here for comedic purposes is (and I avoid using loaded terms 
such as sophisticated, elaborate, or complicated) remarkably similar generally (i.e., 
slaves, bankers, proxy-agents) to that we see much later in, for example, the Sulpicii 
tablets, and specifically in the vocabulary—vinarii, vicarius, trapezita.45 Not just Plautus’ 
words but the scenarios themselves—the existence of wine-traders, for example--suggest 
an existing commercial framework, not dissimilar to that seen much later.  
But if the structural conditions for Rome’s supply of wine existed prior to the 2nd 
century, the wines themselves did not.
46
 In Plautus, named wines were invariably 
Greek.
47
 Cato, producing wine and composing advice for estate owners in the mid-2
nd
 
century BCE, lived when Italian wine production as an enterprise of significant scale was 
stillin its infancy. True, he advocated careful viticulture lest “the wine lose its name” 
(vinum nomen perdat),
48
 but Tchernia rightly pointed out that, although Cato was 
growing reasonable quantities, he did not seem to know by name a characteristic Italian 
wine any more than Plautus.
49
 Pliny claimed that the first Italian wine worth 
remembering postdated Cato by a few decades and appeared in the consulate of Opimius 
                                                          
45
 For the Sulpicii, Camodeca (1999); on the importance of slaves and slave-agents, Aubert (1994), 
Petrucci (1991), Serrao (2002).  On the role of bankers in commercial transactions, Barlow (1978); 
Andreau (1987), (1996:267-275), 1999).  
46
 Tchernia (1986: 60-6) for the development of Italian viticulture.  
47
 E.g., Curc. 78, Poen. 699, Rud. 588, passim.  
48
 Agr. 25. 
49
 Tchernia (1986: 61).  
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in 121 BCE,
50
 though Cicero’s Brutus suggests that a Falernian wine may have been 
known in the consulate of Anicius, in 160 BCE.
51
 Tchernia was inclined, therefore, to 
suggest that wine suitable for commercial distribution was grown in central Italy 
somewhat before textual attestation appears and suggested a date-range in the early 2
nd
 
century BCE.  
Local production on a reasonable scale was certainly a precondition for the rise of 
general consumption at Rome. Imported wine would have been too expensive for most. 
According to Pliny, even in the time of Lucullus’ father, it was unusual for more than one 
bottle of Greek wine to be provided at a dinner.
52
 Exploring the factors that led to wine’s 
downward social diffusion would be a separate book, well outside the scope of serious 
investigation here.
53
 We can briefly point to three key factors in that development over 
the Republic’s last two centuries: the use of wine in provisioning the army; the 
distributions of wine through nobles’ handouts and through the collegia; and 
intensification of medicinal practices in which wine played an important role.
54
  
It is not entirely clear when the Roman army began drinking wine, but it seems to 
have been a feature of military life from at least the mid-2
nd
 century BCE.
55
 This 
consumption must have introduced numerous young Italians to wine-drinking.
56
 Sallust, 
                                                          
50
 HN 14.94-97. 
51
 Brut. 287: ut si quis Falerno vino delectetur, sed eo nec ita novo ut proximis consulibus natum velit, nec 
rursus ita vetere ut Opimium aut Anicium consulem quaerat—'atqui hae notae sunt optumae. Tchernia 
(1986: 61). 
52
 HN 14. 
53
 Tchernia (1986: 58-59) on expanding consumption of wine during the 2
nd
 century. Purcell (1985: 13-16) 
gives a short narrative of the rise in wine drinking at Rome. Both are inclined to see it fundamentally as a 
function of increased urbanism. 
54
 For comparison, see Braudel (1981: 231-38) on the diffusion of drinking wine in 16
th
 and 17
th
 century 
France,  
55
 Though the Roman army also drank posca, a mixture of vinegar and water, its habitual drinkers “likely 
remained the exception.” Tchernia (1986: 19). 
56
 For the numbers of Italians used in the late Republic’s army, see Brunt (1971), Hopkins (1978).  
12 
 
for example, blamed Sulla for having been the first to habituate the Roman army to drink 
(insuevit exercitus populi Romani…potare), which, if true, would date army drinking to 
the very late 2
nd
 century BCE.
57
 Roughly contemporaneously, when Metellus arrived in 
Africa in 109 BCE, he found the army engaged in exchange with, among others, wine 
merchants (mercatores vini).
58
 The presence of these merchants at the army camp 
suggests that supplying the army with wine was already an established practice. This is 
bolstered by Tchernia’s observation of a passage in Appian that, in 153 BCE, the army of 
Lucullus in Spain suffered from lack of wine, in addition to other viands.
59
  
Many veterans must have returned to Rome with an acquired taste for wine, and it 
is likely not a coincidence that we begin to see evidence of more regular distributions of 
wine, both public and private. When Lucullus returned from the East, he distributed more 
than a hundred-thousand jars (cadi) of wine, and Caesar, when dictator, distributed 
amphorae of Falernian at the dinner for his triumph (cena sui triumphi).
60
 This latter, is I 
believe, the first mention of distributions of Italian wine, rather than Greek, and suggests 
that Italian wine had reached both sufficient quality and quantity for Caesar to use it at a 
public dinner—Pliny stated that he still served cadi of Chian wine at his convivia.61 
In addition to these irregular distributions, growing numbers of urban dwellers 
had access to collegia, associations something like clubs which, among their other 
                                                          
57
 Iug. 44.5; Cat. 11.6 
58
 Jug 44.5. 
59
 Tchernia (1986: 16); Appian Iber., 54.  
60
Plin. HN. 14.96-97. On public dining, see Rodriguez (2009: 13-82), focusing on municipal dining; see also 
Hugoniot (2008: 319-333); (2007: 207-235). For comparative perspective on the importance of public 
dining and distributions for diffusing wine, see Francis (1972: 10-11), who pointed out that, in medieval 
London, “The common man could not often afford wine, but he could sometimes push forward to have a 
taste of it…[at social events]…and if he were a dependent of a nobleman…[he could enjoy]…some share of 
the luxuries of his betters. Custom decreed that kings, great men, and church dignitaries should be 
generous hosts and liberal purchasers of wine.” 
61
 Ibid.  
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services, often provided members with dinners and wine.
62
 Though these clubs were 
dominant features of Italian urban life of the empire, they date back to the Republican 
period.
63
 Our knowledge of them is intertwined with polemic about their purported roles 
in that era’s political turmoil, and, though their numbers were “considerable” by the time 
of Cicero, we know little about them.
64
 If it is safe to assume that they played a similar 
social role during this time as they did later on a larger scale, then we should not discount 
their role in accustoming many Romans to wine-drinking though we can say almost 
nothing about the details of this process.  
The medicinal use of wine was important both for its social diffusion and in 
legitimizing its consumption by bestowing on it an air of respectability. In the 2
nd
 century 
BCE, Nicander of Colophon’s poems popularized Apollodorus’ work on theriacs—wines 
with substances added which allegedly counteracted poisons. Though some suspected 
such concoctions were the nostrums of quacks, ridiculed them for having fifty-four 
ingredients of ludicrous proportions, and condemned them as a “specious display of 
learning” (venditatio scientiae),65 wine-based potions became increasingly popular from 
the 1
st
 century BCE onwards. A bilingual 1
st
 century BCE inscription from Antinum, for 
example, commemorated a doctor (originally from Tralles in Asia Minor) who bore the 
epithet “wine-giver.” Such evidence speaks both to the status of wine-giving doctors 
starting in the early first century BCE and to their geographic distribution.
66
 In particular, 
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 Collegia have been interpreted as everything from proto-medieval guilds, proto-Italo-fascist 
corporazioni, and social clubs—Perry (2006). See in particular Clemente (1991: 83-91).  
63
 On the importance of collegia in the civic transformation of 2
nd
 century CE Italy, see Patterson (1994: 
227-38). 
64
 Waltzing (1895: 56); on their role in late Republican politics and the senatusconsultum of 64 which 
banned them, see Ibid., 91-113.  
65
 HN 29.24-25. 
66
 CIL 10.388. Also Nutton (2004: 164).  
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Asclepiades, a doctor from Prusa who flourished in the first half of the first century BCE, 
was instrumental in popularizing medicinal wine.
67
 He departed from Hippocratic 
humoral medicine and instead advocated medical treatment based on exercise and diet. 
Pliny claimed that Aesclepiades was the one who discovered how to make wine 
healthful,
68
 and Tchernia argues that Pliny’s hierarchy of wines is taken, not from 
agricultural sources, but rather from medical writings.
69
  
Even Pliny, generally a skeptic, conceded that wine in moderation could have 
medicinal value,
70
 and many others were much more enthusiastic than he. Celsus praised 
wine’s ability to reduce fevers in numerous places.71 Indeed, medicinal wine was 
imported by barrels to the legionary camp at Aquincum (Budapest); the wood was later 
reused to line wells, and some preserve the stamp: “Duty free for the hospital.”72 We 
should not underestimate medicinal wine’s importance in increasing wine consumption at 
Rome and diffusing its popularity from the wealthier classes down into the general 
populace. The combination of these factors allowed wine to gradually diffuse throughout 
the entirety of Roman society such that, by the beginning of the Empire, drinking wine 
was a feature of every social stratum.    
Surprisingly, not everyone has been convinced of wine’s importance for Rome’s 
non-elite population. The chief argument against such an expansive view of urban wine 
consumption at Rome relies on wine’s expense relative to the low income of most of 
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 Nutton (2004: 167-70). 
68
 HN 7.37: …summa autem Asclepiadi Prusiensi condita nova secta, spretis legatis et pollicitationibus 
Mithridatis regis, reperta ratione qua vinum aegris medetur… Also relevant is Sext. Emp. Math. 7.91: 
τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ. δυνάμει καὶ ὁ Ἀσκληπιάδης εὑρίσκεται κατακεχρημένος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τῶν περὶ οἴνου 
δόσεως  
69
 Tchernia (1995: 299). 
70
 HN 14.7.58 & 23.19-26.   
71
 Celsus Med. 1.8, 2.18.11, 2.28, 2.30, 3.13, 4.12.  
72
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was stationed at Aquincum from 106 to at least 269.  
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Rome’s populace and has been most forcefully articulated by Peter Garnsey.73 Though he 
acknowledged that wine was a dietary staple for the Mediterranean’s population 
generally, he did not believe it ever reached this status in Rome. He admitted that 
“…special reasons have to be found for denying their presence to some degree in the diet 
of ordinary people of Rome” but then argued that “…extreme poverty and 
unemployment…count as special reasons. Until free oil and wine were added to grain in 
the distributions…these commodities had to purchased.”74 The argument holds, therefore, 
that even bad wine was frequently too expensive to form an important part of the Roman 
diet. 
Garnsey’s argument is thought provoking but ultimately misguided, largely 
because it relies on an injudicious comparison of the wine prices between Rome and 
areas around the Bay of Naples, as provided by Duncan-Jones.
75
 In 153 CE, the college 
of Aesculapius and Hygia on the Via Appia outside Rome was left a bequest from which 
periodic distributions of money and meals would be provided.
76
 The cash allotted 
combined with the quantities of wine provided imply that the price of wine was expected 
to range between 61-88.5 sesterces per amphora (the variation arises from our ignorance 
of the rate of return on the initial foundation). Duncan-Jones compared this figure to 
seven prices for retail wine recorded on inscriptions from tabernae at Pompeii and 
Herculaneum. Those prices ranged from an implied price of 12 HS per amphora through 
54 (implied because the figures are prices per sextarius, about half a liter, not amphorae). 
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 Garnsey (1998: 241).  
74
 Ibid. 241. 
75
 I summarize the comparison, found in Duncan-Jones (1982: 364-65). 
76
 CIL 6.10234=ILS 7213; AE 1937, 161.  
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That comparison was enough for Duncan-Jones to suggest that the average price of wine 
at Rome was significantly higher than at other major Italian cities.  
Taking these isolated prices as representative of broader patterns may be unduly 
stretching the evidence. Even if we let that pass, Garnsey’s subsequent interpretation 
faces problems on three fronts. First, Garnsey followed Duncan-Jones and assumed that 
the lower Roman price (61 HS/L) was toward the bottom of Rome’s price-range because 
“the wine is not stated of being of a particular quality.”77 This is a strange argument: the 
range of prices depended on the investment’s expected interest and had nothing to do 
with its quality. Quite the contrary, it is more plausible that the college’s benefactress 
expected her money to suffice for wine of at least middling quality—certainly not the 
worst unless she was a particularly stingy philanthropist. We should therefore hesitate in 
assuming that this figure is on the low end of Rome’s prices.  Second, the Campanian 
prices come from tabernae and popinae, retail establishments partially dedicated to 
selling wine; it is possible (though not provable) that their owners paid a wholesale price 
for amphora significantly less than a college would have to pay to buy that same amphora 
retail. The price differential due to differing modes of acquisition would accentuate the 
perceived regional price variation.  
The third and in my view most serious problem arises from the conclusions drawn 
from the prices. The Campanian wine prices are as follows (in HS/L): 12, 24, 24, 36, 48, 
48, 54. The sample has an average value of 35 and a standard deviation of 16 (each 
rounded to the nearest whole number). Remember that a standard deviation of 15 HS/L 
simply means that 68% of wine prices should fall between 19 and 51 HS/L and 95% 
between 3 and 67 HS/L. In other words, the lower end of the Roman price value fell 
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 Duncan-Jones ibid.  
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within one standard deviation and even the higher price within two standard deviations. 
These figures do not demonstrate that the average price of wine at Rome was 
significantly (i.e., several standard deviations) larger than in Campania; rather, the data 
show such high fluctuation that the Roman prices could easily be part of the same general 
population distribution.  
Moreover, the comparative average prices are actually less informative about 
wine’s accessibility than is the variance in cost. For example, imagine that Gaius can 
spend 4 HS per week on wine and the average cost of wine at Rome is 5 HS/week. Does 
that mean Gaius can buy no wine? Not necessarily: If he had access to five types of wine, 
costing 1, 2, 6, 7, and 9 HS/week (high variance), then he can purchase wine and in fact 
has two options even though the average price exceeds his purchasing power. If all five 
types range between 4.5 and 5.5 HS/week (low variance), he would be hard pressed to 
purchase wine consistently. Thus, the most telling feature of the Campanian numbers is 
their high variance, and the mean is less important. It would be very strange if Rome’s 
wine, even if of a higher average price than that sold in Campanian taverns, did not 
exhibit similar variance. If so, there is every reason to believe that most inhabitants could 
purchase at least some percentage of the available types of wine. Rhetoric though 
Seneca’s “drunk and vomiting populace” assuredly was, the rhetoric gained power from a 
core of truth.
 78
 
We cannot say with any certainty how much wine the city of Rome, in its mature 
phase, consumed. But comparisons to other pre-industrial, Mediterranean societies lead 
one to believe that it was quite a lot. In 18
th
 century Valladolid, consumption was about 
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 Ep. 18.4:  ebrium et vomitans populum. 
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100 liters/year, and in Paris, before the Revolution, 120.
79
 Figures elsewhere during the 
medieval and early modern period range from 83 liters/year to a staggering 419 liters in 
14
th
 century Sienna, with quantities in the 200s/year the most common.
80
 These figures 
have led to per-capita estimations of approximately 182 liters per year.
81
  
As a rough figure, it allows us to explore what those consumption levels imply 
when taken in aggregate. If we accept that imperial Rome’s population was nearing a 
million residents, then annual, urban consumption of wine would be approximately 1.5 
million hectoliters.
82
 Remembering that (conservatively) 10-20% of wine must have 
spoiled before consumption, Rome’s total demand for wine would have been somewhere 
around 2-2.5 million Hl, a quantity sufficient to fill between eighty to one hundred 
Olympic-sized pools year in and year out.  
This dissertation ultimately asks one simple question: what were the economics of 
Rome’s wine commerce which made possible the consistent supply of that impressive 
quantity to Rome’s populace. The study spans the classical period, (roughly) from the 
very late Republic to the upheavals of the 3
rd
 century, and it definitively terminates at the 
reign of Aurelian (270-75), in whose reign wine was finally added to the annona, the 
supplies of grain, oil, and meat which were supplied free to a percentage of Rome’s 
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 Braudel (1981: 236-7). 
80
 Tchernia (1986: 22-3) for the comparative evidence. 
81
 For Rome, Tchernia (1986: 26) estimated an annual consumption of 182 liters/year. Fleming (2001: 59) 
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citizens, and the state’s involvement in the city’s wine supply decisively changed its 
commercial structure.
83
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Chapter II  
Methods and Models for the Study of Roman Wine 
Free-Market or Embedded Trade? 
 Let me begin with a problem fundamental for an economic study of Roman wine: 
are the production, transportation, and supply of Roman wine properly considered as 
market driven or not? The arguments for and against that view will suggest that the 
question itself is flawed, and the rest of this first chapter will show what sort of models 
are better suited for an economic study of Rome’s wine supply. Chivying these out 
generates the fundamental premises of the rest of this dissertation. 
Suetonius gives the following account which nicely encapsulates the formal 
relationship between Rome’s populace and the emperor’s involvement in its wine supply. 
The emperor is Augustus, the time sometime after 19 BCE.
1
 
Sed ut salubrem magis quam ambitiosum principem scires, querentem de 
inopia et caritate vini populum severissima coercuit voce: satis provisum 
a genero suo Agrippa perductis pluribus aquis, ne homines sitirent. Eidem 
populo promissum quidem congiarium reposcenti bonae se fidei esse 
respondit. 
 
But so that you may know that the emperor was restrained rather than 
demagogic, he sternly rebuked the people when it was complaining about 
the dearness of wine, saying that provision enough had been made against 
the people going thirsty by the many aqueducts which his son-in-law, 
Agrippa, had built. But to the same people, demanding its promised food-
distribution, he responded that he would keep his promise.
2
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 The date can be deduced from comparison with Dio 54.11.7, which specifies that the aqueduct 
mentioned is the Aqua Virgo, completed in 19 BCE.  
2
 Div. Aug. 42. 
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Augustus’ abnegation of responsibility for the city’s supply of wine was not 
unique. Some half century later, in Claudius’ reign, there was a food shortage which 
became so severe, said Seneca, that only eight days’ supply was left.3 Suetonius again 
commented that Claudius always took such problems seriously: he insured shippers who 
contracted to transport grain during the dangerous winter months against loss.
4
 Yet this 
same emperor unsuccessfully tried to close Rome’s taverns, the chief source of wine for 
much of its populace.
5
 Until Aurelian, emperors’ attitudes towards Rome’s supply of 
wine varied from mild indifference to complete heedlessness.
6
 
The emperors showed an equivalent lack of concern for the merchants 
(mercatores/negotiatores) who transported wine throughout the Mediterranean and to the 
city itself.  Papirius Justus recorded a rescript of the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Verus 
which reads as follows: 
Imperatores Antoninus et Verus Augusti Sextio Vero in haec verba 
rescripserunt: "Quibus mensuris aut pretiis negotiatores vina 
compararent, in contrahentium potestate esse: neque enim quisquam 
cogitur vendere, si aut pretium aut mensura displiceat, [praesertim si nihil 
contra consuetudinem regionis fiat]." 
 
The emperors Antoninus and Verus wrote the following to Sextius Verus: 
“By what measures or at what prices merchants buy wine is in the power 
of the contracting parties, for no one is compelled to sell if either the price 
or measure is displeasing, especially if nothing is done contrary to the 
region’s general practice.7 
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 De Vit. Brev. 18.5: Modo modo intra paucos illos dies, quibus C. Caesar periit, si quis inferis sensus est, 
hoc gravissime ferens, quod sciebat populo romano superstiti septem aut octo certe dierum cibaria 
superesse. 
4
 Div. Claud. 18: Vrbis annonaeque curam sollicitissime semper egit…nam et negotiatoribus certa lucra 
proposuit suscepto in se damno, si cui quid per tempestates accidisset.  
5
 Dio 60.6.7: καὶ ὁρῶν μηδὲν ὄφελος ὂν ἀπαγορεύεσθα τινα τῷ πλήθει μὴ ποιεῖν, ἂν μὴ καὶ ὁ καθ’ ἡμέραν 
αὐτῶν βίος  μεταρρυθμισθῇ, τά τε καπηλεῖα ἐς ἃ συνιόντες ἔπινον κατέλυσε. 
6
 For Aurelian, HA Aur. 48.1; for an exception, HA Anton. Pius. 8.11: Vini, olei, et tritici penuriam per 
aerarii sui damna emendo et gratis populo dando sedavit. 
7
 D. 18.1.71. The last clause is likely an interpolation which does not affect the general interpretation of 
this passage.  
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We cannot reconstruct the letter which prompted the emperors’ response except in 
surmise. One of the two parties, either the merchants or he selling the wine, must at some 
point have objected to the process by which the transaction was occurring; the specificity 
in the responsio of vina leaves little doubt that the initial petition arose from a problem 
arising within the wine trade.
 8
 But the co-emperors made clear that they had no interest 
in setting any general operating rules beyond the (non-binding) advice that procedure 
should follow a region’s customary practice. Beyond that, contracting parties were 
unregulated. 
 Even what appears to have been active imperial engagement with wine 
production proves to be only superficial. Suetonius, Philostratus, and the Chronica of 
Jerome record an edict promulgated by Domitian which forbade new vines from being 
planted in Italy and enjoined that provincial vines be cut down or, in some cases, reduced 
by half (edixit, ne quis in Italia novellaret utque in provinciis vineta succiderentur, 
relicta ubi plurimum dimidia parte).
9
 A reader accustomed to debates over commercial 
protectionism might naturally assume that Domiatian had something similar in mind, 
intending either limiting new production to protect Italian vineyards or to keep the price 
of wine from falling due to increased production: this is precisely what, for example, 
Rostovtzeff argued.
10
  
Yet Suetonius reported that the emperor was dismayed by the volume of wine 
production in comparison with grain (ad summam quondam ubertatem vini, frumenti vero 
                                                          
8
 This process could be lengthy, as it generally included the sale itself (emptio-venditio), tasting 
(degustatio), measuring the wine (mensura), and final transfer of the wine between the parties (traditio). 
D 18.6 preserves quite a bit on this process and shows that it could take some time to complete. See 
chapter 3 for further detail on contracts of sale.  
9
 Suet. Dom. 7.2, 14.2; Philostr. VS 520, VA 6.42; Chron. 91-92.  
10
 Rostovtzeff (1963: 190) is typical when he claimed, “The protective measures saved Italian viticulture, at 
least to a certain extent.”  
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inopiam existimans nimio vinearum studio neglegi arva).
11
 This fact led first Sherwin-
White and, following him, Finley to refute the earlier argument that Domitian was 
fundamentally concerned with wine.
12
 Since then, scholars have further connected 
Domitian’s edict with grain, in particular, with the famine in Asia Minor that prompted 
the edict of Lucius Antistius Rusticus in Pisidian Antioch.
13
 Given the civic instability 
wrought by famines, we might be reminded of Philostratus’ claim that Domitian ordered 
the vines in Asia destroyed because wine-drinkers were especially likely to revolt.
14
 The 
emperor’s concern was not wine production in and of itself but rather some combination 
of his more usual care for maintaining civic order and the supply of grain, the food 
traditionally of imperial concern.
15
 
These passages show that emperors consistently refused to involve themselves in 
organizing, regulating, or steering the production, transportation, and distribution of 
wine. Under this view, one would seem justified in claiming that Rome’s supply of wine 
was organized by a free-market and should be placed “dans le cadre d’un commerce 
libre.”16 Yet there is another perspective in which the presence of the imperial court at 
Rome was instrumental in shaping the nature of the Roman market. 
Pliny presented a diverting story of a freedman wine-taster of the imperial house 
charged with sampling wines which were destined for a banquet of Augustus. At one 
wine, he sneered that “the taste is new to me and not fine, but Caesar will drink it 
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 Suet. Dom. 7.2. 
12
 Sherwin-White (1966: 258); Finley (1999: 244).  
13
 For this edict see Syme (1983: 359-374) and Wiemer (1997: 195-215). For the connection with 
Domitian’s edict see Levick (1982: 72). The connection depends in part on whether Suetonius’ dating of 
the edict is followed or that of the Chronica. 
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 VS 520: ἐδόκει τῷ βασιλεῖ μὴ εἶναι τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ἀμπέλους, ἐπειδὴ ἐν οἴνῳ στασιάζειν ἔδοξαν. 
15
 Tchernia (1986: 28). 
16
 Ibid. 
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(pertissimum e libertis…dixisse hospiti de indigena vino, novum quidem sibi gustum esse 
eum atque non ex nobilibus, sed Caesarem non aliud poturum).
17
 Pliny included this 
story as evidence for Augustus’ somewhat rustic taste in wine: after all, his favorite, 
according to Pliny, was the less than noble wine of Setinum. The statement reminds us 
that the emperor’s court was a great consumer of wine.  
We should not underestimate the size of the imperial household. The emperors’ 
courts were not restricted simply to the expansive residence on the Palatine. They also 
had residences scattered throughout the city, such as those in the Gardens of Maecenas, 
Lucullus, and Sallust, where Vespasian apparently preferred to live.
18
 In addition to 
residences within the city itself, the emperors had numerous villas and retreats in Latium: 
at Lanuvium, Praeneste, Alba, Antium, and, of course, Tibur, the site of Hadrian’s 
palatial villa.
19
 These buildings needed upkeep. Staffs had to be fed. And stores had to be 
kept in a state of sufficient readiness for when the emperor and his retinue made an 
appearance.
20
 
The cumulative effect of that demand was considerable. Pliny praised the 
comparative abstemiousness of Trajan’s retinue and contrasted it with Domitian’s, which 
purportedly devastated those responsible for its provision.
21
 There is ample papyrological 
attestation for the types of items needed in preparation for an emperor’s arrival: pigs, figs, 
dates, camels, sheep, oil, olives, vehicles, rooms, and wine.
22
 Similar stocks must have 
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 HN 14.72 
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 Cass. Dio. 66.10.4 on Vespasian’s living preference.  
19
 For imperial residences in Rome and Italy, see Millar (1977: 18-28). 
20
 Ibid. 59-131 for the emperors’ entourage. 
21
 Plin. Pan. 20: Nullus in exigendis vehiculis tumultus, nullum circa hospitia fastidium; annona, quae 
ceteris; ad hoc comitatus accinctus et parens: diceres magnum aliquem ducem, ac te potissimum, ad 
exercitus ire: adeo nihil, aut certe parum intererat inter imperatorem factum, et brevi futurum. Quam 
dissimilis nuper alterius principis transitus! si tamen transitus ille, non populatio fuit. 
22
 E.g., PSI 683, BGU 266, P. Panop. Beatty I.1. Cf. Millar (1977: 32-6).  
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been kept ready at the emperors’ permanent residences: Suetonius censured the role 
reversal occurring under Nero whereby the emperor forced his friends to give him 
expensive dinners, in one case amounting to four million sesterces. Dio remarked upon 
how unusual it was that Septimius Severus did not frequently give expensive dinners for 
his friends.
23
 If it is true that Nero’s Domus Aurea had wheat and wine implantations 
along with animals, this likely served the dual purpose of mimicking a country-style, 
gentleman’s estate within the city and helping to supply food for the banquets held 
there.
24
  
We can glean an impressionist account of how much wine this may have entailed 
by comparing some accounts of non-imperial wine stores with the records of purchases 
by extremely wealthy potentates of a later period: Medieval British kings. Nineteenth 
century excavations on the Pincian Hill and near the Trinità de’ Monti (areas of the city 
marked out by their expensive houses) revealed subterranean cellars with “an infinite 
number of earthen jars…belong[ing] to the class of wine amphorae or diotae.25 “Infinite” 
is hyperbolic but the point stands: Lucullus, for example, was of sufficient means to 
distribute to the Roman plebs more than 100,000 jars (cadi) of Greek wine, and Cicero’s 
rival, the orator Hortensius, left 10,000 bottles of wine to his heir.
26
 These distributions 
could be on a large scale: Suetonius tells us that in the early, restrained years of Nero’s 
reign, he limited the expenditures allowed on public dinners (publicae cenae).
27
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As we saw above, the emperor had household members dedicated to procuring 
wine. The amounts procured were likely significant, as a comparison with later English 
kings’ wine supplies suggest. The records of the King’s Butler, responsible for procuring 
wine for the King and used inter alia for provisioning his household, royal castles, 
tournaments, and military expeditions, reveal the impressive amounts that this single 
consumer acquired.
28
 In 1212, for example, King John bought 262 tuns
29
 (ca. 300,000 
liters); in 1300, Edward I  bought two consignments of wine totaling 1567 tuns (ca. 1.8 
million liters) and his son, Edward II, bought 1000 tuns (ca. 1.1 million liters) for his 
marriage with Isabella.
30
  
Though on a lesser scale, non-royal nobles also consumed sizeable volumes of 
wine: the Archbishop of York’s house consumed 80 tuns (ca. 90,000 L) annually, and 
even Edward II’s chaplain, for example, was granted 3 tuns (ca. 3400 l) per year.31 As a 
simple thought experiment, imagine that Rome’s six hundred senators’ households 
consumed between twenty-five and one-hundred percent of the Archbishop of York’s 
annual needs and that the emperor consumed two to six times the amount of the average 
senator.
32
 We can express these ranges as a percentage of Rome’s total consumption of 
wine (estimated above at 2-2.5 million hectoliters). 
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 James and Veale (1971: 6).  
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 Unwin (1991: 366). The statutory capacity of an English tun was 252 wine-gallons, or about 1145 L (the 
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Figure 2.1: Ratio of Rome's Consumption 
 
In this table, the x-axis estimates senatorial consumption on a continuous scale from 
twenty-five percent to one-hundred percent of the archbishop of Canterbury’s 
consumption and estimates the imperial consumption flatly as twice the archbishop’s (I 
prefer not to peg the emperor’s consumption to senatorial consumption since that 
compounds the already considerable margin for error further but simply take it as a 
constant). Those totals are then taken as a proportion of Rome’s total consumption (upper 
bound). The ratios therefore should be taken as cautious estimates. Even so, I think it is 
safe to estimate that senatorial and imperial households annual wine acquisitions was 
somewhere within (the extremely broad range) of five to twenty percent of Rome’s total 
annual consumption of wine.  
Just as the wealthiest minority of Rome’s population was responsible for a large 
proportion of total wine imports, so too did the imperial period see a gradual increase in 
wine-production on the imperial estates themselves. This was not a result of conscious 
policy but came into existence by dribs and drabs, ultimately deriving from a concomitant 
increase in senatorial activity in wine production from the Julio-Claudian period on. By 
the time of the younger Pliny, he and his friends all owned vineyards and sold their wine 
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to unspecified negotiatores.
33
 This increased senatorial involvement necessarily increased 
imperial vineyards because much of the lands forming the imperial patrimonium were 
acquired through gifts, bequests, and confiscations of landholders of the senatorial (or 
slightly below) class.
34
  
Scattered references confirm this impression. Martial described some Alban wine, 
from a town near Rome and the site of many luxurious villas, as sent from “Caesar’s 
cellars” (Hoc de Caesareis mitis vindemia cellis misit).35 Fronto made several references 
to the vineyards on imperial estates and, in one rather touching vignette, even described 
the emperor, Marcus Aurelius, working alongside the laborers during the vintage.
36
 The 
jurist Aurelius Charisius simply stated that those who received wine in Africa 
(susceptores vini per provinciam Africam) were discharging a duty to the patrimonium, 
though admittedly this short sentence fails to specify whether these susceptores were 
collecting wine from imperially or privately held properties (or both).
37
  
These facts beg the following question: to what extent did the emperors’ own 
produce meet their demands? We can surmise, from tituli (inscriptions painted on 
ceramic vessels after firing) that at least some wine came directly from the emperors’ 
estates, for they are designated as belonging to the imperial fiscus (and therefore free 
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from paying custom duties).
38
 The strict dichotomy implied by the question is, in fact, 
probably misleading. Senators and emperors doubtless employed a range of options.  
A good comparison might be the various uses English kings put the wine they 
took via prisage.
39
 On the one hand, prisage wines have been called “essentially 
instruments for the supply of the sovereign’s table.”40 Though much prisage wine was use 
in this context, some was sold directly to merchants; alternatively, the collection right 
was farmed out among the nobility such that the Marquis Ormond, for example, “did not 
esteem any part of his revenue so much as he did that which arose from the prisage of 
wines.”41 Comparably, Galen spoke of Cretan herb growers on imperial properties which 
sent herbs to the imperial fiscus but which later appeared in the markets of the dealers at 
Rome; there is also evidence that the emperors sold balsa from their land near Jericho.
42
  
Emperors were not hidebound and employed a range of tactics to profit from their 
landholdings and supply themselves with produce. There was no hard and fast divide 
between products designated for raising revenue and those for personal use. Imperial 
estates, for example, employed a variety of techniques to manage their land, ranging from 
direct management to leasing parcels to tenants.
43
 Kehoe, in fact, argued that tenancy 
agreements from the Bagradas River Valley in North Africa encouraged tenants to grow 
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profitable crops likes vines, olives, and figs.
44
  Similarly, in 1212, when King John 
bought those 262 tuns of wine, he also obtained another 86 through prisage.
45
 Just as 
English kings used a combination of commercial and non-commercial streams to obtain 
their wine and disposed of it both for revenue and personal consumption, so too did 
Roman emperors. Regardless of the purpose for which elites brought wine to Rome, it 
created a relatively constant source of demand, a sometime source of supply, and made 
the Roman market considerably more stable than in a similarly large but non-capital city 
such as Alexandria or Antioch.  
There are therefore two fundamentally different ways of seeing the operation of 
Rome’s wine commerce. The first would see an absence of active imperial involvement 
at every level of commercial wine production, transport, and distribution. The second 
would claim that this absence is illusory, that the invisible hand guiding Rome’s wine 
supply was not fundamentally that of the market but that of the emperors’ long reach. 
Which picture one adopts will greatly affect the types of models chosen: the first would 
lend itself to fairly pure, economic analysis; the second to models drawn from sociology 
or anthropology.
46
  
But both viewpoints are defensible: there was certainly an unregulated, free-
market in wine at Rome, but the shape of this market owed a great deal to background 
forces and institutions shaping the market’s operation. Existing histories of Roman wine 
commerce do not successfully bridge that divide. In contrast, this dissertation offers an 
economic study of Rome’s wine supply focusing precisely on these sorts of problems: the 
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relationship between individuals’ economic activity and the institutions providing the 
framework for those actions.   
“At the Distancce of Centuries…” 
We can trace post-classical antiquarian interest in Roman wine to Andreas 
Bacci’s seven volume treatise De naturali historia vinorum, published in 1596. This work 
differed from earlier works, for example, Pietro Cresczeni’s early 14th century opus 
ruralium commodorum (see below), by treating the history of wine as a subject worthy of 
study in and of itself rather than as précis for handbooks and advice to contemporary 
growers. Among English writing antiquarians, we can mention Dr. John Arbuthnot’s 
Coins, Weights, and Measures (1754), Sir Edward Barry’s treatise Wines of the Ancients, 
(1775), Alexander Henderson’s The History of Ancient and Modern Wine (1824), and 
Cyrus Redding’s History and Description of Modern Wines (1833). These antiquarian 
histories continued into the early 20
th
 century with, for example, Dr. Basserman-Jordan’s 
Die Geschichte des Weinbaus (1907), and Billiard’s La vigne dans l’antiquité (1913). 
Even today there are studies produced in the same antiquarian spirit, for example, 
Pellechia’s (a long standing owner of a New York wine shop) Wine: The 8,000-Year-Old 
Story of the Wine Trade (2006). 
 Though these works are not without interest—Bacci for example made oblique 
reference to certain structures for storing wine within the city of Rome still extant in the 
16
th
 century, and the others culled material from ancient sources with wide-sweeping, if 
not critical, eyes—they are all fundamentally antiquarian in nature, in Momigliano’s 
definition of antiquarians. He defined antiquarians as those who “collect all the items that 
32 
 
are connected with a certain subject whether they help solve a problem or not.”47 Their 
perspectives on Roman wine, uniformly different from modern and colored by the world 
of pre-modern wine production, repay reading them.  
 It was not until the 19
th
 century that we first see wine discussed as an economic 
rather than agricultural product, a result of the development of the modern study of 
economics. Historians noticed wine because of its potential profitability and its need for 
capital investment.
48
 Thus Niebuhr, though not mentioning wine in particular, gave a 
short description of the declining economic fortunes of the Roman people and sadly notes 
that it is a condition “towards which, at present, unfortunately all Europe is hastening.”49 
Mommsen made the connection between the growth of the wine industry and changing 
agricultural regimes on the Italian peninsula more explicit, saying that wine, “under the 
favorable climate of Italy, had no need to fear foreign competition…there is some ground 
for assuming that capital invested in land was reckoned to yield a good return at 6 per 
cent… the vineyard gave the best return.”50  
The connection between wine, capital, and labor which Mommsen reported was 
part of the broader interest in those latter two topics which we find in Smith, Ricardo, and 
Mill. Marx too picked up on the close connection between wine and capital investment in 
Das Kapital where he gave wine as an example for a typical type of “capital 
production.”51 Weber too implicitly invoked wine, the capital agricultural product sans 
pareil when analyzing the use of unfree labor in profit making establishments.
52
 None of 
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these writers offered new, independent research into the nature of Roman viticulture or 
wine commerce itself but used the development of Italian viticulture as a proxy subject 
for evaluating the development of labor and capital regimes on the ancient peninsula. 
This use of wine as a proxy economic subject has had, as we shall see below, a long life. 
This stage also largely coincided with the birth of non-antiquarian archaeology. 
The publications of Rodolfo Lanciani, in particular in his serial Storia degli scavi, and his 
more “popular” works, Ancient Rome in the Light of Recent Discoveries (1888) and The 
Ruins and Excavations of Ancient Rome (1897), were as far as I can tell the first since 
Bacci’s casual references to describe wine storage and distribution within ancient Rome. 
For example, Lanciani reported on previous excavations, indicating “that wine cellars 
were established not only in a place naturally…shaded from the sun but wherever the 
building of the substructures afforded an opportunity to create subterranean vaults.”53 His 
works on topography and archaeology added an important element to the study of 
commerce within the city of Rome generally and on wine specifically. Moreover, several 
of his reports treated structures no longer extant, and they remain useful sources.
54
 
The epigraphist Heinrich Dressel, who in 1878 became a professor at the German 
Archaeological Institute at Rome, tried to bring typological order to the daunting 
numbers of clay vessels he found at Rome (primarily at Castra Pretorio) in order to 
further his study of the those with tituli picti—painted inscriptions on the vessels’ rims.55 
Although his focus on amphorae found in urban contexts has been mildly censured for 
“starting at the wrong end” (i.e., with amphorae’s distribution point rather than 
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production points), he ended up providing the foundation for Roman amphorae studies 
which have proved to be the single most important material for studying Roman 
commodity trade.
56
  
Historical accounts of wine commerce in the last century have been influenced by 
all three of those approaches. The antiquarian interest in the details of the wine trade has 
remained, but those details have often been used in service of theses about much broader 
economic topics. Material evidence has remained the most important and often only type 
of data used. We see this combination as early as 1908, in a lecture given by the 
historian and journalist Guglielmo Ferrero at the White House and subsequently 
published in 1909 as Characters and Events of Roman History. In lecture seven, “Wine 
in Roman History,” he credited the Italian wine industry with a foundational role in 
establishing and stabilizing Augustus’ principate. He wrote:  
At the distance of centuries, these vine-growing interests do not appear 
even in history; but they actually were a most important factor in the 
Roman policy, a force that helps us explain several main facts in the 
history of Rome. For example, vineyards were one of the foundations of 
the imperial authority in Italy. That political form which was called with 
Augustus the principality, and from which was evolved the monarchy, 
would not have been founded if in the last century of the Republic all Italy 
had not been covered with vineyards and olive orchards. The affirmation, 
put just so, may seem strange and paradoxical, but the truth of it will be 
easy to prove.
57
 
 
Though Ferrero’s interpretation would seem to us today shockingly hyperbolic, its 
detailed use of ancient sources along with contemporary economic thought marks a new 
stage in the history of Roman wine.  
 Ferrero’s willingness to equate ancient and modern economic factors in wine 
commerce was part of a much broader tendency to analyze ancient economic behavior 
                                                          
56
 For the quote, Patterson (1988: 241).  
57
 Ibid. 188. 
35 
 
with uncritically modernizing models.
58
 Thus Rostovtzeff, an exile of the economic 
upheavals of late Czarist Russia and the Bolshevik revolution, thought himself uniquely 
qualified to analyze what he saw as the strikingly similar process of economic 
development and struggle in late Republican Rome.
59
 He ascribed to mid-Republican 
Romans an imperialist spirit driven by capitalistic acquisitiveness and argued that the 
push for Carthage’s destruction in the mid-2nd century BCE was encouraged by wine and 
oil producers who wanted to remove their fiercest rival.
60
 Tenney Frank saw Italian 
villas’ wine production as evidence for “capitalistic specialization…chiefly under slave 
labor.”61 
 In the later 20
th
 century, archaeological evidence continued to solidify its 
dominance as the source par excellence for the study of Roman wine, and the topic itself 
continued to be shaped by larger developments in ancient economic history, though less 
so by extra-disciplinary economic developments. In particular, the wine trade was a 
battleground in the interpretive war between the so-called primitivists—followers of 
Moses Finley who argued that ancient economic activity was limited in scale and 
motivated by non-economic goals –and modernists, who were more inclined to see 
evidence of economic-growth, long-distance trade, and rational economic behavior in the 
ancient world.
62
 
Wine, the prime example of a profit-oriented agricultural product for prior 
historians, became a champ de bataille. Columella’s proof of viticulture’s profitability 
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become proof, for Finley, of the nature of Roman accounting and was characterized as 
“nonsense…merely a perfunctory desk exercise.”63 By extension, this became evidence 
for lack of ancient economic rationality. Carandini, a Marxist historian especially 
interested in the growth of slave mode of production, the development of Italian 
viticulture, and the economics of the villa system,
64
 tried to adopt Kula’s model of bi-
sectorial economy to preserve the rationality of Columella’s accounts.65 Against this there 
was, said Finley, “neither a shred of evidence nor a shred of probability.”66 The 
economics of wine production and trade became a birdie batted around by historians 
fundamentally interested in much broader structural questions.
67
 
Against the backdrop of these debates about the general characteristics of ancient 
economic activity, the increasing sophistication of undersea archaeology, and the 
corresponding development of amphorae studies, the archaeologist André Tchernia 
published Le vin de l'Italie romaine: Essai d'histoire economique d'apres les amphores 
(1986). Its most important achievement was to redefine the narrative of the development 
of wine commerce in Italy. For the historians described above, the story of wine in 
Roman Italy was one of intensive capitalist investment and trade, the rise of provincial 
competition, and subsequent crisis and collapse. Tchernia decisively showed that Italy’s 
wine commerce was more complicated than previously thought and not well described by 
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a crisis-narrative. For example, Tchernia showed, from the distribution of Lamboglia 2 
amphorae, that late Republican Italy imported Apulian wine, some of which was re-
exported east.
68
 In other words, even in the period where the export “balance of trade” in 
wine supposedly favored peninsular Italy, the same groups could be both importing and 
exporting the same wine. Such a relationship was likely not restricted to the republican 
period.
69
   
Moreover, Tchernia argued that the rumors of the death of Italy’s wine-industry in 
the imperial period were exaggerated.
70
 Amphorae became more standardized, which 
makes it more difficult to specify a vessel’s provenance. Barrels, poorly preserved 
archaeologically, were becoming increasingly common by the second century (indeed, 
the earliest dates for barrels seem to be pushed earlier with each subsequent 
publication).
71
 Moreover, local wines at Rome, which by a recent estimation constituted 
about 33% of the total, probably were transported neither in amphorae or barrels but in 
skins (cullei), which held twenty-five amphorae and were more suitable for land transport 
than rigid, clay containers.
72
 Tchernia’s book was a culmination of the topical threads 
traced above, but also departed decisively from the economically reductive view of 
ancient wine characterizing much earlier work and remains the only substantial, synthetic 
history of the Roman wine trade.
 73
 
  Tchernia’s work is unquestionably the best history of Roman wine yet written, 
but its emphasis on archaeological remains, amphorae in particular, necessitated leaving 
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many fundamental questions unanswered. The Romans’ ability to transform grapes on a 
vine in Spain into wine in an amphora at Ostia raises questions about the organizational 
structure of commerce which allowed this trade to occur: to what extent did were 
production, shipment, distribution, and sale vertically integrated? At which, if any, of 
those stages was there a tendency to integrate horizontally? If commerce in wine was 
relatively un-integrated, were enforcement mechanisms primarily contractual or more 
informal? What were the most important driving forces in both the production structures 
and retail markets? The latest stage of historical accounts of Roman wine—i.e., since 
Tchernia—has not tackled these questions because amphorae studies dominate the field.74 
Rather than tackling broad historical questions, research has become increasingly 
narrow. The tendency toward specialized studies of individual amphorae and kiln sites 
with little synthetic analysis has engendered some puzzlement among archaeologists: 
recently, Kevin Greene suggested that, “increased self-esteem amongst pottery specialists 
might bring to the surface thoughtful economic and cultural discussions which are 
currently rather difficult to locate.”75 On the rare occasions when these studies are 
considered in combination, it is predominately to answer questions about the large-scale 
nature of the Roman economy, to investigate whether “…long-distance trade operate on a 
scale sufficient to increase the overall size of markets in certain goods…enabling 
specialization and division of labour, and thus Smithian growth?”76 Once again, the 
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Roman wine trade becomes a method for making far-reaching claims about the Roman 
economy as a whole.  
These are worthwhile questions and the growing sophistication of historians’ 
answers enriches our view of ancient Rome’s economic development.77 But they do not 
get us closer to the more modest and perhaps more creditable goal of understanding how 
Rome’s supply of wine operated. Offering such an account is the goal of this dissertation 
and demands a fairly different set of questions, models, and evidence than we find in 
contemporary treatments of Roman wine. The rest of this chapter gives an overview of 
the sources I use, a brief narrative of the growth of wine consumption at Rome, and a 
picture of the engine driving the city of Rome’s market for wine.  
Models 
 Ancient economic histories have been underpinned by one of two dominant 
theoretic approaches, often referred to as primitivism versus modernism or substantavism 
versus formalism. Good descriptions exist describing the historical development and 
countours of the debate between adherents of these two schools, and there is little to be 
gained by repetition here.
78
 In short, the primitivist/substantivist approach advocates that 
models drawn from sociology and anthropology work better than economic models for 
analyzing ancient economic behavior because the cultural conditions and “mentalitès” of 
pre-moderns were so different that modern economic theory has little explicative value.
79
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 The opposing pole can be described as economic modernism, which “describes a 
heterogeneous set of approaches for studying ancient economic behavior.”80 In short, 
modernists assume that economic models are not historically contingent and therefore 
apply the concepts, techniques, and models of economic theory to analyze the contours 
and performance of ancient economic activity. Problematically, these approaches have 
been used primarily to demonstrate the similarity between ancient and modern economic 
activity; in other words, it smooths away differences. Economic modernism therefore has 
a problematic ambiguity because it has been both a methodology and, implicitly, an 
interpretive theory.  
This ambiguity is problematic because it should go without saying that ancient 
economic activity faced considerably different problems and behavorial constraints than 
in the modern world, and the solutions developed should correspondingly differ. 
Economic theory, as a methodology, should not be limited to homogenization but should 
be equally adept at explaining differences between two (or more) economic systems. In 
my view, the fundamental goal of a work of ancient economic history should be to find 
appropriate models for explaining how, in a Rankean sense, it actually worked and not 
just to elucidate similarities between the ancient and modern world.  
The search for such models leads us to the economic approaches blanketed by the 
appellation of New Institutional Economics (hereafter NIE). Though NIE encompasses a 
range of differing theoretical approaches, they all share a common core which accepts 
most neo-classical premises but believes that market mechanisms are costly to use. 
Institutions, both formal and informal, play a large role in determining how costly 
markets and their alternatives are to use and thus shape the range of plausible actions 
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available to economic actors.
 81
 Its premises and approaches are essential for 
understanding my dissertation. They are still mostly unknown to ancient historians even 
though this body of work has been the foundation of a “quiet revolution” in economics.82 
Therefore, I will provide an extremely brief overview, drawing attention to those features 
and its vocabulary most relevant to this work.  
 Ronald Coase unintentionally founded NIE with two seminal articles on the 
nature of firms and problems of social cost.
83
 These articles introduced several key 
concepts. In particular, he argued that firms exist because there are costs to using 
markets, and these may be prohibitively high in some circumstances. To describe these 
costs, he introduced the notion of   transaction costs.
84
 The upshot was to suggest that 
individuals’ economic actions and their institutional settings could be unified— a fusion 
which was not successfully reached either by neo-classical economic theory or by Old 
Institutional Economics.
85
  
 Three distinct but closely connected approaches are important for addressing the 
questions about Roman wine posed above: Economics and the state, transaction cost 
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theory (TCT) and incomplete contract theory (ICT), also called property rights theory.
86
 
Though my primary procedure will be to introduce concepts as needed, a brief overview 
here will save repetitious explication later. These approaches are unified by their reliance 
on the concept of distortions from perfect efficiency introduced by transaction costs.  
 Douglass North was most interested in economic history writ large and argued 
that certain premises of neoclassical models made them unsuitable for studying historical 
economic operation. Rather, he used as building blocks a theory of property rights (i.e., a 
transaction cost theory—“TCT”), a theory of state functioning “since it is the state that 
specifies and enforces property rights” and “a theory of ideology that explains how 
different perceptions of reality affect the reaction of individuals to the changing 
‘objective’ situation.”87 North’s approach is most concerned with the way state power 
structures create the rules of the game under which any economic activity occurs.
88
  
The notion of transaction costs has also had a great deal of success in explaining 
why firms form and how they can allow economic actors to avoid problems associated 
with the open market. In this theory, firms and markets are alternatives; generally, firms 
arise when the costs of using the market become excessively high.
 89
 TCT tries to explain 
how trading partners form arrangements that protect their relationship-specific 
investments at the least cost.
90
 Williamson helpfully defined asset specificity as “durable 
investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost 
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of which investments is much lower in next best alternative uses or by alternative users 
should the original transaction be prematurely terminated.”91 Asset specificity leads to a 
number of potential problems, the most notable (and subject to the most economic 
research) is the hold-up problem.
92
 Hold-up can occur when two partners both make ex 
ante investments in a specific good but one partner places a higher ex post value on the 
good then the other. In such a case, there are rents available for appropriation by the other 
partner, i.e., he can hold his partner up.  
We can give a specific example where the hold-up problem may have arisen in 
the buying and selling of Roman wine. Gaius, discussing the relationship between a 
wine-seller and a wine-merchant, said: 
 This is true if he is a vendor for whom those containers are not necessary 
except at the new vintage. But if he is a merchant, who is accustomed to 
buy and sell wines, the time should be observed when they can be 
removed at the seller’s convenience  
 
Hoc ita verum est, si is est venditor, cui sine nova vindemia non sint ista 
vasa necessaria: si vero mercator est, qui emere vina et vendere solet, is 
dies spectandus est, quo ex commodo venditoris tolli possint).
93
  
 
Let us call the vendor Sextus and the merchant Stichus and ask what problem 
lurks behind this short excerpt from Gaius. First, we note that vasa, large storage vessels 
from which wine would be decanted into smaller containers, have a high degree of asset 
specificity, in other words, they have a fairly restricted range of uses.
94
 Imagine a 
situation where Stichus contractd to buy wine from Sextus, who agreed to preserve it 
until an appointed time in his vasa. Problematically for him, the value of these vasa is 
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contingent on his deal with Stichus: in other words, the containers’ notional market value 
is less than their value under the terms of the specific contract.  
Stichus, knowing this, has the opportunity to behave opportunistically and 
demand an ex post adjustment to their agreement, one which unfairly favors his interests 
(more technically, Stichus will want to appropriate the quasi-rents accruing to the vasa).
95
 
For example, he might insist on leaving the wine in Sextus’ vasa for a longer period than 
initially agreed upon, thereby increasing his opportunity to sell the wines downstream at a 
higher price but negatively impacting Sextus’ ability to re-use his vasa for future 
transactions. Sextus, fearful of such opportunistic behavior, might refuse to enter into 
such an arrangement in the first place although, with a credible commitment mechanism, 
the transaction’s outcome would be Pareto efficient (i.e., both parties would be better 
off).  
TCT predicts that when contracts lack credible commitments—as they will when 
uncertainty is high, assets are specific, and the potential for market sanctions low—
substitute governance arrangements will emerge, for example, vertically integrated 
industries, long-term contracts, or partial ownership arrangements to avoid these potential 
problems.
96
 The legal stipulation is one potential source of forcing the merchant to make 
a credible commitment, though the credibility of the legal rule would depend on a host of 
other variables.  
In contrast to TCT, which focuses on asset specificity and intra-firm costs as key 
variables separating the firm from the market, property rights (incomplete contract 
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theory—“ICT”) economics offers an integrated view of their relationship.97 ICT makes a 
distinction between economic property rights and legal property rights. The former is 
simply one’s ability to benefit from something; the latter is what a government assigns 
and guarantees to an individual.
98
 Property rights economics focuses predominately on 
the former and points out that they “…are not constant; they are a function of their [i.e., 
the owners] direct efforts at protection, of other people’s capture attempts, occasionally 
of formal and informal non-governmental protection.”99 Legal property rights may help 
ensure economic property rights but they are neither necessary nor sufficient: throughout 
this dissertation, property rights refers to economic property rights unless otherwise 
specified.  
An example will make this distinction clear and demonstrate some of its 
implications. Grapes on the vine are liable to theft. Ulpian, discussing legated goods, said 
“and he says that a guard must be placed by the heir for guarding those things which are 
unable to be secure without security, for example, flocks, or grain and grapes if the 
harvest and vintage has not occurred (Idem ait ad custodienda ea, quae sine custodia 
salva esse non possunt, custodem ab herede ponendum (ut puta pecoris, et si nondum 
messis vindemiave facta sit).
100
 The heir to the grapes has full legal rights over them, but 
he cannot ensure their full use and enjoyment without additional cost: security.  
Therefore, the legal owner does not have full economic property rights over the 
grapes: in the argot of economists, there are residual rights over the grapes which have 
partial owners, or residual claimants: the legal owner and potential thieves. The price (or 
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effort) it would cost the owner to secure these residual rights (i.e, protect against theft) 
constitutes the value of those residual rights. The cost of discovering and securing those 
rights are a form of transaction costs.
101
 In the real world, where transaction costs are 
positive, some residual rights will invariably be left unclaimed or contractually 
unspecified because, relative to the object’s value, measuring and securing them are 
prohibitively costly.
102
 
In many cases, moreover, the value of these residual rights is not distributed 
evenly. In the example given by Ulpian, the value of the grapes may be worth 
considerably more to the heir than to a potential thief. Imagine that the value of the 
vintage to the heir was 1000 sesterces but only 100 sesterces to the thief. Further, imagine 
that the cost of hiring guards is 500 sesterces. Under these highly idealized conditions, 
there is considerable incentive for the grape owner to purchase the thief’s residual rights 
for, say, 250 sesterces, and a corresponding incentive for the thief to accept. More 
generally, Grossman and Hart argued that the assignment of these residual rights is the 
cause of firm formation because it will often be impossible or too expensive to specify ex 
ante the parties’ specific rights; sometimes it is cheaper for one party to purchase all 
residual rights of control rather than attempt to contract on every specific right.
103
  
This dissertation uses approaches from all three of those theories but not 
arbitrarily. Rather, each has comparative advantages for certain types of questions. Oliver 
Williamson has offered a four-part diagram, illustrating the levels of social and 
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institutional relationships, which I have adapted in the figure below.
104
 Each level has an 
body of theory particularly well suited for it.
 
Figure 2.2:  Institutional Analysis 
 
 Level 4: These are a society’s socio-cultural foundations. We could include here 
religion, custom, ethical code, and (linguistic anthropologists would argue) language. 
These are unlikely to be designed intentionally but arise evolutionarily and form the 
backdrop in front of which all other levels operate. Economists generally take this level 
as a given.
105
 This level changes the most slowly, on the order of centuries.
106
 
Level 3: These are the institutions which, for North, constitute the “formal rules 
of the game.”107 These institutions include legal codes, constitutions, and political 
systems which design and enforce property rights as well as basic tools like money, 
financial systems, and taxation. This level has received a great deal of focus from 
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property rights economists. This circle spins more rapidly than Level 4, but because of its 
close proximity to it, changes still occur fairly slowly, on the order of decades.  
Level 2: Given the rules set out in level 3, level 2 is the governance arrangements 
by which actors play the game. Markets, labor relations, and contracts are defined and 
established; boundaries between markets and firms are established as are the latter’s 
internal organizations. Choices are made in order to economize on transactions such as 
vertical or horizontal integration, ad hoc market transactions or long term contracts. 
Though directly below Level 3 and influenced by it, changes in governance arrangements 
happen much more quickly, on the order of years. Much of Williamson style TCT 
analysis occurs at this level.  
Level 1: This is the level where day-to-day economic activity occurs. Neoclassical 
market economics’ concepts of supply and demand, wage and labor markets, and prices 
work well at this level.
108
 The adaptation of new strategies occurs continuously and 
organizations are treated as a production function, a black box which converts the 
traditional triad of land, labor, and capital into output.
109
 We generally lack the 
information necessary to examine this level with any detail for the Roman period.  
Level 0: Call this the “instinct” level. Homo sapiens, like any other living 
organism, has been subject to millions of years of adaptive pressures, and the ways in 
which these pressures manifest themselves in human behavior, mentalities, and decision 
making processes have been of interest to behavioral psychologists, biologists, 
anthropologists, and increasingly, economists.
110
 For example, should models be built off 
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notions of “instinctive rationality” rather than perfect rationality?111 Why do we so easily 
fall prey to “irrationalities” like the Gambler’s fallacy, the Concord fallacy, or the Sunk 
Cost fallacy?
112
 These analyses are rightly receiving increasing attention in the economic 
framework of human actors.
113
 Although not dealt with explicitly, it is worth 
remembering that they exist.  
Roman wine history has produced several centuries of works ranging from 
outright antiquarianism to sophisticated analyses of the shifting patterns of trade and 
Italian viticulture. But many questions, fundamental to understanding the driving forces 
behind the wine-trade’s commercial operation and development, remain ignored. This is 
unsurprising, for it is only within the last thirty years that the economics of organizations 
has come into its own and has developed a range of robust models for tackling such 
questions. It would be laughably hubristic to claim that this dissertation could be anything 
more than a prolegomenon, but I hope it will open a new line of inquiry, both topically 
and methodologically into this fascinating subject.  
Sources 
 Of course, all the models in the world will be unable to help if we cannot find 
appropriate evidence for using them. There are several types of evidence at our disposal, 
each with its own advantages and disadvantages. The biochemical properties of grapes 
and the fermentation process necessarily constrain a wine maker’s behavior within a 
relatively narrow range of acceptable actions. Grapes must be ripened appropriately. 
They must not be picked before there is enough sugar for the yeasts (which naturally 
occur on the skin of grapes) to ferment. But they must not be allowed to ripen excessively 
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and become subject to rot. These wines, lacking acidity, are prone to bacterial 
contamination and taking on an off-putting “jammy” flavor.114 Juices, once pressed from 
the grapes, must be allowed to ferment and then mature in environments allowing the 
proper oxidative reactions to occur.
115
 Containers must be found to protect the wines as 
much as possible from various types of acidification and decay. These constraints have 
dictated that wine production, prior to the 19
th
 and, especially, 20
th
 centuries’ 
developments in chemistry, biology, and engineering, have followed fairly similar 
contours. This similarity offers us at least one advantage: we can draw on a 
chronologically diffuse range of sources on production.    
Roman written sources focus predominately on viticulture and wine production 
with very little explicit discussion of topics such as selling, shipping, or marketing the 
wine: Stray references to those latter topics can be found sprinkled throughout the literary 
corpus though never in any lengthy or particularly coherent framework. In addition, 
papyri and legal sources frequently preserve interesting aspects of both wine specifically 
and commercial practice more generally. 
The extant Roman agronomists—Cato, Varro, and Columella—offered manuals, 
most likely composed with two audiences in mind: the wealthy landowners like Niger 
and Silvinus to whom Varro and Columella respectively dedicate their works and also for 
the use of slaves—the foreman (vilicus) particularly.116 These works overwhelmingly 
focus on the proper running of an estate, giving advice on topics ranging from the types 
of vines to plant, the orientation of vineyards, how many vine-dressers to use, the 
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procedures for vinification, and what part of the estate vinum novum should be stored in. 
For reasons likely both of genre and intended audience, very little can be gleaned about 
the future of these wines once made, for example, how and when to sell it or the 
relationship between the estate owner and wine merchants. But for questions of 
production, these are some of the most useful sources available. 
Later agronomists too can be useful. Because they were adapting and sometimes 
outright copying those agronomists cited above, places where the later agronomists 
diverge may suggest that a functional change had occurred in wine production or 
commerce. Among these writers we can include the late Roman Palladius, and those of 
the 12
th
-15
th
 century Italian agronomists Pietro de’Crescenzi, Paganino Bonafede, 
Corniolo Della Cornia, and Michelangelo Tanaglia.
117
 For example, Crescenzi drew a 
clear distinction between varietals typical to the coast and those of the plains and made a 
clear separation between their respective qualities, a distinction not made (at least not 
explicitly) by the Roman agronomists.
118
 Though I do not draw on them frequently, 
distinctions between them and their Roman sources often open suggestive avenues for 
exploration. 
The Elder Pliny’s encyclopedic natural history, with over a thousand references to 
wine, is also useful. Book XIV deals exclusively with vines, viticulture, and wine and 
provides many details about the history of wine in Italy. Though we cannot separate his 
interest in wine and viticulture from his work’s broader artistic and cultural aims, his 
                                                          
117
 For Palladius, see the edition of Rodgers (1975); on his relationship to late-Roman, Italian agriculture 
see White (1979: 39-45); Frézouls (1980: 193-210). On viticulture in medieval Italian agronomists and 
their relationship to Roman authors, see Gaulin (1989: 93-118).  These works, chronologically, are the 
Liber ruralium commodorum (early 14
th
), the Thesaurus rusticorum (mid-14
th
), the Divina Villa (early 15
th
), 
and the De Agricultura (end of 15
th
).   
118
 Gaulin (1989: 103).  
52 
 
details are informative even if they cannot be considered a proper account of Roman 
viticulture, let alone wine commerce, in any sense.
119
 After this, literary sources primarily 
offer nothing more than scattered details in support of some topic of radically different 
context, though Cicero’s In Verrem, Pro Fonteio, and the Younger Pliny’s Epistulae do 
offer a notably high level of detail about aspects of Roman wine commerce. 
I have already indicated that archaeological remains have, in the course of the last 
50-75 years, gradually obtained a preeminent place in the study of the Roman wine trade. 
The most visible archaeological remains are amphorae—clay vessels designed to 
transport produce—commonly found on sites, both underwater and on land throughout 
the Roman Empire and, to a lesser extent, dolia—very large clay vessels, ranging in 
capacity from several hundred to nearly a thousand liters.
120
 There were, however, quite a 
few other types of containers which leave traces of variable visibility in the 
archaeological record. 
Visual representations of barrels appear with some regularity from the first 
century on, but their wooden frames preclude them from preservation at anywhere near 
the rate of ceramics.
121
 The Italian agronomists do not mention them, though Pliny and 
Strabo both were aware that the Gauls stored wine in wood with hoops, and Caesar 
recounts the use of barrels filled with pitch and set on fire as weapons.
122
 Though the 
origin, chronology, and rate of technological adoption are still debated, the general trend 
has been an earlier and earlier temporal revision of barrels’ adoption and diffusion.123 
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Wine was also transported in skins—utres. These also are not preserved in the 
archaeological record (Juvenal, in fact, uses them as an example of objects easily 
destroyed
124
) but may have been important in short-distance, overland transportation.
125
 
This necessarily cautions us about leaping immediately to over-generalized conclusions 
about products’ provenience, routes, and destination, which are unavoidably based 
predominately on ceramic finds.  
Nevertheless, amphora studies have been fundamental tools for reconstructing 
Roman oversea trade since the work of Zevi and Tchernia in the mid-60s.
126
 The 
combination of shipwreck archaeology, beginning with the Grand Congloué wreck in the 
early 50s, along with increasing care paid in differentiating fabric types of ceramics led to 
an increased ability to trace the movement of amphorae around the western 
Mediterranean and to pinpoint their production sites. Additionally, the studies of tituli 
picti, inscriptions painted on amphora after firing, and stamps, abbreviated names and 
symbols, has presented their own, closely connected issues.
127
  
Shipwreck archaeology was launched by the findings (and popularization of these 
discoveries by Jacques Cousteau) at Grand Congloué beginning in 1952.
128
 There was 
initial debate over the dating of the wreck. Confusion arose because it was eventually 
determined that there were, in fact, two wrecks superimposed on top of each other, the 
first dating to the mid-2
nd
 century BCE and the first from the late 2
nd
 or early 1
st
 century 
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BCE.
129
 Among the most interesting items to appear were over a thousand Dressel 1 
amphorae, many stamped with the (abbreviated) name of Sestius along with symbols 
such as anchors, stars, and tridents and which were later shown to have been produced in 
the region of Cosa, in southern Eturia.
130
 Today, there are over 1100 wrecks known in the 
ancient Mediterranean. Continued interest in their histories coupled with technical 
improvements in underwater research have increased the analytic sophistication with 
which the questions posed above are addressed.
131
 
On land, archaeologists began to pay more careful attention to amphorae finds in 
the early 70s and, by the late 70s, the discipline had developed enough such that scholars 
began to hold conferences dedicated to the field.
132
 The field witnessed an upsurge of 
amphora-specific studies during the 80s and considerable effort was given to synthesizing 
previous decades’ research into broader, historical narratives: when the second major 
colloquium on amphorae were held in 1986, participants expressed surprise at the field’s 
rapid development over the previous ten years.
133
 This development fundamentally 
changed the way in which one could study wine.  
But the growing regional specificity of amphora studies has been a double edged 
sword, for it has also increased the field’s fragmentation and the challenges facing 
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scholars attempting to use amphorae for synthetic history.
134
 For example, a recent 
argument on the origin of Lamboglia 2 amphorae, a mid/late Republican transport 
amphora which carried oil or wine generally and developed either in Apulia, the western 
Adriatic, the Adriatic islands, or Dalmatia, illustrates how increased technical 
specialization can hinder answering certain questions.
135
 Lindhagen argues for a 
Dalmatian-Adriatic origin on the basis of the similarity of mineral composition between 
those of Lamboglia 2 finds and the sediment of the Croatian coast.
136
 His technical 
arguments are interesting, but his conclusion that “The Roman economy worked on 
different levels…yet the system still operated within the framework of…the State” is the 
type of conclusion that has prompted Kevin Greene’s complaint that ceramic studies are 
lacking in “thoughtful economic…discussions.”137 This is perhaps somewhat unfair. The 
study of Roman wine without these specialized studies would be hobbled, but his 
observation of an imbalance between technical analysis and historical synthesis is well-
taken.  
Amphorae stamps and tituli picti have also added to our knowledge of what 
amphorae contained, how they were distributed, and to our ability to reconstruct the 
relationships between the producer of the amphora’s contents and of the vessel itself.138 
The two volumes, Recueil de timbres sur amphores romaines, offer a panoptic survey of 
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the research and interpretations (through the mid-90s).
139
 The online database, Corpus 
CEIPAC, hosted by the University of Barcelona, offers a database of all epigraphy 
related to ceramic vessels along with a searchable, bibliographic database and is probably 
the single most useful resource for research on this subject.
140
 Epigraphy on ceramics, by 
adding people to the equation (implicitly or explicitly) significantly broadens the scope of 
ceramic studies generally by at least theoretically telling us something about the people 
behind the pots.  
Literary sources present a view of Roman wine largely reflecting the attitudes of 
upper-class landowners and focus predominately on the agricultural aspects of production 
and gustatory qualities of wines for consumption. Other features are passed over or 
casually mentioned in problematic contexts. Archaeological sources, especially ceramic 
finds, speak to different aspects of the commercial process: production sites, distribution 
and transportation patterns, and the items subject to long-distance, over-sea movement. 
But these sources, whether taken on their own or in conjunction with one another, can 
allow us to reconstruct what economic pressures constrained and generated Romans’ 
particular productive, transport, and distributive processes for wine. One largely ignored 
source provides the missing piece: Roman legal writing. 
The writings of the Roman jurists provide an additional and almost wholly 
ignored source for studying the Roman wine trade and the economics of commerce. This 
is surprising: wine appears in the Digest over a hundred times in topics ranging from risk 
and sale, to legacies, and to market operation. Gaius, for example, stated that judgment 
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on a condictio (a general action on a fixed sum of money or thing) should be dependent 
on the judge because “we know varied prices are for things in different cities and regions, 
especially for wine, oil and grain” (Ideo in arbitrium iudicis refertur haec actio, quia 
scimus, quam varia sint pretia rerum per singulas civitates regionisque, maxime vini olei 
frumenti).
141
  
This type of statement never occurs in the other written sources where wine 
appears as a topic, but it is important. The acknowledgment of variation in market price 
for wine and the belief that an arbiter could determine the going market price suggests, 
for example, that perhaps Romans’ ability to discover prices for wine (a type of 
transaction cost called a search cost) was not prohibitively expensive. Or, on the other 
hand, maybe Gaius overestimated a judge’s ability to determine a fair price; if so, 
contracting parties might not trust the courts to judge fairly if the contract was disputed, 
thus creating incentive for private-ordering arrangements.  
There are, I think, three reasons why juristic writings have scarcely been used in 
studying Roman wine commerce. First, the texts themselves are problematic to interpret. 
Second, it is difficult to determine how closely connected the texts are with real-world 
issues. Third, and most fundamentally, the theories analyzing the relationship between 
law as an institution and economic performance are almost wholly ignored by ancient 
historians. Lacking the proper theoretical framework for interpreting the texts removes 
almost all the incentive for using them.  
Legal writings present unique interpretive problems. At least in general, our 
extant jurists’ writings, with the exception of Gaius’ Institutes and the scattered remains 
preserved in the Fontes Iuris Anteiustiniani, all significantly post-date the classical 
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period. The Digest was commissioned by the Eastern Roman emperor Justininian and 
compiled during 530-533 by a team led by the jurist Tribonian.
142
 To collate, organize, 
and condense all previous legal thought into a manageably sized tome, the compilers 
sifted through some 2000 classical juristic writings, picked out excerpts relevant to the 
title at hand, and reassembled these excerpts in more-or-less logical order.
143
  
This editorial process raises potentially significant problems for us.
144
 The process 
of excerpting often means that reconstructing the jurists’ original thought-process and the 
original context in which the excerpt appeared may be difficult or impossible. Lenel’s 
Palingenesia Iuris Civilis (1889) attempts to backwards-engineer the Digest fragments 
and is therefore an invaluable resource for dealing with this issue, but it is also limited by 
the small percentage of source material that appeared in the Digest.  
The code was designed largely to fossilize classical legal thinking and, in 
fossilization, provide a foundation for the Byzantine legal system.
145
 As the constitution 
establishing the Digest recorded, the task seemed nearly impossible (res quidem nobis 
difficillima, immo magis impossibilis uidebatur) and its reliance on “the providence of the 
highest Trinity” (omnem spem ad solam referamus summae prouidentiam trinitatis)146 
reminds us that the society that codified the Digest was quite different from that which 
produced the original laws. The codifiers’ aim had two practical effects on the extant 
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text: deletion and interpolation, and these effects render for us the reconstruction of the 
jurists’ “original meaning” scarcely easier than Justinian’s project of excerpting them.147  
The first practice arose naturally from the editors’ need to expurgate references to 
problems or practices that time had rendered obsolete. There are indications, for example, 
that Roman jurists were, from a fairly early time, interested in legal issues pertaining to 
banking; however, the Digest preserves relatively little on this subject—some scattered 
references to the necessity of providing documents in court but little of credit at auctions 
because many of Roman banking practices were antiquated by the 6
th
 century.
148
 We 
must always be aware that the Digest’s compilers may have irremediably removed pieces 
of the puzzle. 
On the flip side, there are numerous excerpts which are highly unlikely to 
preserve the classical jurists’ Latin faithfully because the compilers have added, often for 
compression or clarification, their own Latin. For example, the common parenthetical 
addendum puta (“for example”) often signals an interpolation. There is scarcely a 
sentence in the Digest which some critic has not placed in the square brackets of doubt at 
some point.
149
 The heyday of interpolation hunting, however, has come and gone and the 
philosophy articulated by Max Kaser of textual conservatism (though not blind 
acceptance) is today dominant, a philosophy inclined to see, even where some verbal 
interpolation has occurred, a “kernel” of original, judicial thought.150 The loss of the 
excerpts’ original contexts is probably worth more regret than the more formal 
interpolations, whatever their frequency. These problems, while real, have not proved to 
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be a decisive argument against using legal sources for social history. They necessitate 
caution but not cowardice.
151
 
Using legal sources for writing social history forces us to address the following 
problem: to what extent were jurists’ cases, reasoning, and solutions informed by and 
tailored to real world problems? Scholars have largely answered this question in one of 
two ways, some optimistically, others much more doubtfully. Watson, for example, has 
forcefully propounded the view that “Roman jurists argue as if they lived in a vacuum, 
remote from economic, social, religious, and political considerations.”152  Some have 
criticized his view for relying on ambiguous evidence from which a less isolationist 
picture could be drawn, but it is also true that the jurists often seem to inhabit a Laputa, 
governed by its own peculiar interests and logic.
153
  
The opposing view holds that it would beggar belief if the many stray details 
given in the legal scenarios did not reflect the actualities of life in the Roman world. 
Ulpian attested the existence of smoked-cheese processing at Minturnae, and Paul not 
only mentioned a wine ship (navis vinaria) but also added that “there are many ships into 
which wine is poured,” (ut sunt multae, in quas vinum effunditur).154 This God-is-in-the-
details approach is characterized nicely by the title for a collection of articles united by 
their use of law as sources for social history: speculum iuris—the mirror of law.155 
Proponents of this view maintain that “legal sources can provide an impressionistic 
picture of ancient realities.”156  
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Even further, there have also been efforts to find instances where “legal values 
…[became]…integral to the structuring of society.”157 Kehoe, for example, has argued 
that Roman jurists were often implicitly concerned about the economic interests of those 
affected by their judgments, largely Roman upper classes, and that those judgments were 
steered by the economic realities around them.
158
 In an article on Augustan marriage 
practice, McGinn showed the extent to which jurists were both reactive and proactive: 
their discussions reflected, for example, general upper-class endogamy but also 
proactively tried to shape social hierarchies by deterring certain groups from social 
advancement.
159
  These are examples of increasing efforts to bridge “the chasm between 
the study of Roman history and the study of Roman law.”160 As those examples show, 
attempts to bridge that history/legal divide are most successful when they focus on 
activities of importance to the upper classes: landholding practices, marriage legislation, 
or slave-managers (institores).
161
 This was apparently equally true for the housing rental 
market at Rome, which in sheer numbers was dominated by impoverished short-term 
leaseholders but whose legal discussion was strongly tilted toward the upper-class rental 
market.
162
  
We should remember, however, that law itself does not exist outside the body of 
institutions ordering private actors’ behavior but is itself an institution.163 Using Roman 
legal writings as a mine for information about Roman society with details to be hewn 
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from the larger mass is akin to buying a car for its radio—one may enjoy the music while 
missing the point of the car. Rather, legal institutions are not “given outside the economic 
system but…variables within it.”164 This notion is the core tenet of economic analyses of 
law.
165
 This fact entails that any legal rule is subject to economic analysis, for example, in 
origin, consequences, and efficiency, not just legal topics “readily associated with 
economics.”166  
The closest approximation of this approach to the Roman wine trade is Bruce 
Frier’s article, “Roman Law and the Wine Trade: The Problem of Vinegar Sold as 
Wine.”167 Noting that juristic discussion of the problems arising from wine’s natural 
deterioration into vinegar, he argued that the evolution of buyer’s protection revealed 
“considerable doctrine but little dogmatism” and that the jurists were likely reacting to a 
“received standard of trade.”  In this view, reciprocity existed between merchants’ 
business practice and legal judgments whereby the merchants’ collective business 
dealings influenced the institutional setting in which they occurred which in turn made 
established practice more favorable. Even here, a broader law and economics perspective, 
particularly one informed by the relationship between incomplete contracts and the 
formation of legal default rules, allows one to expand that analysis considerably (I offer 
such an interpretation in Chapter Three).  
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There is a great deal of overlap between the law and economic approach and that 
of the new institutional economics described above.
168
 Indeed, there has been debate 
whether law and economics should be considered its own movement or part of NIE.
169
 
Narrowly, treating law as an endogenous variable in economic action, affected by and 
influencing economic behavior, has an important implication: we can largely avoid the 
problem of how explicitly concerned the jurists were with real-world problems. 
Regardless of their motivations or knowledge, the judgments they made would have 
lowered the costs of certain behaviors while raising those of others. This observation 
allows us to consider the potential of basically any legal ruling to affect economic 
behavior.  
More generally, scholars of NIE have been favorably disposed to historically 
centered studies because such “historical studies give an empirical dimension to law and 
economics” and prevent the field from becoming overly theoretical.170 There has not been 
(to the best of my knowledge) any attempt to use the approaches of NIE and law to pose 
questions relating the economics of Roman law and commercial activity. I hope that this 
study will reveal the approach’s potential for generating unasked questions fundamental 
to understanding Roman economic behavior to Roman historians and perhaps encourage 
those more skilled in economics than I to refine the models and arguments presented 
here.  
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“These fragments I have shorn…” 
The history of Roman wine has been of interest since the time of the Romans 
themselves, and modern histories, both antiquarian and scholarly, have dealt with a range 
of questions. Indeed, a keyword search on the words vino, vin, Wein, and wine on the 
DYABOLA database comes up with over 700 scholarly works. Nevertheless, this chapter 
has argued that this long scholarly history has not seriously addressed a host of questions 
related to the city of Rome’s wine supply, organization, and economic development and 
that attempting to answer such questions requires a rather different historical 
methodology than that generally offered by ancient historians.  
The three major sources—literary, archaeological, and legal—offer unique 
benefits and drawbacks for studying Roman wine commerce. None on its own can offer 
anything approaching a holistic account. Additionally, we need an organizing principle to 
bring the combination of these sources into a coherent framework. It is my contention 
that economic models, particularly (though not exclusively) those drawn from New 
Institutional Economics provide the best option, both theoretically and pragmatically, for 
shedding light on this underexplored topic.  
Let me conclude by returning to the problem with which I began this chapter: 
whether Rome’s supply of wine predominately driven by free commerce or 
surreptitiously driven by non-market, elite manipulation. For a New Institutionalist 
economist this is nearly a pseudo-question: the duality itself is an important economic 
feature because the state both sets the rules of the game under which economic activity 
occurs and because the state is an economic actor subject to the rules it sets. And in 
another, related sense we can agree with Justice Jackson’s contention in Wickard v. 
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Filburn (arguing that the Interstate Commerce Clause gives congress the power to 
regulate even the quantity of home-grown wheat) that,  
 …such volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a 
substantial influence on price and market conditions…But if we assume 
that it is never marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which 
would otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-
grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce.171  
 
Substitute wine for wheat, and this provides a pithy encapsulation of the problems of a 
dichotomous separation between market and non-market driven trade.  
The questions and methods of NIE have a unique ability to show how structures 
and processes not traditionally subject to economic analysis can in fact be modeled 
economically by relaxing only a few neoclassical premises, and this realization has 
revolutionized economics over the last forty years. The subsequent chapters build on that 
observation to focus on one fundamental issue: to understand how the market in wine 
operated when the market itself was partly contingent on the historical specificity of the 
agents who set the “rules of the game” and to investigate the consequent differences in 
transaction costs, qualitatively and quantitatively, between the Roman period and ours. I 
do not believe this study is anything more (nor less) than a prolegomena: every chapter 
raises questions, topics, and problems which demand their own treatment not presented 
here. In a sense, I hope to show a path forward for any prospective reader even if I do not 
tread far upon it myself.  
The method of argument and presentation may appear chimerical: There is a great 
deal more formal economic and mathematical model building than is customary among 
ancient historical works (though considerably less, both in quantity and sophistication, 
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than in most economic histories); but these models are all used to answer questions 
specific to the Roman wine-trade. Where comparative material is adduced, it is more 
often to elucidate differences rather than similarities between Roman and non-Roman 
societies. I hope that the historian will not get lost in the economics nor the economist in 
the historical details.  True, this combination may prove pleasing to neither. I find myself 
in response drawing again on an economist’s dictum, that all “feasible modes of 
organization are flawed.”172  
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Chapter III 
The Scope of the Roman Wine Firm 
“The Price was Inviting” 
Chapter One surveyed previous studies of Roman wine and suggested that too 
little attention has been given to the Roman institutions steering the wine trade. We 
examined one important institution, namely, the trade policies of the imperial government 
and saw that Rome’s imports in wine were, on the one hand, affected by the emperors’ 
unwillingness to ensure a steady supply but also, on the other hand, by the collected 
money and demand of the city’s wealthiest inhabitants. I concluded the chapter by 
suggesting the law and economics approach had potential for studying the economic 
operation and performance of Rome’s wine commerce.  
This chapter provides a broad interpretation for understanding the relationship 
between Rome’s body of organizational law and a narrower demonstration of how those 
conditions affected the law of wine specifically and, thus, its trade. This analysis will 
show that institutional constraints led to a relatively narrow range of organizational 
shapes for wine enterprises. That relatively few forms became dominant should be 
neither surprising nor censurable; after all, competitive pressures should favor the more 
efficient options and, over time, drive out the others. The chapter instead asks, after 
reconstructing the dominant organizational shape, whether institutional pressures 
encouraged efficient operation or tended to retard it. 
The point where producer met purchaser is little mentioned by extant sources. The 
following description, in a letter of the Younger Pliny, is unique, and I quote it in full 
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because it reveals an interesting separation between producing wine and its bottling, 
transportation, and eventual final sale and distribution (mercantile operations):
1
 
[1] Alii in praedia sua proficiscuntur ut locupletiores revertantur, ego ut 
pauperior. Vendideram vindemias certatim negotiatoribus ementibus. [2] 
Invitabat pretium, et quod tunc et quod fore videbatur. Spes fefellit. Erat 
expeditum omnibus remittere aequaliter, sed non satis aequum. Mihi 
autem egregium in primis videtur ut foris ita domi, ut in magnis ita in 
parvis, ut in alienis ita in suis agitare iustitiam. [3] Nam si paria peccata, 
pares etiam laudes. Itaque omnibus quidem, ne quis 'mihi non donatus 
abiret', partem octavam pretii quo quis emerat concessi; deinde iis, qui 
amplissimas summas emptionibus occupaverant, separatim consului. [4] 
Nam et me magis iuverant, et maius ipsi fecerant damnum. Igitur iis qui 
pluris quam decem milibus emerant, ad illam communem et quasi 
publicam octavam addidi decimam eius summae, qua decem milia 
excesserant. [5] Vereor ne parum expresserim: apertius calculo ostendam. 
Si qui forte quindecim milibus emerant, hi et quindecim milium octavam et 
quinque milium decimam tulerunt. [6] Praeterea, cum reputarem quosdam 
ex debito aliquantum, quosdam aliquid, quosdam nihil reposuisse, 
nequaquam verum arbitrabar, quos non aequasset fides solutionis, hos 
benignitate remissionis aequari. [7] Rursus ergo iis qui solverant eius 
quod solverant decimam remisi. Per hoc enim aptissime et in praeteritum 
singulis pro cuiusque merito gratia referri, et in futurum omnes cum ad 
emendum tum etiam ad solvendum allici videbantur. [8] Magno mihi seu 
ratio haec seu facilitas stetit, sed fuit tanti. Nam regione tota et novitas 
remissionis et forma laudatur. Ex ipsis etiam quos non una, ut dicitur, 
pertica sed distincte gradatimque tractavi, quanto quis melior et probior, 
tanto mihi obligatior abiit expertus non esse apud me, “ἐν δὲ ἰῇ τιμῇ ἠμὲν 
κακὸς ἠδὲ καὶ ἐσθλός.” Vale. 
 
[1] Some enter into their lands so that they return richer; I that I might be 
poorer. I had eagerly sold the vintage to some merchants who were 
buying. [2] The price was inviting, both what it was then and what it 
seemed likely to be. The expected price failed. It was arranged to give 
remittance equally to everyone but that was not fair enough. Moreover, it 
seemed honorable to me that just as away as at home, in great affairs and 
small, in others’ affairs as my own, to accomplish justice. [3] For if sins 
are equal, so too are good deeds. And so, I yielded to everyone an eighth 
of the purchase price so that “no one would depart ungifted by me.” [4] 
Then those, who had undertaken the highest purchase-prices, I consulted 
separately, for they had helped me more and had suffered greater loss. 
Therefore, for those who had bought at more than 10,000 I added to the 
common and as it were general eighth a tenth of the total by which they 
had exceeded 10,000. [5] I fear this is confusing—an example will clarify. 
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If, say, some purchasers bought at 15,000, they took an eighth of the 
15,000 and a tenth of 5,000. [6] Moreover, as I was considering that some 
had made a considerable deposit, others some other percentage, and some 
nothing, in no way was I truly judging that those whom faith of payment 
had not equalized were being made equal in the kindness of the refund. [7] 
Again therefore I remitted to those who had paid a tenth of the payment. 
For this seemed to me the best way to give a remittance to each in accord 
with what each deserved and in relation to past practices and seemed best 
for encouraging both purchase and payment in the future. [8] This scheme 
and its leniency were expensive but it was worth a great deal. For through 
the entire region the novelty of the refund and its form was praised. Even 
from those whom I treated not with one measuring-rod, so to speak, but 
particularly and by grades, as much as each was better and more upright, 
so much the more did he leave obliged to me, having learned that it is not 
the case with me that “Les bons et mauvais trouvent le même honneur.” 
 
Pliny had reached a deal with an apparently unconnected and unspecified, but 
reasonably numerous, group of merchants to sell wine from his estate.
2
 The merchants 
were speculators and offered bids on the assumption that the price for wine was going to 
be high that year, but they were wrong and stood to lose a great deal of money because 
their bids exceeded the wine’s market value. This miscalculation allows us to infer that 
the sale was made well before the harvest and likely even before the grapes had matured, 
so perhaps in the late spring or early summer. The sale of wine in advance is well known 
from Egypt and the Elder Pliny attests to its existence also in Italy, reporting that the 
aforementioned Sthenelus sold his wine while the grapes were still on the vine—
vindemia pendens.
3
  
Pliny, however, opted for a post factum reduction of purchase price in proportion 
both to the original bid and whether it had already been paid. He justified this solution on 
the basis of fairness and for more strictly economic reasons: it would hurt him down the 
road if some or all of his purchasers lost their shirts. Moreover, as he said explicitly, his 
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fairness would encourage them to return in other years.
4
 Sirago raised the interesting 
possibility that Pliny found himself in this position in the year after 107 when he had 
instituted a new share-cropping scheme for his tenants and thus found himself with a 
surfeit of wine to dispose.
5
  
This is a plausible, if ultimately unprovable, proposition for several reasons. First, 
the letter strongly suggests that the negotiatores ementes were hitherto unknown to Pliny. 
He did not explain his generosity, for example, on the basis of having conducted previous 
business with them but only because of his innate sense of fairness and his hopes that 
they would return in later years. The latter hope, however, suggests that wine-sellers and 
merchants could (and perhaps often did) repeatedly transact with one another. The word 
certatim implies that the buyers competed against each other (i.e., there was not one 
singular buying firm) and offered bids for quantities of wine.
6
 The bids may even have 
been auctioned, but the letter’s lack of detail makes this only a possibility.  
Unfortunately, Pliny declined to inform Calvisius how many total buyers there 
were. There must have been more than a few, however, given the pains Pliny took for 
inventing a just refund scheme for many different categories. But we can use his figures 
to generate a rough idea of the vineyards’ sizes. Using the estimation from chapter 3 of 
3380 L/ha and use the average amphora price at Pompeii and Herculaneum of 35 HS, 
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then 10,000 sesterces would have bought wine from 8.5 iugera and 15,000 from 12.5 
iugera.
7
 True, those prices are retail prices, and the wholesale price here would have been 
considerably less. Even if we believe the prices differed by a factor of two, we would still 
be dealing with land tracts of around twenty iugera, by no means sprawling.  
This is telling because if Pliny were selling entirely his own produce, it is difficult 
to understand why he would not simplify the procedure and combine his vineyards into 
one for the purpose of sale. It seems much more likely that the bidders’ purchase prices 
reflect their bids on individual vineyards, namely, Pliny’s tenants. Altogether, there is 
reasonably good circumstantial evidence that Sirago was correct: Pliny was forced to 
invent this plan after redesigning his rent-system. We see here some pressure toward 
centralization of decision-making power and sale but, since the individual tenants were 
still at least partially autonymous, such integration did not proceed far.    
Pliny’s letter illustrates the extent to which both producers and merchants’ ability 
to make profits relied on a dubious ability to predict future markets. Both his refund 
scheme, which was a novitas in the region, and his tenancy system, described as nova 
consilia (new plans), show Pliny’s inventiveness in dealing with these problems and his 
continued efforts to solve them in a way that encouraged repeat business and steady 
income.
8
 Business operations in market conditions constrained by highly costly contracts, 
such as Pliny’s which required significant and expensive ex-post readjustments to the ex-
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ante terms, are precisely the type where the greatest pressures to vertically integrate 
emerge: 
It may be extremely costly to write a contract that specifies unambiguously 
the payments and actions of all parties in every observable state of nature. 
We assume that integration in itself does not change the cost of writing 
down a particular contractual provision. What it does change is who has 
control over those provisions not included in the contract…the owner of 
an asset has the residual rights of control of that asset, that is, the right to 
control all aspects of the asset that have not been explicitly given away by 
contract.
9
 
 
Imagine, for example, an alternative arrangement for Pliny: if the merchants were his 
employees (or slaves) rather than independent contractors then in a year where the market 
price for wine was unexpectedly bad, he could choose to store most of the wine until the 
subsequent year. But Pliny was forced to sell before the market conditions became 
manifest and then was forced not only to deliver wine that might best have been laid 
aside but also to renegotiate the original contract at considerable expense to himself. 
Despite Pliny’s creativity, there is no indication that he even considered the alternative.  
One example can, of course, be an exception. We have, unfortunately, precious 
few opportunities for comparison to Pliny. We do, however, have information about the 
family of the Sestii, said to have controlled a “wine and pottery empire” and to have 
“maintained, at its height, almost a monopoly over the production and distribution of 
wine.” This enterprise provies a comparative example where we would expect market 
pressures to encourage vertical integration.
10
 The Sestii’s commercial operations were of 
a scope significant enough that even poets at Rome noticed it. The fourth poem of 
Horace’s Odes poetically references the Sestii’s business interests. The poem was 
dedicated to L. Sestius Quirinus, a fellow rebel of Horace’s at Philippi in 42. Will 
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perceptively argued that much of the poem’s vocabulary, for example, regna vini, 
carinas, officinas, regumque turris, and beate not only applied to Sestius’ business 
interests generally but specifically called to mind the family’s hub at Cosa.11 In a later 
article, she claimed, “the poet almost seems to be describing…a landscape painting of 
Cosa and its port done in the Roman Third Style.”12 Let us briefly examine the nature of 
so singular a firm. 
Evidence of the Sestii’s business interests comes primarily via finds of amphorae 
with Sestius stamps along with mention in late Republican writers, in particular, Cicero 
who was a close colleague of Publius Sestius, the father of Horace’s dedicatee.13 The 
family likely shipped jars oversea by the late 3
rd
 century BCE and continued operations 
into the imperial period, though ultimately switched to brick and tile manufacture.
14
 
Though the early investigators of the Grand Congloué wrecks (the shipwrecks off 
Marseille which produced Sestius amphorae in large numbers) had argued that the jars 
had held Campanian wine, it is now accepted that the manufacture of the jars themselves 
and the wine therein originated from Cosa and the ager Cosanus, in South Etruria.
15
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Will believes that the early amphorae, Dressel 1 and 2-4, had primarily shipped 
wine from the Sestii’s own lands up until 39 BCE when, following the restoration of the 
Sestii’s land, new amphora types of the Will 16 variety appeared, probably for garum 
(fish sauce). By the late Republic, “the Sestius family’s huge wine empire diversified into 
other directions.”16 Some points have been raised, however, that might cause us to doubt 
whether the Sestii’s admittedly impressive operations are best characterized as a wine 
empire or a pottery empire. Manacorda rightly pointed out that, even if we accept that the 
Sestii produced the containers, it in no way necessitates that they produced the wine 
therein.
17
  
Richardson contended that, “the enormous number of Sestian containers seems 
out of proportion to any single estate,” and that “it seems not unlikely that…his [i.e. 
Sestius’] agents bought from small vineyards and supplied these with Sestian 
containers.”18 Further, some of the SES-stamped amphorae still have stoppers. Some of 
these stoppers are stamped L. Titi C. f  (of Lucius Titius, son of Gaius). Benoit believed 
that Sestius was the merchant and Titius the producer, though, as Manacorda pointed out, 
a vice-versa relationship is the more likely interpretation.
19
 Certainly, we know from the 
Digest that stamping an amphora was commonly part of the sale in order to identify the 
wares.
20
 Once again, as in Pliny, we observe a separation between the wine-producer and 
the wine-purchasers.  
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Further, certain contracts of wine-sale from Egypt strengthen our confidence that 
such a separation was common. For example, SB XVI 12486 from Hermopolis recorded 
a contract for an advance sale of 250 knidia (approximately 500-1000 liters) where the 
seller specified the quality of wine to be provided and the buyer supplied the vessels.
21
 
On olive oil amphorae, stamps have been lumped into two groups: stamps of “simple 
content” and stamps of “composed content.”22 These stamps often record both the oil 
producer and the potter, and it was apparently common for the two not to be identical.
23
 
This should not be so surprising: making amphorae required, first, the proper materials 
and knowledge of how to use them, and then reasonably skilled, trained potters to execute 
the design. Not every landowner, or perhaps even most, could be expected to have met 
those requirements. It seems to me that the unifying feature of the Sestii’s enterprise was 
in items produced from clay—mostly containers but also lamps, bricks and tiles—not the 
product contained therein.  
The Pliny and Sestii examples point at a similar underlying business structure. 
Pliny was an extremely wealthy landowner who grew, among other products, grapes for 
wine. He contracted with another firm which took control of the wine for transport and, 
possibly, downstream sale, though we cannot of course know with certainty to what use 
Pliny’s merchants put the wine. Pliny presumably had the money to integrate those 
operations if he had wished. But he did not. The Sestii, though also landowners of the 
highest class, apparently engaged in mercantile activities in buying up local, Cosan wine 
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for bottling in their containers and (possibly) transporting on their ships.
24
 But there is no 
indication that the Sestii made any effort to integrate their operations with the scattered, 
regional winegrowers and gain more control over their product and operations. In both 
cases, there may have been integration of business practice within one sector, either 
production or transportation, but not between the sectors despite the fact that there were 
pressures conducive to such integration in both cases. The simple question thus arises: 
why not?  
Business Organizations and Asset Partitioning 
The defining feature of corporate firms is its existence as a legal entity, in some 
sense a fictional person, an agglomeration of assets and a “nexus of contracts” which can 
enter into agreements, incur obligations, liabilities, and earn profits separately from the 
owners and managers who operate the firm.
25
 The rights and limitations of a firm’s 
actions and thereby its potential structure largely depends on a given society’s body of 
organizational laws (for example, a legal system that prohibits direct agency will generate 
business forms of a decidedly different type than one which allows it).
26
 Such entities 
have two fundamental features: a body of managers, agents of the owners who can 
authoritatively incur obligations on the firm’s behalf, and a body of assets which gives 
the firm the “ability to bond its contracts credibly” and which are separate from the 
managers’ personal assets.27  
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The separation of personal assets from company assets takes two reciprocal 
forms: “affirmative asset partitioning” or entity shielding and “defensive asset 
partitioning” or limited liability.28 These shielding mechanisms characterize modern 
firms to various degrees depending on the extent to which assets are partitioned and 
shielded. Entity shielding gives priority to firm creditors over the owners’ personal 
creditors and, in a stronger form, often includes liquidation protection so that owners and 
their personal creditors cannot force liquidation in their share of the firm. Defensive 
partitioning gives personal creditors prior (and often sole) claim to owners’ personal 
assets over firm creditors.
 29
  
Roman law recognized non-personal legal entities in only a few cases.
30
 These 
were guild-like associations (collegia), towns with municipal status (municipia), charities 
(piae causae), un-entered estates (hereditates iacentes), and the companies of publicans 
(societates publicanorum).
31
 Roman private businesses lacked even weak forms of asset 
partitioning. The Roman partnership was in no way a corporate form: “it was a contract 
creating rights and duties merely between the socii themselves. Nobody could therefore 
act for the socius.”32 Moreover, the change of any one partner dissolved the entire 
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partnership, and the remaining members had to draw up a new agreement.
33
 Such 
arrangements are unstable and make it extremely difficult to determine the division of the 
firm’s assets. Theoretically, if a firm dissolved, either through the death of a member, 
withdrawal, or an actio pro socio by one of the members, then an actio communi 
dividundo had to be brought in order to divide the partnership’s joint property, which was 
held in common.
34
 Even if Romans did not always rigidly adhere to the letter of the law 
in practice, the default legal rules placed a partnership’s assets at a perpetual risk of 
dissolution.  
Some have argued, however, that Romans developed a functional, if not legal, 
equivalent to modern forms of asset partitioning by acting through their slaves.
35
 It is 
common in slave-holding societies for slaves to accumulate their own quasi-property 
besides the clothing and food provided by their owner.
36
 The Romans, however, were 
unique in the extent to which they institutionalized slaves’ private possessions as a 
peculium.
37
 Carrying out business through a slave, it has been argued, “can be seeing as a 
functional equivalent of the corporate form from an economics perspective, in that it 
allows a de facto depersonalization of business…”38 This de facto equivalence stems 
from an effective asset-partitioning between the master and slave’s possessions and the 
master’s limited liability for obligations incurred on his behalf by the slave. In other 
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words, the difference between ancient and modern organizational law was in in form, not 
in function, as neatly encapsulated here: 
A typical example…could be given by the demand of the entrepreneur to 
limit his own liability towards third parties to a single part of his 
patrimony. Such a demand, characteristic of any exchange economy, made 
itself felt at Rome already by the period of great commercial 
development…and can be considered an expression of the growing 
strength and expansion of commercial capital. The same demand, and 
certainly with greater intensity, is a point of concern for the economic 
broker in the modern, capitalist world [trans. from the Italian].
39
 
 
 The observation that slaves were frequently and actively involved in numerous 
types of business activities is interesting and clearly right. However, if the use of slaves 
in business provided a functional equivalent to modern corporate governance structures, 
it is fairly mysterious why there is no example of a large or even moderately sized private 
firm with numerous owners, a characteristic of firms in societies which allow strong 
asset-partitioning.
40
  It is possible, of course, that time has eradicated the evidence for 
them or that there were countervailing forces preventing the availability, thus constituting 
a large scale analogue to what has been called a “missing-person argument.”41  
 I, however, do not think such an explanation would be correct. It has been 
argued, quite persuasively, that the development of entity shielding has been far more 
important in the development of business than owner shielding.
42
 Importantly, one can 
create owner-shielding via contract without an institutionalized law of limited liability; 
however, this does not hold true for entity shielding because the excessively high moral 
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hazard costs preclude a contractually formulated equivalent.
43
  A survey of the evidence 
most frequently adduced in support of the functionalist argument reveals that there was 
institutionalized owner shielding but not entity shielding. The system of delegation 
through slaves turns out to most resemble a so-called “agency through title” alternative to 
institutionalized affirmative asset partitioning, which ultimately suffers from the same 
moral hazard problems as attempting to establish it through contract. This fact has 
significant economic implications and largely explains why Roman businesses generally 
did not have numerous owners nor acquire assets allowing them to vertically integrate 
their holdings despite their willingness to use slaves as proxies.
44
   
In early Roman law, slaves (or sons-in-power, for that matter) could not bind their 
paterfamilias through their own obligations, nor could he be negatively affected by their 
actions.
45
 Gaius expressed this principle succinctly, noting that “our condition can be 
improved by slaves but not be made worse” (melior condicio nostra per servos fieri 
potest, deterior fieri non potest).
46
 These restrictions would have made dealing with a 
slave or son in potestate an extremely risky proposition. Over time therefore, the praetor 
began instituting remedies which made the paterfamilias liable to various degrees for 
obligations incurred by his slaves. These are the so-called actiones adiecticiae qualitatis 
and include the actiones institoria, exercitoria, de peculio, tributoria, de in rem verso, 
and quod iussu.
47
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The actiones institoria and exercitoria were actions available against a master 
who had set someone, often though not necessarily a slave or son, in charge of a business 
or ship respectively.
48
 Liability was not limited, as the Latin in solidum makes clear. Nor 
is there any suggestion that the assets of a slave placed in charge of a ship or tavern 
(servus praepositus) would be shielded from the dominus’ personal creditors. Only the 
range of actions for which the master is liable is restricted: to the stated purpose of the 
appointment. In other words, if a master appointed a slave over a shop and the slave also 
engaged in some business un-related to that appointment, the master would not be liable 
for debts related to the latter activity under the actio institoria.  
The actiones tributoria and de peculio differed from the previous two actions 
because the dominus did not actively direct his subsidiary’s business. Moreover, these 
actions were restricted to operations undertaken by slaves or sons. The difference 
between these two actions derived primarily from whether the master had active 
knowledge (scientia) of his son or slave’s transactions. Gaius explained that an actio de 
peculio made a paterfamilias liable for business debts incurred by a slave or son endowed 
with a peculium.
49
  Somewhat strangely, the master himself was a privileged creditor: 
“…of course, when the action is on the peculium, a calculation of the deduction from the 
peculium owed to the master is made.”50  
The tributoria action was similar except that the master had more active 
knowledge that his slave was using the peculium in some broadly speaking commercial 
way. The most important consequence was the leveling of creditors—that is, the dominus 
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lost his position as a privileged creditor to the peculium, though he was still only liable 
for the amount equal to the value of the peculium.
51
 In addition to these two actions, the 
actio de in rem verso was available if the paterfamilias had materially gained from the 
financial operations financed by his dependant’s peculium.  
 The availability of these actions would have introduced an element of moral 
hazard into any contract with a slave or son because a master might be tempted to 
withdraw assets from the peculium, thus limiting his losses on risky investments. It was 
presumably for this reason that the praetor granted an action, the actio de in rem verso, in 
cases where a master had made a profit from his slaves but the peculium was unable to 
meet its debts.
52
 In that case, the master was liable for the amount by which he had 
profited in excess of the peculium.
53
 Taken wholly, these actions have become the 
linchpin for arguing that Romans had functional equivalents of formal corporate asset 
partitioning. Let us therefore examine to what extent these laws mimicked affirmative 
and defensive asset partitioning.  
In the slave-run firm, if the functionalist argument is correct, slaves are managers 
operating on behalf of owner(s) with creditors in a quasi-corporate structure. It is 
therefore important to note, before considering the specifics of Roman asset partitioning, 
that “in nearly all standard-form legal entities, both affirmative and defensive asset 
partitioning, with respect to managers, follow a rule of exclusivity: The firm’s assets are 
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not available to satisfy the manager’s personal obligations, and the manager’s personal 
assets are not available to satisfy the firm’s obligations.”54 This was not true for slave 
managers.  
It was, in fact, the opposite. The peculium simply consisted of everything in the 
quasi-possession of the slave beyond that which the master gave as part of normal upkeep 
(like food and clothes).
55
 In the presumably common cases where slaves used their 
peculia without the master’s active scientia, there was no asset separation within the 
peculia itself. That introduced an element of uncertainty for creditors to the peculia 
because they could not be sure what proportion of the peculia would be used toward the 
firm’s operation. If a slave used his peculium to finance, say, a fruit-vendor but also to 
play dice every night, this would obviously severely impact the liquidity, credit-
worthiness, and ultimate success of the fruit-trader’s business.   
It is fairly well accepted that these laws did defensively partition the owners’ 
personal assets from his slaves’ quasi-assets: “[N]egotiatio per servos communes” it was 
recently stated, “provided a way of achieving limited liability…the slave’s creditors 
could only seize the peculium assets, while being generally barred from reaching out to 
the owner’s personal assets.”56 This conclusion seems fairly obvious and unexceptionable 
from the actions’ descriptions and scope. We should note, however, that the actio de in 
rem verso, which allowed firm creditors to attack personal assets in certain situations and 
was analogous to piercing the corporate veil in modern law, may imply some degree of 
fluidity between personal and firm assets and the difficulty for firm creditors of 
effectively monitoring firm assets.  
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Affirmative asset partitioning—entity shielding—has been largely ignored in the 
literature, even though “limited liability is only a secondary, and by no means universal, 
characteristic of legal entities.”57 The already cited article by Abatino, Dari-Mattiaci, and 
Perotti is the only example I know where this problem has been addressed. They suggest 
that the rules above created a weak form of entity shielding, though they concede that, 
although one of their main points of evidence “…is not sufficient to prove the existence 
of entity shielding, it is clearly compatible with it.”58 The authors’ attempt to address this 
problem is commendable. Their (admittedly hesitant) conclusion is, however, wrong.  
Explaining their error requires us to back up and consider entity shielding 
broadly—what its economic costs and benefits are and what other criteria are required for 
its existence. After that, we can inspect arguments in favor of Roman entity shielding and 
explain why they do not hold up. Affirmative asset partitioning provides several benefits, 
namely, reducing firm creditors’ monitoring costs, reducing the transaction costs of 
severally-owned firms, and increasing the stability of a firm’s value; its costs primarily 
stem from incentive for debtor opportunism.
59
  
A creditor (someone to whom is owed monetary or contractual obligations) incurs 
monitoring costs whenever he lends to a firm: knowledge of the firm’s assets, liquidity, 
debts, etc. are important for determining whether he should do business with the firm. 
Entity shielding reduces those creditor monitoring costs in two ways. First, the creditor is 
not responsible for evaluating and watching the firm owners’ personal finances because 
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the firm’s assets are shielded from personal creditors. This lowers the cost of credit to the 
firm because it lowers the uncertainty for the creditor.  
Second, imagine a vertically integrated wine firm, growing grapes in Spain, 
making and bottling wine, shipping the wine, and retailing the wine at Rome. The ability 
to partition assets within a firm into multiple distinct corporations is important because 
the different components of the wine-firm are almost certainly going to depend on two 
different classes of creditors.
60
 A producer of amphorae in Spain will probably be fairly 
knowledgeable about the local vineyards’ productive capacities. A lessor of urban real 
estate at Rome will probably be fairly knowledgeable about the profitability of wine-
retailers in the city. But neither creditor is likely to be well-informed about the financial 
strength of the corporation at more than one or two specific points.
61
 When the respective 
lenders are only responsible for knowledge of their specific point of intersection with the 
firm, they will offer lower credit and thus the total cost of credit for the firm is lower. 
Moreover, limited liability is not sufficient to achieve this effect: without entity shielding, 
the creditors in Spain do not have priority to the assets related to wine-production over 
those in Rome, and monitoring costs would still be considerably higher than they would 
be with affirmative asset partitioning.
62
  
These advantages become all the more important in the case of firms with 
multiple owners. Recall the rule of Roman partnerships: partners did not obligate one 
another, and actions were against the individual and not the societas. This rule 
corresponds perfectly to a world without entity shielding, where “creditors of any single 
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owner would have the right to proceed against that owner’s share of the firm’s 
assets…”63 Even if the partner was acting through a commonly owned slave, thus 
limiting his personal liability to that amount of the peculium, the problem still remains 
because the actio de peculio would be against the individual owner, not the partnership. 
This situation would cause firm creditors and even the other firm owners to incur 
prohibitively high monitoring costs because they would have to assess both the financial 
viability and assets of the firm, the owners’ personal finances, and any other firms in 
which any of the owners had financial stakes, not just once but continuously.
64
 This 
would almost certainly make credit expensive and difficult to acquire.  
Those advantages are available even to weakly shielded entities, like the modern 
general partnership, but the strongly shielded entity, with liquidation protection, has 
become the principal corporate form over the last two centuries because of its decisive 
advantages.
65
 Even if firm creditors have priority to claim firm assets over the owners’ 
personal creditors, a substantial risk remains that an owner’s personal insolvency will 
cause his personal creditors to force liquidation of his shares in the firm. That risk means 
that the firm’s fortunes are still intimately tied to its owners’ personal fortunes and, if an 
owner’s fortune turns for the worst, the firm could stand to lose a portion of its value 
which would injure both the other owners and the firm creditors. Roman firms definitely 
did not have liquidity protection.
66
  
To be sure, the defensive asset partitioning created by the praetorian actions had 
important effects and the actio de in rem verso limited one of the chief costs of limiting 
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personal liability, namely, if the firm acted unscrupulously towards its creditors. Owner 
shielding presents several advantages; I mention only two here.
67
 In particular, owner 
shielding mirrors the reduction in monitoring costs created by entity shielding by 
allowing personal creditors to ignore the performance of personal debtors’ business 
interests. It also shifts some of the costs of monitoring a firm’s managers away from the 
owners (who may have limited knowledge of their managers’ ability and performance) to 
creditors who know that they cannot lay claim to the firm- owners’ personal resources to 
offset their own poor investments. It has become increasingly clear, however, that those 
benefits have not been as important in the evolution of modern corporate forms as entity 
shielding, “…the net benefits of which are so decisive that it is today an element of all of 
the law’s standard forms for enterprise organization.”68  
The functionalist argument of Roman business practice claims that Romans 
developed a non-institutionalized equivalent to weak entity shielding. This claim seems a 
priori highly unlikely because the moral hazard costs of establishing entity shielding via 
contract are so high as to make it impossible.
69
 Contractually negotiating for entity 
shielding would require a firm to guarantee a prior claim on firm assets to creditors over 
personal creditors with already existing claims. The firm-owners’ personal creditors 
would therefore become secondary creditors without their consent or even knowledge.
70
 
The firm would therefore have to commit itself credibly to acquiring an agreement 
subordinating the claims of personal creditors, past, present, and future. The costs of 
writing such a contract would be prohibitively high because firm creditors would be 
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unable to monitor the firm’s compliance. This factor would engender extreme moral 
hazard because there would be “…strong incentive not to obtain the necessary 
subordination…in the circumstances in which they would be most important to business 
creditors—namely, when the entrepreneur is facing a substantial risk of insolvency 
and…(a) in strong need of further credit, and (b) in a poor position to obtain credit that is 
subordinated.”71  
Moreover, the problems arising from moral hazard would increase with the 
number of owners. The benefits of promising priority of credit position to firm creditors 
would be shared (via lower firm borrowing costs) by all the owners, but higher personal 
borrowing costs would be borne only by the individual who negotiated the promise. 
Thus, “each owner would face an incentive to omit the waivers from personal dealings 
opportunistically, a temptation…difficult to police.”72 Institutionalized entity shielding 
reduces the costs of writing such a contract and eliminates the moral hazard by essentially 
inserting a mandatory clause into every contract that subordinates personal creditors 
whether they wish it or not.  
It would be fairly surprising if there was entity shielding at Rome since without 
formal organization law it should be impossible to obviate those problems. Let us briefly 
examine the evidence adduced in Abatino, Dari-Mattiaci, and Perotti’s article. First, it is 
claimed that “…if the same slave was given different peculia or if the same master had 
several slaves each with a peculium, insulation between the different peculia was a direct 
consequence of the limited liability of the master.”73 It is true that this insulation allowed 
for some degree of asset partitioning and perhaps for quasi-subordinated forms (i.e., a 
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firm with partitioned and separate sub-firms). But these partitions were not affirmatively 
asset partitioned. Though the creditor to one peculium probably could not reclaim losses 
from the other peculium, there is no hint that either peculia would be shielded from non-
firm creditors.  
The authors draw attention to several interesting juristic passages where the jurists 
display interest in problems relating to affirmative asset partitioning, but I would like to 
begin with the following quote which illustrates the argument’s tenuousness: “It remains 
to be verified whether the same form of entity shielding stood between the peculium and 
personal creditors of the owners; that is, if peculium creditors could seize peculium assets 
prior to personal creditors. Roman law scholarship considers this point to be unsettled.”74 
But if one is going to advance a claim that entity shielding existed in Rome, then this 
claim is fundamental: if there is no prior claim for firm creditors, then there is no entity 
shielding. There are two immediate pieces of evidence against this view and one in its 
favor.  
First is D. 42.6.1.9 (Ulp.), focusing on a specific subtype of peculium, the 
peculium castrense (military peculium) which deals with the peculium of a son-in-power 
acquired while that son was in the army: 
Si filii familias bona veneant, qui castrense peculium habet, an separatio 
fiat inter castrenses creditores ceterosque, videamus. Simul ergo 
admittentur, dummodo, si qui cum eo contraxerunt, antequam militaret, 
fortasse debeant separari: quod puto probandum. Ergo qui ante 
contraxerunt, si bona castrensia distrahantur, non possunt venire cum 
castrensibus creditoribus. Item si quid in rem patris versum est, forte 
poterit et creditori contradici, ne castrense peculium inquietet, cum possit 
potius cum patre experiri. 
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If the goods of a son-in-power, who has a military peculium, are sold we 
should see whether there should be a partitioning between the military 
creditors and the rest. They will be admitted that a partitioning should be 
made, provided that some creditors contracted with him before his military 
service began. And I think this is right. Therefore, those who contracted 
prior cannot come with the camp creditors if camp-goods are being broken 
up. Likewise, if some some profit is made for the father’s accounts, he will 
be able to oppose the creditor from disquieting the military peculium since 
the issue can be, rather, raised with the father.  
 
Here, Ulpian questioned what the priority of creditors to that peculium was vis-à-
vis other creditors (…an separatio fiat inter castrenses creditores ceterosque, videamus). 
Ulpian agreed with a general opinion that a separation should be made between the two 
classes of creditors and that, should an actio de in rem verso be brought against the 
paterfamilias, the peculium castrense should be protected from the creditor (Item si quid 
in rem patris versum est, forte poterit et creditori contradici, ne castrense peculium 
inquietet, cum possit potius cum patre experiri). This judgment endowed the peculium 
castrense with weak entity shielding. The fact, however, that Ulpian explicitly 
acknowledged and explained the reasoning for the priority of peculium creditors in this 
one case strongly suggests that peculia did not normally offer this protection to their 
creditors.
75
 
We note first, with Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, that creditors’ claims 
against the peculium were not specifically for peculia assets per se but for any assets 
equal in value, which suggests “the lack of a legally separate fund in which to recognize 
creditor priorities.”76 This introduced elements of uncertainty for firm creditors along 
with problems of potential hold-up. Say, for example, I go into a business with a slave-
managed firm because it counts among its assets a wine-press to which I want access. 
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The possibility that the slave’s master might remove the press from his peculium and 
replace it with the cash value of the press will be of concern to me because I contracted to 
use a specific firm asset. Moreover, I might fear that the dominus, knowing that I have 
invested in his slave’s business on the basis of a specific asset, may threaten to remove 
that particular asset unless I pay a fee.
77
 The availability of unjust enrichment actions (in 
particular the de in rem verso) would not solve this hold-up problem: As long as the 
dominus replaced the asset with another of equal ex ante value, he had the ability to 
appropriate the quasi-rents accruing to the peculium’s specific assets ex post. This 
problem could only be solved through entity shielding.  
Classical Roman law provided several remedies to creditors when a debtor was 
unable to pay all his debts, which included cessio bonorum (yielding of goods) and 
venditio bonorum (sale of goods).
78
 These procedures gave guidelines for disposing of 
the property of an insolvent debtor for satisfying the creditors’ claims. Without wishing 
to obscure understanding by oversimplification, these remedies can be considered the 
foundation of Roman bankruptcy procedures, without taking the procedures to imply the 
existence of a general Roman law of bankruptcy. There is, however, a key difference: in 
modern law, bankruptcy is a defensive device to protect assets from creditors; cessio 
bonorum was an aggressive process available to creditors. Taken in sum, the general 
background of remedies and procedures for insolvency were not congruent with weak 
entity shielding. 
                                                          
77
 As discussed in Chapter One, this type of problem, the so-called hold-up problem or the problem of 
asset specificity, introduces numerous transaction costs into contractual arrangements and has been one 
of the linchpins of transaction cost explanations for the existence, scope, and limits of firms. See 
Williamson (1985: 55); Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978: 297-326); Joskow (1988). 
78
 Kaser (1966: 316-17) provides a succinct description.  
92 
 
Given the lack of separate funds into which personal and firm assets were 
grouped, it does not seem that creditors were generally classed by which fund they had 
lent to. At first glance this may seem to be a surprising claim, for Abatino, Dari-
Mattiacci, and Perotti offer apparently contradictory evidence, namely, D. 14.4.5.15-16 
(Ulp.):
 79
 
Si plures habuit servus creditores, sed quosdam in mercibus certis, an 
omnes in isdem confundendi erunt et omnes in tributum vocandi? Ut puta 
duas negotiationes exercebat, puta sagariam et linteariam, et separatos 
habuit creditores. Puto separatim eos in tributum vocari: unusquisque 
enim eorum merci magis quam ipsi credidit. (16) Sed si duas tabernas 
eiusdem negotiationis exercuit et ego fui tabernae verbi gratia quam ad 
bucinum habuit ratiocinator, alius eius quam trans Tiberim, aequissimum 
puto separatim tributionem faciendam, ne ex alterius re merceve alii 
indemnes fiant, alii damnum sentiant. 
 
(15)If a slave has many creditors but some are only in certain commercial 
activities, should they all come into judgment jumbled together? For 
example, he was operating two businesses—say a clothing and a textile 
business and he had separate creditors. I think they should be called 
separately into judgment: for each one had given credit to the particular 
business more than to the individual himself. 
(16)But if he was operating two shops (tabernae) and I was a computant 
of the shop which he had at Bucinum and his other computant was of the 
one across the Tiber, I think it fairest that judgment be reckoned 
separately, lest some are enriched from the affairs and business of another 
while some suffer loss. 
 
This is an extremely interesting discussion, and Ulpian, in raising questions about 
fairness to creditors when one owner has multiple firms and suggesting a form of asset 
partitioning between them, paid heed to problems that were motivating factors in granting 
firms entity shielding in medieval Italy.
80
 Although Ulpian’s judgment is consistent with 
versions of weak entity shielding, it is not identical to it. In particular, asset separation 
                                                          
79
 Abatino, Dari-Mattiacii, and Perotti (2011: 382). 
80
 Medieval Italian entity shielding was “…heavily locational in nature. If a merchant was engaged in 
businesses at different locations or had several branches of the same business at different locations, 
creditors at one location enjoyed priority of claim to the assets held there,” Hansmann, Kraakman, and 
Squire (2006: 31).  
93 
 
here is only with respect to the two firms’ creditors. No discussion, however, followed of 
the creditors’ priority with regard to the firm owner’s (i.e., the dominus) personal 
creditors. In no way whatsoever did Ulpian affirm priority for firm creditors over 
personal creditors. Though judgments like this might possibly have lowered creditors’ 
monitoring costs and, consequently, the cost of credit, it could only be a modest 
improvement and would have done nothing to ease the high transaction costs incurred by 
firms with multiple owners.  
 Finally, the Roman court system of determining creditor priority is not consistent 
with weak entity shielding. Roman courts generally followed a first-to-file payout of debt 
procedure whereby creditors were paid based on the order in which they filed their 
claims.
81
 But the development of weak entity shielding has generally occured 
simultaneously with the development of pro rata bankruptcy courts in which creditors are 
paid out in proportion to debt they issued as a proportion of the firm’s assets.82 This 
development has ineluctably followed the creation of entity shielding because 
“prioritizing creditors based on when they file claims is incompatible with weak entity 
shielding, which prioritizes instead based on the distinction between firm creditors and 
personal creditors.”83 In Ulpian’s willingness to partition firm assets by the firms’ 
differing locations, he acknowledged a factor that later motivated the creation of pro rata 
bankruptcy courts. He did not, however, fundamentally change the Roman first-to-file 
payment of debts. In other words, even though the creditor to the taberna at Bucinum did 
not have to compete with creditors of the taberna across the Tiber, the amount he would 
recoup would still depend on his temporal rank and not on the relative proportion of the 
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firm’s assets he had supplied. The absence of pro rata bankruptcy is consistent with an 
absence of institutionally sanctioned entity shielding.   
I have already explained why transaction costs are too high to create entity 
shielding via firm-negotiated contracts. Another alternative to contracts is a so-called 
agency with title structure, where there is a “…transfer of ownership of those assets to the 
manager(s) of the business, subject to a contractual commitment by the manager, acting 
as agent for the owners, to manage the assets for the exclusive benefit of the owners and 
to reconvey the assets to the owners under appropriate circumstances.” 84 This shares 
some similarities to the Roman slave-manager form.  In this case too, there turn out to be 
transaction costs that are prohibitively expensive to avoid sans institutionalized rules. 
A Roman slave could not hold formal title to property, but the peculium was, by 
definition, property to which the slave held a quasi-title.
85
 A seeming advantage of 
agency with title is that it avoids the problem of having to negotiate for waivers from 
each of the master’s personal creditors by making the agent a de facto conditional owner 
of the assets. This replaces the group of prohibitively expensive contracts with one 
owner-agent contract and would make bonding the firm assets to creditors credible 
because “…it would be sufficient to show them the waivers in the agency contracts 
between the owners and the manager.”86 Although this would effectively shield the 
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owner’s assets from his personal creditors, it would not shield the business assets from 
the manager’s personal creditors.87  
The lack of asset separation within the peculium(s) would have raised a problem 
analogous to that of the dice-addicted slave I raised before.
88
 But any attempt to partition 
assets within the peculium itself absent organization law would be subject to precisely the 
same costs and moral hazards in attempting to establish entity shielding contractually. 
This would lead to high monitoring costs not only for firm creditors but also for the 
firm’s owner, both of whom would have incentive to monitor the slave-agent’s 
management of the firm assets.  
The Roman jurists were aware of issues pertaining to asset partitioning. The 
actiones adiectae qualitatis established a fairly robust form of defensive asset 
partitioning (owner shielding) for slave-managed firms. There was, however, no 
corresponding institutionally sanctioned form of affirmative asset partitioning (entity 
shielding) for peculia firms, with the exception of the peculium castrense. In an historical 
context the existence of limited personal liability without entity shielding is unique, since 
the development of owner-shielding in part developed to compensate personal creditors 
for institutionally sanctioned infringement of their rights via entity shielding. It has been 
suggested that the fact  
…that the Romans gave the peculium owner shielding but apparently not 
entity shielding suggests that Rome’s legal devices for preventing debtor 
opportunism were less than fully effective, and therefore that commercial 
entity shielding may not have been feasible.
89
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There is also no effective alternative to institutionalized entity shielding—in other words, 
the functional equivalent argument of Roman commercial law, at least in regards to entity 
shielding, fails because there can be no functional equivalent.
90
  
Given the lengths to which I have gone to express my skepticism of the 
functionalist arguments of Roman commercial law, my contention that the lack of 
affirmative asset partitioning had profound consequences on the Roman wine-firm should 
be unsurprising. Romans’ ability to use slaves as agents and to develop fairly autonomous 
nexuses of contracts was important. Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that, in the 
historical development of corporations and multi-owner firms, limited liability was “of a 
distinctly secondary importance.”91 In particular, entity shielding drastically reduces the 
monitoring costs incurred by creditors to the firm owners and the owners themselves who 
must otherwise continuously evaluate the personal and outside business affairs of the 
other owners.  
Rome’s wine industry intuitively seems like a sector favoring integration because 
market imperfections and its corresponding costs were high. Pliny’s letter, with which I 
began this chapter, gives an excellent example of one way in which a structural market 
imperfection (information costs) could have dauntingly expensive repercussions. Grapes 
are highly perishable and require “a great deal of effort to coordinate the supply between 
                                                                                                                                                                             
because masters could not be obligated by their slaves. Granting of a degree of owner liability should be 
seen as bowing to the reality it would be nearly impossible to use slaves in business if masters were 
wholly unliable for their actions. The normal historical development has run in the reverse direction: 
managers’ default position is of full personal liability (as is today the case in the modern US general 
partnership) which can be limited in some circumstances. 
90
 The question of why Romans never institutionalized entity shielding despite some positive pressures is 
outside the scope of this chapter. Suffice it to say, however, that I suspect that it is a result of some 
seemingly unrelated path-dependent outcomes in social relationships, governmental restrictions, and 
technological development.  
91
 Hansmann and Kraakman (2000: 387).  
97 
 
growers and wineries at harvest time.”92 But the non-existence of Roman entity shielding 
placed severe constraints on the size of firms: firms with multiple owners sufficient for 
significant capital-pooling would have been very difficult to sustain. This difficulty must 
have impacted the Roman wine trade, an industry that could have benefited from the 
ability to vertically integrate its operations at different sectors. Though it is possible that, 
over the several centuries in which the city of Rome imported wine from a Mediterranean 
wine catchment, some firm managed to vertically integrate its operations to some degree, 
the structural constraints generated by Rome’s system of organization law prevented such 
integration from being more than a fluke and was certainly never a structural feature of 
the Roman wine trade. Rather, firms (often based on the familia) would have generally 
focused on a particular sector, for example, production, transportation, or distribution. 
Pliny and the Sestii’s organizational set-up, described at this chapter’s beginning, are 
consistent with this prediction.   
All things being equal, wine commerce favors vertical integration for a number of 
reasons. There are numerous sunk-costs such as presses, fermentation vats (lacus), and 
storage containers (dolia, amphora). Manufacturing containers required investment in 
clay-beds, pottery-wheels, and human capital investment, namely, skilled employees or 
slaves. Between the producer, transporter, and retailer there would have been problematic 
information asymmetries. A wine producer in Southern France wishing to sell his wine at 
Rome probably had neither particularly detailed nor au courant information about 
Rome’s prevailing market conditions. Such asset-specificities and information 
asymmetries generated expensive transaction costs for those using market mechanisms 
for commerce in wine. In such an environment we would expect to see an increasing 
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tendency toward vertical integration as the geographic catchment area from which Rome 
drew wine expanded.  
In fact, this was the conclusion of a recent article in Agribusiness which analyzed 
upstream integration in the wine industry (i.e., vintners’ acquisition and control of the 
grapes) from the transaction-cost style approach described above and found that  
…transaction cost economics’ predictions explain upstream integration in 
wine industry and our hypotheses based on the transaction cost framework 
are strongly supported. First, grower’s asset specificity has a positive 
impact on vertical integration. Likewise, the results show that two forms of 
uncertainty, behavioral and environmental, have a positive relationship 
with vertical integration. Conversely, size is negatively related to vertical 
integration. Finally, evidence is found that high added-value products are 
more likely to be integrated.
93
 
 
To be sure, there are some differences between the object of the Agribusiness 
study and Roman wine operations. Most importantly, this study treated upstream 
integration as opposed to downstream integration.
94
 This difference is probably less 
important than it first appears because in considering a Roman landholder integrating 
downstream wine interests or a Spanish vintner integrating upstream agricultural 
interests, we are dealing with integration by the capital-rich party. True, the Agribusiness 
study was fairly narrow in focus, addressing only the problem of integration between 
grape-grower and wine-producer. But the same economic motivations should, however, 
hold a fortiori for the entire stream of wine production: As was noted in the April 2002 
volume of Wine Business Monthly, there is today a “tendency for wine companies to be 
vertically integrated” in all sectors, from growing and manufacture to bottling, 
advertising, and distribution.
95
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The tendency for consolidation within the wine industry makes sense when we 
consider the factors encouraging integration. Transaction cost economists explain that 
firms often choose to integrate when bilateral relations are prohibitively costly, for 
example, in relationships fraught with incentives for opportunism, a high cost of writing 
contracts, or an inability to force one of both parties to commit themselves credibly to ex 
post enforcement of ex ante contractual terms.
96
 In such cases,  
Internal organizations are likely to better harmonize these conflicting 
interests and provide for a smoother and less costly adaptation process 
under these circumstances, facilitating more efficient ex ante investment in 
the relationship and more efficient adaptation to changing supply and 
demand conditions over time.
97
 
 
Consolidating problematic market transactions within a firm also generates costs, 
primarily the bureaucratic costs of organizing intrafirm activities, incentive arrangements, 
and monitoring employee performance. It is predicted that vertical integration will only 
occur when those transaction costs are less than those incurred by using the market 
because an economic actor’s goal is to “align transactions…with governance 
structures.”98 
 As I have shown, the institutional background behind Roman firms strongly 
constrained the extent to which vertical integration was a feasible governance structure 
because the lack of entity shielding made costs of integration prohibitively expensive. We 
would, therefore, expect that Romans made a correspondingly high effort to lower the 
cost of bilateral transactions, in particular, contracts. This is ineluctable: either business is 
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done via contractual, market governance structures or within a firm.
99
 If the latter is too 
expensive then the former must be made cheap enough to be usable. If both governance 
mechanisms cost more than the profits available, no one would bother being in business 
at all. But since we know the Roman wine industry functioned well enough to supply 
hundred of millions of liters of wine to the city of Rome each year, we can safely say that 
it met the city’s demand. Understanding how requires us to examine how Romans 
compensated for the pressures against vertical integration.  
“Everything is in the Power of the Contracting Parties…” 
Rome’s legal system precluded the solution commonly taken by modern wine-
firms to avoid the great uncertainties in contracting: extensive vertical integration. It is 
my contention, however, that the rules of contract, especially as regards wine, became 
fairly sophisticated and were market oriented. My argument analyzes how the jurists 
formulated the default rules governing the sale of wine and suggests that the rules were 
designed primarily to correct information asymmetries between buyers and sellers. 
Indeed, the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Verus perfectly encapsulated the modus 
operandi of Roman wine traders in decreeing that “everything is in the power of the 
contracting parties.”100  
We have, unfortunately, only one wine contract from Italy: Cato’s model contract 
provided in the de agri cultura, and it concerns wine, already pressed, stored in large 
vats: 
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(148) Vinum in doliis hoc modo uenire oportet: uini in culleos sing. 
quadragenae et singulae urnae dabuntur. Quod neque aceat neque 
muceat, id dabitur. In triduo proxumo uiri boni arbitratu degustato; si non 
ita fecerit, uinum pro degustato erit. Quot dies per dominum mora fuerit, 
quo minus uinum degustet, totidem dies emptori procedent. [2] Vinum 
accipito ante K. Ian. primas; si non ante acceperit, dominus uinum 
admetietur. Quod admensus erit, pro eo dominus rem soluito; si emptor 
postularit, dominus ius iurandum dabit uerum fecisse. Locus uinis ad K. 
Octobres primas dabitur; si ante non deportauerit, dominus uino quid 
uolet faciet. 
(148) Wine in dolia should be sold in this way: There will be forty-one 
urns to the culleus. That which is neither vinegary nor musty will be 
given. Let a tasting occur within the next three days according to the 
judgment of a good man; if he will not have done so, let the wine be 
considered tasted. By however many days the owner delayed from letting 
the wine be tasted, let the same number be added for the buyer. [2] Let the 
wine be received before the first of January; if he will not receive them, let 
the owner measure out the wine. Let the owner discharge the affair on this 
basis, i.e., by what he has measured. If the buyer demands it, the owner 
will give an oath that he has acted honestly. A place for the wines will be 
given by the first of October. If the buyer will not have removed them by 
then, the owner will do what he wishes with the wine. 
It is true that Cato, writing in the mid-2
nd
 century BCE, somewhat predates the 
epoch studied here. Nevertheless, his contract’s basic features are consistent both with 
features identified by later jurists as typical features of wine-sales, and comparanda are 
found in Egyptian papyri as well, which encourage us to use Cato’s description, in its 
general form if not in all the individual details.    
Warranty clauses, for example, appear frequently in Egyptian papyri, in a type of 
sale commonly called sale of wine on delivery.
101
 These contracts generally cover a full 
year’s activity. In winter or spring, a wine-grower sells a quantity of his yet-to-be-
produced-wine; generally acknowledges that he has received the full payment; and 
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obligates himself to provide the agreed upon quantity at the agreed upon time, commonly 
in the month of Mesore (July/August): vintage time.
102
 In a sizeable percentage (about 
70%) of contracts of sale on delivery, there was an additional clause in which the vendor 
further guarantees that he will replace any wine found vinegary, moldy, or unfermented 
for several additional months, usually until Tybi (Dec/Jan).
103
 
But these guarantees were not ubiquitous, and the papyri fall fairly neatly into two 
categories: those with warranties and those without.
104
 Jakab has persuasively argued that 
these two contract types reflect two fundamentally different types of sales. In sales 
without a guarantee, the buyer will have taken the must immediately after the pressing 
and made the wine himself.
105
 Generally, these contracts also included a clause 
specifying that the buyer was responsible for providing the necessary jars.
106
 Conversely, 
it seems likely that, in contracts including a guarantee, the seller fermented the wine in 
his cellar and took responsibility for the wine’s quality. The degustatio and traditio of the 
wine would almost certainly have occurred no later than the date at which the guarantee 
terminated.
107
  
These warranty provisions deserve a much more thorough study than is within the 
scope of this chapter. A primary purpose of warranties is its use as a signaling device by 
which consumers can differentiate high-quality from low-quality producers and as 
insurance devices offered by producers to encourage risk-averse consumers to make a 
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purchase.
108
 Generally, however, variable warranty lengths are the crucial signaling 
device. Strangely, Egyptian warranty provisions invariably terminate at the same time, 
the beginning of January. In addition, differing quality of wine should be reflected in the 
price since the buyers had an opportunity to taste the wine as part of the purchase. One 
might think that the warranty was actually a guarantee against the vagaries of 
transportation and that transporation was too undifferentiated to justify differing warranty 
lengths.
109
 There is, however, nothing in the contracts suggesting that the wine-maker 
was responsible for transportation, and it is not likely that a producer would guarantee a 
factor entirely out of his control.
110
 These warranties demand their own study, for their 
purpose is fairly mysterious. 
More generally, it has been argued that, in a long-term, bilateral relationship 
where sellers sell repeatedly the same product and buyers have a broader base of past 
experience and reputational knowledge,  
Risk-neutral parties will approximately choose the first-best levels of 
quality investments and care-taking, if the discount rate of future profits is 
small enough. So, even in a situation where warranties are not 
enforceable, there is a realistic chance that parties will choose the optimal 
quality and care investments.
111
  
 
In other words, long-term models of warranty formation suggest that, when certain 
conditions hold, legal intervention will not be necessary because first-best warranties will 
be created through privately-ordered arrangements. This finding is broadly in line with 
                                                          
108
 Cf. Akerlof (1970: 488-500); Priest (1981: 1297-1352); Grossman (1981: 461-83); Mann and Wissink 
(1990: 432-36); Wehrt (1999: 179-99); Murthy and Djamaludin (2002: 231-60) provide a review of the 
literature.  
109
 This possibility was suggested to me by the economist Donald Jones, email to author, September 28, 
2011.  
110
 In bilateral, one-shot contracts “the organization of warranty contracts is essentially determined by the 
consumer’s potential influence on parts of the product” (Wehrt 1999: 188).  
111
 Wehrt (1999: 193-4).  
104 
 
historical economic investigations regarding the role of reputation in private-ordered 
contracts.
112
 
Strikingly, the jurists only make passing references to wine warranties. Ulpian 
mentioned that the vendor might accept liability for vinegary wine (periculum acoris), 
Pomponius referred to a sale of wine “with vinegars and musts excepted” (exceptis acidis 
et mucidis), and Gaius identified situations where the vendor might make guarantees 
about the wine’s quality (si quidem de bonitate eorum adfirmavit venditor).113 Despite 
their recognition that contracts of sale might include specific warranty provisions, they 
did not describe them in any detail nor give any wine-specific warranty default rules. 
This coincidence raises the tantalizing possibility that the jurists paid little attention to 
wine-warranties not because they were unimportant nor through ignorance but precisely 
because no legal intervention was needed.  
That proposition can be tested by comparing juristic discussion of warranties with 
that on tasting, which was, by contrast, extensive. This analysis reveals that legal 
intervention was useful in crafting contractual rules for tasting and that the jurists 
deliberately designed rules beneficial to efficient trade. Tasting wine was an equally 
important part of Roman wine commerce.
114
 Cato, who was unique in describing the sale 
of wine, advocated a fairly short, three day period during which the buyer could taste the 
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wine (in triduo proxumo uiri boni arbitratu degustato; si non ita fecerit, uinum pro 
degustato erit).
115
  
Roman winemakers were known to doctor their wine with herbs and spices 
including marjoram, thyme, hazelwort, juniper, myrtle, saffron, and cardamom which 
were undoubtedly used to obscure “the failings of an inferior wine.”116 We can compare 
this to later medieval wine trade where “…the amateur was often duped into buying a 
mixture of the dregs of many good wines, or bad wines mixed with white of egg, honey, 
and other sweeting matter.”117 Skillfully tasting the wine was crucial for adjudicating its 
commercial worth, and poor judgment (or skipping tasting altogether) could have dire 
consequences.
118
 Moreover, the transaction costs generated by information asymmetries 
between the contracting parties were extremely high. It was for this reason that tasting 
caught the jurists’ eyes.119 
We can use as a starting point Bruce Frier’s article, “Roman Law and the Wine 
Trade: The Problem of Vinegar Sold as Wine.”120 He began with a problem presented in 
D. 18.1.9.2 (Ulp.) concerning vinegar sold as wine. That case where a buyer has 
purchased what he thinks is wine but, unbeknownst to him and the seller, it has turned 
into vinegar prior to the sale.
121
 In short, Frier’s article advanced the following argument: 
early jurists considered the legal problem one of error in substantia, a fundamental error 
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in the “substance” of the object of sale (for example, if I buy a jar thinking it is gold when 
it is actually bronze) that voided the contract.
122
 Error in substantia (as opposed primarily 
to error in corpore) has generally been viewed as a result “of the prevailing system of 
remedies for breach of warranty…to fill an unsatisfactory gap in the protection of the 
purchaser.”123 Frier, on the other hand, considered the doctrine an “illogical adjunct to the 
rules of formation on sale through consensus,” which developed as a form of primitive 
buyer-protection.
124
 By the late classical period, however, the law of sale had 
independently developed sufficient buyer protection so as to restrict the scope of error in 
substantia to all but a few specialized cases.
125
  
Ulpian, however, differed from other late classical jurists who wished to abandon 
the doctrine of error in substantia altogether. In the case of wine, Ulpian precluded using 
error in substantia for wine which had turned to vinegar prior to the sale as a basis for 
voiding the sale but allowed it to be subsumed into the doctrine of “fundamental defect,” 
which made the seller liable for the difference in price if he was unaware of the 
acidification.
126
 Frier concluded that this development should be seen as analogous to 
later Common Law developments whereby “Roman law was “receiving a standard of 
trade associated with ‘mature mercantilism’”.127 
Based on the preceding analysis, we can broaden this argument to consider how 
the jurists engaged with the problems of the wine trade more generally. In the case above, 
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Ulpian’s argument against using error in substantia to void sales of vinegar-sold-as-wine 
likely mirrored “standards of trade,” and the rule he crafted reflected mercantile practice 
on the ground. In this case, the legal default rule is simply that which contracting parties 
would prefer. However, the legal default rule for degustatio generally was to assume that 
no tasting was necessary unless it was specifically contracted. This default rule was 
almost certainly the opposite of what the contracting parties would prefer, since both 
Cato’s contract and every Egyptian record of wine sale includes tasting. This apparent 
strangeness, however, is not evidence for juristic ignorance or apathy toward the wine 
trade. Rather, this default rule was also designed to enhance the efficiency of contracting 
for wine.  
If contracts were complete, that is, if every right and duty for both parties were 
made explicit for every contingency ex ante and ex post, then it would never be necessary 
to appeal to an exogenous body of law because the controversy could be decided by the 
terms of the contract itself.
128
 In the real world, all contracts are incomplete. There are 
always certain contingencies either impossible to stipulate ahead of time or prohibitively 
costly to negotiate because their probabilities of occurrence are very low. In these cases, 
it behooves the law to furnish “default rules, in order to resolve any disputes that are not 
settled by the terms of the document itself.”129 How these default rules are chosen can 
make a great deal of difference to the efficiency of economic transactions, and the 
question of how default rules should be chosen has garnered a great deal of attention 
from those interested in the economics of law.
130
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These analyses have both a positive and a normative component. In the normative 
sense, arguments over setting default rules are basically prescriptive and suggest how 
lawmakers ought to enhance economic efficiency in their selection of default rules. In a 
positive sense, the manner of default-rule creation is closely associated with arguments 
on the efficiency of common law. The analyses suggest, somewhat vaguely, that common 
law efficiency will in aggregate select efficient contract default rules.
131
 One could use 
my argument that the Roman jurists’ contractual rules for wine did in fact promote 
contractual efficiency as evidence for the positive efficiency of common law, but one 
should be aware that the truth of the former does not automatically entail the truth of the 
latter. And whether Roman jurists were intentionally (i.e., in a consistently normative 
sense) seeking efficient rules is an even harder question to answer.
132
  
One approach to selecting default rules is that of hypothetical consent, sometimes 
called majoritarian or market mimicking rules.
133
 In this approach, the law should try to 
fill in contractual gaps with what the two parties would have chosen if they had explicitly 
negotiated the missing piece. Ulpian’s desire to eliminate error in substantia arguments 
as applied to wine that turned into vinegar prior to sale is best understood as a rule of 
hypothetical consent to an un-contracted for but implied warranty.  Ulpian recognized 
that treating the wine’s acidification as a problem of error in substantia did not favor 
efficient commerce in wine because in many cases the buyer would want redress but 
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would not want the sale itself voided. Rather, Ulpian (D. 19.1.13 pr) considered it better 
to grant an actio empti analogous to the actio quanti minoris arising out of the aedilitian 
rules of liability, thus giving the buyer redress to reclaim whatever the difference in price 
would have been had he known about the product’s latent defect.134  
Indeed, since the parties could contract for warranty provisions, we can assume 
that buyers did not do so only when they were either badly misinformed about the 
product’s quality or, more likely, the market was such that negotiating for such a term 
engendered prohibitively high transaction costs. This is an example of one of the two 
economic arguments advanced in favor of majoritarian rules, namely, that in cases where 
it would be “costly…for the parties to make their contract more complete by specifying 
their own rule…selecting a default rule that matches whatever rule the parties prefer may 
save some parties from having to incur those transaction costs, thus producing all the 
benefits of the most efficient rule…”135 
We note, however, that effectively establishing market-mimicking default rules 
depends to a great extent on a fairly homogenous, symmetrical market. If this does not 
hold, crafting the efficient rule becomes very difficult. Frier, for example, considers it 
unclear “…why Ulpian did not allow the buyer to have his choice of remedies—either 
avoiding the sale or preserving it and seeking compensation.”136 But this failure is 
consistent with a problem often arising when market-mimicking rules are created for 
imperfect markets. For example, in the presence of imperfect information, it has been 
asked whether “…the law [should] adopt as its default remedy the one that is in fact most 
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efficient, or should it adopt the less efficient remedy that the (imperfectly informed) 
parties would choose if left to their own devices?”137 Ulpian’s decision could be seen in 
this light as a paternalistic decision to remove what he considered a less efficient legal 
rule out of fear that many parties might choose to leave it in place.
138
 
The confusion over which remedy to choose could more generally arise out of 
common market imperfections in which a single default rule might only be efficient for a 
percentage of contracting parties.
139
 In such cases, the law faces a choice: should it try to 
tailor the default rules to create a different default rule for each type of contracting party 
or should a generic rule suffice, thus forcing a percentage of contracting pairs to incur the 
costs either of negotiating an alternative rule or accepting the non-advantageous default 
rule?
140
 The higher the market imperfections are, the more difficult it will be for 
lawmakers to craft an effective market mimicking rule. In the first place, the transaction 
costs incurred by the legal system in developing tailored, market-mimicking rules may be 
prohibitively costly (or impossible) and usually result in “vague standards…which entail 
higher litigation costs…and make it hard for the parties to predict what rule will be 
applied to their relationship.”141 Moreover, tailored market mimicking rules have been 
criticized for giving parties incentive to shift the contracting costs from themselves onto 
the courts by simply avoiding negotiation, in other words, deliberately making contracts 
excessively incomplete.
142
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In consequence, there were many factors limiting market-mimicking mechanisms 
in the Roman law of commerce generally and wine in particular. First, as we saw in 
Pliny’s letter, the market for wine was highly variable, differed considerably by place and 
time, and had severe information asymmetries between contracting parties.
143
 These 
market imperfections would have made it very difficult for the jurists to craft effective 
majoritarian rules. Moreover, the increased cost to the courts of crafting the rules and the 
possible encouragement of cost-shifting contractual incompleteness would have made 
this approach unattractive, uncommon, and inefficient.  
Rather, we consistently see the jurists adopting an opposite technique, crafting 
rules that conform to penalty-default rules. The penalty-default term was introduced in a 
highly influential article by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner in 1989. They attempted to 
show, both from a theoretical and positive perspective, that in situations of great 
information asymmetry, the law may be better off providing a rule which is not 
advantageous to the parties, thereby inducing the parties to contract around the rule with 
the expectation that, in so doing, the better informed party will be forced to reveal crucial 
information to the less informed party.
144
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Surprisingly, the jurists made explicit their general interest in tailoring their 
pronouncements to the benefit of wine commerce. Indeed, it is thought that the 1
st
 century 
jurist Sabinus dedicated a whole book to problems related to wine.
145
 In his commentary 
on that book, Ulpian agreed with Labeo against Trebatius’ ruling that a wine buyer’s 
sealing of a container constituted an effective traditio (transfer of possession), because 
one sealed the container to identify it and protect it from substitution, a reason clearly 
grounded not in legal dogma but in the traders’ actual intentions.146  
Likewise, Ulpian pointed out that although a wine vendor might have the legal 
right to pour out wine if the buyer had not taken possession of it by the appointed day, it 
was more praiseworthy if he did not.
147
 Gaius drew a distinction between the wine’s first 
seller and a “merchant who is accustomed to buy and sell wines.”148 Papirius quoted a 
rescript of Marcus Aurelius and Verus who were aware (and declined to regulate) the 
extent to which prices and measuring standards of wine differed from place to place.
149
 
There is preserved an enticing but disappointingly short description of a problem that 
could arise in assessing damages for lost profit if there was a delay in the traditio of wine 
when the sale and action were brought in a different place from where the wine was to be 
handed over.
150
  All this would seem to justify Frier’s contention that the jurists expended 
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considerable effort “…in adapting the scaffolds of Roman private law to the peculiar 
needs and usages of the wine trade.”151 
The jurists’ default rules regarding tasting illustrate how those scaffolds were 
erected. Tasting the new wine is among the most important moments in a given wine’s 
career.
152
 It is here that its quality is adjudged and its potential price becomes clear. 
Should the wine taste vinegary, moldy, or even give the impression that spoilage is likely, 
severe loss will accrue to the seller. The moment’s historical importance is perfectly 
captured in a beautiful tableau from the Flemish Book of Hours (late 15
th
 century) in 
which a nobleman takes a goblet of wine drawn from a freshly pressed barrel for tasting 
in preparation for purchase.
153
 Today, it has been estimated that the tasting judgments of 
certain professional tasters can result in a nearly three euro per bottle variation in price.
154
 
Several excerpts contained under title 18.6 treated degustatio and its effects on the 
allocation of risk. Ulpian stated that, in the absence of a degustatio, the risk for the wine 
going bad was entirely the buyer’s.155 The seller could, however, contractually obligate 
himself to bear the risk for any period of time. If the seller failed to specify a precise time 
period, then it should be until the tasting (quod si non designavit tempus, eatenus 
periculum sustinere debet, quoad degustetur vinum). There are two important default 
rules set by this: first, in the absence of contractual agreement otherwise, all risk for wine 
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spoilage after the sale is complete is the buyer’s; second, the parties may contract around 
this rule, in general, by including a degustatio in the future unless the seller has agreed to 
bear the risk for a longer time.
156
  
The effects of tasting on risk allocation are further expanded in D. 18.6.4.1 (Ulp.), 
concerning an unspecified date for tasting. He says:  
Quare si dies degustationi adiectus non erit, quandoque degustare emptor 
poterit et quoad degustaverit, periculum acoris et mucoris ad venditorem 
pertinebit: dies enim degustationi praestitutus meliorem condicionem 
emptoris facit.
157
 
 
Therefore, if the day for tasting has not been stated, when the buyer will 
be able to taste and until he has tasted, the danger for acidifying and mold 
is the vendor’s, for a set-day for tasting makes the buyer’s condition 
better.  
 
As it stands, it is difficult to make sense of this. In the first place, the text would imply 
that in the absence of a defined date for tasting, the seller must bear the risk indefinitely. 
De Zulueta explained the seeming implausibility of the vendor bearing indefinitely long 
risk by suggesting that the seller could “probably…put him in the wrong by giving him 
notice to taste within a reasonable time.”158 If this is right, then the final sentence, which 
claims that a defined date is to the buyer’s advantage, seems fatuous, so de Zulueta 
follows Cujas and Mommsen’s erroneous emendation of emptoris (the buyer’s) to eius 
(his, i.e, the seller).
159
 Yaron in contrast argued that quandoque degustare emptor poterit 
meant “when the buyer is in a position to taste;” that is, quandoque is nearly “as soon 
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as.”160 That left the seller the option of forcing an immediate tasting if no specific, later 
date was contractually specified.  
In my view, the correct interpretation is a combination of de Zulueta’s and 
Yaron’s. The former’s contention that the seller could issue a notice obliging the 
purchaser to taste within a certain amount of time seems plausible based on a comparison 
with D. 18.6.4.2 (Ulp.) on the non-removal of purchased goods. Yaron’s assertion that a 
defined day should be preferred because it precluded the buyer from being forced to taste 
earlier than he wished is also plausible. Yaron’s belief, however, that the seller could 
force an immediate tasting (or nearly so) is an example of allowing logic to trump 
common sense. If a buyer were in a position where he could taste immediately (that is, if 
the sale took place at or near the wine) and if the buyer did not want to taste immediately, 
he would never fail to contract for a dies adiectus. Rather, the unspecified tasting would 
likely result when the point of sale was distinct from the wine’s location.161  
This interpretation is made more plausible if we bear in mind that this discussion 
of an indefinite tasting comes in a title concerning wine sold per aversionem (at one price 
in bulk), a form of sale which Jakab identified, in the case of wine as “meistens in 
großem Umfang, auf den Großmärkten, meistens in Form einer Auktion gehandelt…die 
verkaufte Ware bleibt noch für längere Zeit, meistens für Monate, beim Verkäufer 
gelagert.”162 In other words, wine sold in bulk could be sold at a distance from its storage 
location and could lay there for some time thereafter. The buyer might prefer in those 
cases not to specify a date for tasting. However, once the buyer was in a position to taste 
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the wine, the vendor probably could oblige him to do so as soon as possible. There are 
two points to take away from this overview: first, tasting was a crucial component in the 
allocation of risk between the two parties; second, the contractual default rule in the sale 
of wine was no tasting.   
This is actually somewhat counterintuitive: clearly the buyer would want to taste 
the wine, and it is also in the seller’s interest since, ceteris paribus, he can charge more 
money for good wine if it is tasted than un-tasted.
163
 True, as we saw above, wine was 
often sold prior to production, but, even in those cases, there was often a tasting at which 
the buyer could refuse the wine. Ulpian observed that “it is difficult to believe that 
anyone would contract for a sale without a tasting.”164 Suppose the default rule in the sale 
of wine is the majoritarian rule that wine has been tasted unless it has been explicitly 
stated otherwise. Suppose further that the seller knows that this is the default rule but the 
buyer does not. And allow that a buyer will generally pay a higher price for wine he has 
tasted than for un-tasted wine. In certain cases, the seller will have incentive to withhold 
that information because it allows him to engage in rent-seeking activity, profiting by the 
difference in price between what he could charge with a tasting and without.  
We can capture this relationship with a buyer-seller game played under imperfect 
information.
165
 Imagine that there can be two types of vendors (V), a competent vendor 
(VF) and an incompetent vendor (VD). These types are binary in that there is no in-
between type. In any given game, both types can choose to play fairly (i.e., sell their 
product fairly) or act opportunistically (cheat). There is a probability, x, that any given 
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vendor is F (competent) and 1-x that he is type D (incompetent). The buyer (B) of course 
prefers to deal with type F but he can only infer what type of player he is dealing with by 
signals given to him by the vendor. The possible signals are shown in the game-tree 
below.
166
  
In any given transaction, the buyer can receive three possible signals from the 
vendor. Either B  receives a negative signal, in which case he is perfectly informed that 
the vendor is type D and is opportunistically taking advantage of him or B receives a 
positive signal, in which case he is perfectly informed that the vendor is fair. The 
difficulty arises with a neutral signal because it is compatible both with a competent 
vendor acting opportunistically or an incompetent vendor acting fairly. When faced with 
a neutral signal, the buyer has a choice to make: he can punish the vendor, taking the 
chance that he is unfairly punishing an honest (but incompetent) vendor, or he can enter 
into a contract, and take risk that he will come out the worst in a deal with a competent 
(but cheating) vendor.  
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Figure 3.1: Vendor-Buyer Game  
  
This game has two perfect Bayesian equilibria dictated by the buyer’s initial 
beliefs about the a priori value of x.
167
 If the buyer believes x is low, he will be willing to 
contract with a vendor displaying a neutral signal; a vendor will seek to preserve the 
buyer’s initial beliefs because this allows a vendor of type F to behave opportunistically 
without being punished. In this case, both opportunistic and fair vendors will elect to 
preserve the buyer’s initial beliefs, that is, to display a neutral signal. If the buyer believes 
x is high, he will punish a neutral signal—“separating equilibria thus reveals the private 
information…to the competitive market.”168 A vendor of type F who is not behaving 
opportunistically will avoid displaying a neutral signal. A fair vendor of type D will have 
incentive to reveal private information to the buyer to avoid being unfairly punished. In 
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the aggregate, economic efficiency is enhanced by a rule encouraging buyers to give a 
non-neutral signal.  
Conclusion 
Degustatio served as such a signaling mechanism; however, only a default rule 
assuming it had not been stipulated encouraged a separating equilibrium. Under a market-
mimicking default rule, the vendor’s not stipulating for a tasting would be a neutral signal 
consistent either with a dishonest, competent vendor opportunistically seeking to capture 
information-rents or with an honest but incompetent vendor, poorly informed about the 
law. With a market mimicking rule, legal institutions would not improve the level of 
information on the marketplace.
169
 The situation changes, however, under a no-tasting 
default rule. A competent vendor not behaving opportunistically will want a tasting 
because he can make more money for his product. In this case, a buyer will interpret 
leaving the default rule in place (no wine-tasting provision) as a signal of opportunistic 
behavior or as an genuine signal of poor wine quality.  
The codification of degustatio as a penalty-default rule, however, introduced a 
new element of moral hazard by giving an incentive to the buyer to behave 
opportunistically by penalizing good wine. He could, in other words, engage in rent-
seeking activities on the difference in value between tasting-approved and unapproved 
wine. The jurists were aware of this problem: Pomponius raised this as a possible issue 
and followed Proculus’ decision, which Yaron considered likely to have been derived 
from an actual case:
170
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 A classic example of the effects of imperfect information on buyers’ selection is found in Akerlof (1970: 
488-500) on adverse selection in the used-car industry.  
170
 D. 18.6.6. Yaron (1959: 74): “Probably this was an actual case decided by Proculus, and we cannot 
know what was the factual situation underlying it.” I think we can.  
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Si vina emerim exceptis acidis et mucidis et mihi expediat acida quoque 
accipere, Proculus ait, quamvis id emptoris causa exceptum sit, tamen 
acida et mucida non venisse: nam quae invitus emptor accipere non 
cogeretur, iniquum esse non permitti venditori vel alii ea vendere. 
  
If I have bought wines with the vinegars and musts excepted and it is 
expedient for me also to accept the vinegars, Proculus says that, although 
the exception was made for the buyer’s sake, nevertheless the vinegars and 
musts are not sold, for it is unfair that the seller not be permitted to sell 
those things, which the buyer is not compelled unwillingly to accept, to 
another.  
 
Yaron found this case peculiar since it reversed the usual problem: here the seller wanted 
to void the sale because wine was adjudged as vinegar.
171
 Frier noted this case only in 
passing because it showed the jurist’s recognition that “wine and vinegar are…alternative 
marketable substances” derived from a common origin.172 In fact, the case is considerably 
more interesting: in a world where at least some jurists considered the sale of vinegar 
sold as wine as valid, there was incentive for the buyer to engage opportunistically at the 
degustatio by rendering negative judgment against good wine and bringing a subsequent 
action on the sale for a refund of the difference between the payment price and what he 
would have paid had he known it was vinegar.
173
 Proculus’ case solved that problem of 
moral hazard by removing the buyer’s incentive to lie. Proculus’ rule forbade the buyers 
from keeping products on which he had rendered negative judgment. The jurists thus 
ensured that the buyer could not have his wine and drink it too. 
We can see, therefore, the jurists’ setting of default rules as an attempt to induce 
the better informed party to reveal information ex ante—signaling—to the other party to 
reduce transaction costs derived from uncertainty and the ensuing ex post renegotiation or 
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 Ibid.  
172
 Frier (1983: 277).  
173
 Cf. D. 19.1.13 pr (Ulp.): …qui pecus morbosum aut tignum vitiosum vendidit, si quidem ignorans fecit, id 
tantum ex empto actione praestaturum, quanto minoris essem empturus si id ita esse scissem. Cf. 
Zimmermann (1996: 320).  
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litigation. This method of creating default rules belongs to a class of penalty default rules 
and promoted economically efficient sales of wine by reducing contractual transaction 
costs. But the jurists were also minimalists: they did not deal with the extremely puzzling 
warranties on wine. This should be explained by remembering the warranties, unlike 
tasting, can often reach first-best outcomes without legal intervention. 
In conclusion, Rome’s body of organizational law was not a first-best solution to 
economically efficient commerce. It had no system of entity shielding, so there were 
significant constraints on the number of owners, pooled capital, and degree of integration 
that wine firms exhibited. Rome’s supply of wine depended to a remarkable degree on 
bilateral relations between unintegrated sectors of the industry: production, transporation, 
and distribution. That this system worked as well as it did owed something to the jurists 
who, like Teddy Roosevelt, tried to do what they could with what they had where they 
were. Those attempts are particularily visible in their detailed consideration of Rome’s 
wine commerce and sensible solutions to those problems least solvable through private 
bargaining.  
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Chapter IV 
Wine Production 
 “Quality, Quality, Quality: What is Quality to Me?” 
In the previous chapter, I argued that Roman wine commerce, though driven by 
private enterprise and lacking active state intervention, depended a good deal on the city 
of Rome’s great wealth, embodied first and foremost in the imperial court and senatorial 
elites. In this chapter, I will show that wine production was also disproprionately shaped 
by elites who had little active interest in the results of their actions on the general 
populace. Not only does this chapter reveal the importance of capital in the sphere of 
production but demonstrates that Roman wine production fundamentally differed from its 
early-modern counterparts.
 1 
 Moreover, this argument helps explain why there was never 
sufficient pressure placed on the Roman legal system to develop a body of organization 
law more conducive to efficient commerce: the elites who had the most coChantrol over 
the legal system had relatively little at stake in changing the institutions.    
The chapter consists of five parts. It is fairly discursive so a brief summary here 
will be helpful. The first section explores the assertion that Roman viticulture followed a 
path comparable to that of late medieval/early modern western European viticulture, in 
particular, in France. Next I argue that this view, while initially plausible, is ultimately 
wrong. In the third part, I describe three differences between Roman and early-modern 
commerce causing these differences. I then show how a basic economic model of 
                                                          
1
 There is a great deal of bibliography on the physical process of producing wine but very little on the 
economic motivation and structure of production. On the former topic, however, see the examples given 
in the collection Archéologie de la vigne et du vin (1990), Boissinot (2004: 190-201), Brun (2004: 5-59).  
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“international” trade can help isolate explanatory variables for understanding the contours 
of Roman wine commerce which are more relevant than those offered in previous Roman 
historical scholarship. In the final section, I show how using that information along with a 
fundamental model of New Economic Geography can help us make sense of the overall 
dynamics of the Roman wine trade.   
We can begin with the thesis of Nicholas Purcell, the only English language 
author who has taken up the question of how Roman wine production compared with its 
medieval/early-modern operation.
2
 He argued that the development and practice of 
viticulture on peninsular Italy should be understood as an evolution of growing wines of 
quality towards quantity.
3
 He adopted this distinction between growing grapes for quality 
wine versus those for wine in quantity from the seminal work of the French historical 
geographer Roger Dion, whose Histoire de la vigne et du vin en France made that 
distinction a decisive variable in the development of French viticulture.
4
 Purcell’s thesis 
therefore sees Roman viticulture as structurally similar to western European medieval 
and early-modern periods.  
Purcell explicitly claimed that the development of French wine, as traced by Dion, 
could be instructive for scholars of the Roman wine trade.  He drew attention to “some of 
the similarities between the French and Roman experience,” which might generate a “not 
                                                          
2
 Purcell (1985) 1-19. I pass over the interpretations of many Italian scholars, particularly Carandini and his 
followers. Their interpretation of Italian viticulture is driven by a Marxist narrative of the growth, crisis, 
and decline of the slave mode of production, a model which is difficult to justify empirically and 
problematic theoretically. For the example par excellance of Marxist analysis of Roman production see 
Giardina and Schiavone (1981). See also Carandini and Rosella Filippi (1985). For a critique of this theory 
applied to Roman history, see Rathbone (1983: 160-8) for approaches to ancient slavery. More generally 
on Roman slavery and persuasive argument against seeing ancient slavery as fundamentally a mode of 
economic production, see Finley and Shaw (1998). 
3
 Purcell (1985). 
4
 Dion (1959). 
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unrewarding account.”5 However, he never elucidated what these similarities were but 
relied on untested assertions to equate the two wine-growing regimes—an understandable 
method for a short article but not rigorous enough to allow us to adopt his contentions 
without further examination.  
For example, Purcell suggested that Roman vintners used a system similar to 
complant, a medieval system of vineyard tenure designed to convert wasteland into 
viticulture or to make capital improvements and with a specific profit-sharing scheme.
6
 
The evidence for this is a story in an epistle by Seneca, who wrote that, while visiting 
Scipio’s antiquated villa at Liternum, he saw the land’s current occupant (agri possessor) 
working on a vetus arbustum and replanting a vitem annosam.
7
 In Purcell, this single vine 
has become a “vineyard in Campania which had been allowed to become exhausted” and 
claimed that the solution—the occupant restoring the vines—resembles complant. But 
there is no evidence that this was wasteland (Scipio’s villa was apparently dilapidated but 
that is not germane); the land was not being converted to viticulture (one vine was being 
replanted); nor can we say anything at all about the contractual system under which this 
gentleman was possessor agri. Purcell’s use of the term complant gives the impression of 
having uncovered a significant structural similarity in the operation of vineyards, one 
unjustified by the evidence.  
The claim that, “the multiplication of fine wines led to a more complex range of 
regional appellations…by the mid-1st century B.C.” is similarly problematic.8 
Appellation, a word betokening the French regulatory system of appellation d’origine 
                                                          
5
 Purcell (1985: 2). 
6
 Berman (1995: 246). See also Borrero-Fernandez (1989: 135-40) on systems of agricultural exploitation. 
7
 Ep. 86.14-20. 
8
 Purcell (1985: 18). 
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controlée, implicitly equates the regional variation of Italian wines with the regional 
variation of French wines and, by extension, with the high level of quality of the best 
varieties. But the development of France’s appellation d’origine controlée, Italy’s 
denominazione di origine controllata, and the USA’s American Viticultural Areas in the 
19
th
 and 20
th
 centuries did not result from “a more complex range” of varieties. Rather, it 
was created as a method of protecting producers of quality wine who were encountering 
growing competition from growers elsewhere imitating their product.
9
 These two 
preceding examples do not mean that Purcell’s thesis is unjustified but encourage us to 
investigate it more rigorously before accepting it. 
Purcell’s argument runs as follows: Roman elite attitudes towards vines and wine 
were ambiguous: growing them was labor and capital intensive. Therefore, there was no 
senatorial involvement on any large scale prior to the imperial period.
10
  He then claims 
that a reasonably important commerce in wine already existed in Campania by the 2
nd
 
Punic War (218-202 BCE), when gradually spread north. He claims that this production 
aimed at “consistent, relatively high quality” wine.11 The civil wars, combined with 
elites’ “depressing lack of concern” for good agricultural practice, proved a lethal 
combination and “ensured that Italian viticulture could not cope with rising 
production.”12  These factors then led to the spread of vineyards of low-quality wine 
aimed at mass consumption rather than high-quality wine for maritime export.
13
 
                                                          
9
 On the development of the French quality laws (on which other countries modeled theirs) see Vialard 
(2001: 119-32).  
10
 Purcell (1985: 1-6). 
11
 Ibid. 7. 
12
 Ibid. 9. 
13
 Ibid. 17. 
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We can begin by clarifying the distinction between quality and quantity wine. 
This distinction is usually considered the fundamental production choice because the 
growing, pressing, aging, storing, and bottling practices differ. Taken wholly, producing 
quality wine generally demands greater financial resources than cheaper, more 
voluminous production.
14
  The most colorful description of the vintner’s choice comes 
not from a wine-grower or a historian but from Balzac’s Lost Illusions, in a conversation 
between one of the two main characters, David Sechard, and his father, the “Old Bear.” 
David has come to ask his stingy father for money, but his father refuses to speak of 
anything but the progress of his vines and the prospects for the upcoming vintage. This is 
how he expresses his philosophy of viticulture:   
‘They all tell me that I ought not to put on so much manure,' replied his 
father. 'The gentry, that is M. le Marquis, M. le Comte, and Monsieur 
What-do-you-call-'em, say that I am letting down the quality of the wine. 
What is the good of book-learning except to muddle your wits? Just you 
listen: these gentlemen get seven, or sometimes eight puncheons of wine to 
the acre, and they sell them for sixty francs a piece, that means four 
hundred francs per acre at most in a good year. Now I make twenty 
puncheons, and get thirty francs a piece for them—that is six hundred 
francs! And where are they, the fools? Quality, quality, what is quality to 
me? They can keep their quality for themselves, these Lord Marquises. 
Quality means hard cash for me, that is what it means.’ 15 
This description is interesting not only because it emphasizes the greed of the elder 
Sechard but also because it shows the extent to which growing wines of quality was an 
agricultural practice characteristic of nobles: people of high quality grew quality wine, 
people of lower status grew wine for quantity. To test Purcell’s thesis then we must also 
ask: Were Roman producers’ attitudes more akin to the attitude of a Sechard or a 
Monsieur le Marquise? 
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 Unwin (1991: 268-9). 
15
 Balzac (2006: 180-1). 
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We can begin by noting that the thesis exhibits fuzzy internal logic—that these 
pre-Augustan elite growers both produced wines of quality and displayed a “depressing 
lack of concern” for careful agricultural practice does not seem particularly consistent.16 
Leaving that aside, we can consider the two fundamental questions posed by Purcell’s 
narrative: First, did the conditions leading to the quantity-quality schism in French 
viticulture (and ultimately to Balzac’s description) sufficiently exist in Roman Italy such 
that a similar split occurred; second, can the growth of provincial viticulture in the 1
st
 
century be explained by Italian vineyards’ inability to cope with rising demand?  
As a point of comparison, one notes that it was not until the beginning of the 17
th
 
century that grands crus—first growth wines of careful production and of the highest 
qualities— appeared in France.17 Prior to that “le vignoble francais a connu une 
production relativement indifférenciée, et le plus gran nombre s’est satisfait du vin local 
ou regional.”18 The earliest mention of a cru identified by the name of its proprietor 
comes from Les Graves in Bordeaux, mentioned in the journal of Samuel Pepys, who in 
1663 wrote, “…And here drank a sort of French wine called Ho Bryan that hath a good 
and most particular taste that I never met with.”19 “Ho Bryan” is Pepys’ charming 
phonetic rendition of wine from the Château Haut-Brion, the domain of Arnaud de 
Pontac who, as president of the parliament of Bordeaux, was a foundational figure in 
establishing the first-growth wines, comprising Château Lafite-Rothschild, Château 
Margaux, Château Latour, Château Haut-Brion, and Château Mouton-Rothschild.
20
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 Purcell (1985: 7, 9). 
17
 Pijassou (1980).  
18
 Lachiver (1989: 221).  
19
 Pepys (1946: 601). 
20
 Lachiver (1989: 222).  
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Thus, it was not until the 17
th
 century that the quality-quantity schism had 
sufficiently developed in Western Europe for it to appear in our sourcs. This late 
appearnce should make us cautious about automatically believing that Roman production 
exhibited it. Of course, undifferentiated production does not mean that wine of the same 
quality was produced everywhere. Producers differentiated grape varieties, methods of 
growing and propagating them, and techniques of vinification. But, as we shall see, the 
differences in wines’ qualities depended on the quality of the grapes, the nature of the 
land on which they were grown, and on the care of the viticulturist. During the Roman 
period, there was little effort to manipulate any of those variables in a way that would 
produce wine of higher than natural quality at the expense of the potential volume of 
lower quality wine.    
Among the agronomists, Columella came the closest to making a modern 
distinction between quality and quantity in his advice on choosing a vine for the 
vineyard, suggesting that, “Such a vine, even of middling productivity, should be selected 
only if a place is held in which taste is esteemed and expensive; for if it is common or 
cheap it is better to sow one which is extremely productive so that return is increased by 
the quantity of the yield” (Talis nobis eligatur vel mediocriter fecunda, si modo is locus 
habetur, in quo gustus nobilis pretiosusque fluit; nam si sordidus aut vilis est, 
feracissimam quamque serere conducit, ut multiplication frugum reditus augeatur).21 
Even here, Columella envisaged only a limited number of situations where choosing a 
low-yield vine made sense. But his distinctions were entirely based on exogenous 
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 Rust. Iii. 2.5.  
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variables, for example, on geography and soil type rather than, for example, on proximity 
to an urban market, transportation conduits, or local tastes.
22
 
Likewise, grape varietals were considered fecund or barren by nature. There was 
no recognition that the same varietal could produce wine of either high or low quality or 
that “Falernian” could be grown anywhere but on Mt. Falernus. The task of the Roman 
vintner was to select the proper vine for the proper soil in the proper climate. Human 
manipulation of these variables was hardly considered. We can contrast this attitude to 
those of the 19
th
 century Californians, who, in 1861, sent Agoston Haraszthy to report on 
“the ways and means best adapted to the…culture of the grape-vine in California” by 
traveling through and observing the workings of Europe’s vineyards.23 No Roman 
agronomist would have duplicated Haraszthy’s acquisition of 100,000 European vines of 
1400 varieties, purchased on the assumption that “California can produce as noble and 
generous a wine as any in Europe.”24 Even Columella, one of the few Romans to 
distinguish sharply between high and low quality viticulture believed that the distinction 
relied mostly on soil and varietal. He made an exception when he advocated planting the 
Aminean vine fairly ubiquitously and cautiously suggested that it could be made to 
produce fruitfully in many places but conceded that his confidence in the vine’s ability to 
produce everywhere was contrary to nearly everyone else’s belief (cui nostrae sententiae 
scio paene omnium agricolarum diversam esse opinionem).
25
  
The distribution of wine-presses in and around Pompeii also suggests that 
investment was not a function of the quality of wine grown but that any wine-maker of 
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 Haraszthy (1862). 
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 Ibid. xv-xx. 
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 Rust. 3.7.2. 
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sufficient means would choose to make as much wine as possible. The basic purpose of a 
press is to dramatically increase the amount of must obtainable from the grapes.
26
 Around 
Pompeii, wine processing installations have been found with presses and without, within 
the city and outside of it.
27
 Rossiter claimed that “a farmer would have probably invested 
in a press only if he was making wine on a large commercial scale.”28 But presses were 
also used for small vineyards, like that of Villa Regina, too and were even found in the 
city itself, like the vineyard in Regio II Insula 5, occupying only about .65 hectares.
29
 
Given this variation, it is difficult to believe that the use of presses depended on the 
quality of the wine produced rather than whether the land-owner could afford one.
30
 Once 
again, growers preferred to produce as much as possible on whatever size parcel of land 
they had regardless of wine-type. 
Thus far the argument has advanced by using literary and archaeological sources 
to argue that there is very little evidence that Roman wine-growers ever aimed at 
manipulating their production to improve the innate quality of their wine at the expense 
of quantity. On the contrary, they seemed to prefer to grow as much wine as possible of 
whatever quality the grapes and land naturally allowed. We can also approach the 
problem in two other ways: from peninsular Italy’s productive capacity and from the 
economics of the choice between quality-quantity wine growing.  
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 On the role of the press in winemaking see Hornsey (2007: 170-4).  
27
 For a list see Rossiter (1981: 348-9). For olive and wine presses in Rome’s suburbium, see Corrente 
(1985: 112-18). 
28
 Rossiter (1981: 348).  
29
 Jashemsky (1970: 62-67); Brun (2004: 22). 
30
 It is also likely that sharing occurred—another wine producing intramural site is found in Pompeii in 
Regio I Insula 20, and given the smallness of these urban parcels, some economies of scale could be 
achieved by sharing a press. Similarly, medieval peasants would have used their lord’s press for a fraction 
of the wine produced. See Dion (1959: 192); Unwin (1991: 171). 
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Recall Purcell’s claim that, as the number of wine drinkers grew, Italian 
production of quality wine was no longer able to meet consumer demand, and producers 
therefore shifted to making wines in quantity.
31
 In other words, the productive capacity of 
Italian land becomes a key variable in driving this development. As a point of 
comparison, however, one notes that in 1828 (the first year of good statistics), Italian 
vineyards took up 428,000 hectares, and we can use this number as a baseline for Roman 
Italy’s potential cultivatable area. If the average hectare produced 3380 L,32 then Italy’s 
annual output would be about 1.5 billion liters of wine. If we accept the plausible 
estimate of Italy’s population at the time of Augustus’ census in 28 B.C.E. as 5-6 million 
people, then we arrive at a potential per-capita wine production of about .7 L, more than 
sufficient to meet our estimate of average per-capita wine consumption given in chapter 
one.
33
 We have no idea, of course, how much land had vines on it at the time of 
Augustus, but these numbers show that there was potential, arable land that could have 
been brought into wine production if demand rose high enough without a drastic shift in 
the type of wine produced. Moreover, my average value for volume produced was based 
on quality-production values. Production of lower quality wine would considerably lower 
the estimated land necessary for supplying the population.  
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 A  recent estimate, de Sena (2005 : 6-7) estimated Roman Italy’s production per hectare at 3310 L, 
based on Cato’s figures in combination with estimations of production at Boscoreale and Settefinestre. 
My estimation is based on a somewhat arbitrary estimation of average production of 2.5 tons of grapes 
per acre, which is on the low end of contemporary average production but towards the high end of the 50 
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doubt that these were achieved on any but the best land and certainly not by the small growers who must 
have produced a sizeable percentage of Italy’s total wine. 
33
 For a review of the relevant arguments on how to interpret the Augustan census figures, see Morley 
(2001: 50-62); Scheidel (2004: 1-26). 
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That observation suggests that if such a quality to quantity evolution occurred in 
Italy, it was not constrained by land but was driven by another variable(s). We can 
approach the problem from a more formal, economic perspective to try to identify these 
variables. It should be intuitively obvious that quality and quantity are, in some sense, 
flip sides of the same coin, if that “coin” is revenue. We flesh out this quantity-quality 
dichotomy by examining the relationship between two grapes of different values in 
California. In 2009, Cabernet Sauvignon grapes were sold in California for an average of 
$4780/ton whereas Chardonnay grapes sold for an average of $2400/ton, a ratio of 2:1; 
yet, the more expensive Cabernet made up 52% of California’s vineyards while the 
cheaper Chardonnay took up only 13%.
34
 We can calculate the cost to produce a bottle of 
wine, with these figures at about $5.37/bottle-Chardonnay and $11.57/bottle-Cabernet.
35
  
Comparing the bottles’ production costs with their average retail costs reveals that 
a bottle of Cabernet sells for about 1.5 times the price of a bottle of Chardonnay; 
subtracting the cost of production from the price for each bottle of wine reveals that 
Cabernet has a profit margin of 1.4:1 over Chardonnay despite the fact that its grapes are 
considerably more expensive. In this case, quality pays. We can also posit some 
predictions about Chardonnay growers in this environment. For example, we might 
expect them to be less financially well-endowed and unable to afford the higher initial 
outlay (more expensive grapes) or the longer duration of cask-aging (two years instead of 
one). If wine growing land is equally well suited for both grapes, we would expect 
Chardonnay growers, ceteris paribus, to occupy more marginal land.  
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 Statistics are from California’s “Agricultural Crop Report” (2008: 10-13). 
35
 See http://www.bergmanvineyards.com/glswn.html for an example of how to calculate the cost of 
producing a bottle of wine.  
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Let us generalize that example into a model for Roman wine growing under the 
following assumptions and use it to test Purcell’s narrative. Imagine there are two grape 
types, G1 and G2 from which wine can be produced. We can write two Cobb-Douglas 
production functions for these grapes. YG1,G2=AL
,where, as usual,Y is the total 
production, A is a coefficient representing total factor productivity, L is land, N is labor, 
and are output elasticities. Allow that, when all inputs are identical, YG2>YG1 due to 
endogenous characteristics of the grapes. Let us make the further simplifying 
assumptions that labor and land are undifferentiated. It should be immediately clear that 
under these conditions YG2=YG1 simply means that the same amount of labor can be 
applied to the same amount of land to result in the same quantity of wine produced, 
regardless of the initial grape chosen.    
Of course it is highly unrealistic to assume that land suitable for grapes is 
undifferentiated: some land is simply unsuitable because of damp, cold, or lack of 
sunlight while some land is particularly well suited for grapes.
36
 Let us add therefore that 
land must be of a minimum rent (i.e., value) r*, r<r*, Y=0, sufficient for growing either 
grape varietal and that r*g1>r*g2, that is, G1 needs land of higher value than G2. Further, 
let us call p the price at which output is sold and that pg1>pg2. At this point, we can turn to 
a profit maximizing equation which give us an output Y in terms of output price for (G1) 
and the two input prices, w and r: Y=A[(pA/w)pAr)37This equation 
crystallizes the relationships between variables nicely, and we can use it to examine the 
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 See Hornsey (2007)  
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 This formula is derived from a rearrangement of the constrained optimization (Lagrangean) of the 
profit-maximizing function pQ-wN-rL + Q-A(NL Jones (forthcoming).  
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following question: what variable(s) would have to change for the quantity produced, Y, 
to increase at a given output price, p?  
Remember that we are assuming that labor is undifferentiated and that wages are 
basically a constant (all the more realistic an assumption if we believe that labor was 
dependent on slavery, though, even if not, it is highly unlikely that wages offered were 
much higher than the minimum anyway), so we can ignore the left side of the equation 
within the brackets. This leaves four variables that will raise total output: 1) A, the 
coefficient of technical change or, rather, the rate at which technological change alters the 
capacity to produce more output, could increase; 2) r could decrease; 3) could increase; 
4) Producers could shift from G1 to G2. Let us ignore possibilities one and three on the 
grounds of a priori implausibility and turn our attention rather to two and four.
38
  
On consideration, we can observe that two, the value of the land, and four, the 
potential value of the grapes, are functional equivalents. To see why, consider: a land’s 
rent is a function of the land’s worth. There is a range of r r*g1 for which it possible to 
grow either varietal of grape. If one is a grower of G1 and the value of one’s land falls 
beneath r*g1 but remains higher than r*, he will be compelled to switch to G2. Likewise, 
if more marginal lands turn to viticulture, we would not be surprised that they produce 
G2 grapes, either because the lands were not of sufficient quality to produce G1 or 
because enough land could be bought to produce a high enough volume of G2 wine so as 
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to exceed the smaller area able to be planted with G1 (this is analogous to the California 
example above). Whether this development occurred in Roman Italy is an empirical 
question, though difficult to test, and I know of no evidence suggesting that such a 
change occured. The second possibility is that landowners capable of growing G2 
willingly switched to G1 for some reason. The problem here is that it essentially leaves 
rent on the table by growing grapes of less than the land’s potential sustainable value: 
Over time, we would expect for these holders to sell their land to buyers willing to pay its 
actual value and then buy more marginal lend on which the same grapes could be grown.  
The example of Remmius Palaemon, who bought marginal land for producing 
high quantities of wine, shows that the model has predictive power, and nicely ties 
together the preceding economic and literary expositions. Palaemon was a famous 
grammarian of the mid Julio-Claudian period. He bought a vineyard in Rome’s suburbia 
and hired a certain Acilius Sthenelus to oversee and improve the property.
 39
 He improved 
it so much that ten years later, Seneca bought the property for quadruple Paleamon’s 
purchase price. In other words, Palaemon took advantage of differentiated, initial land 
values to grow grapes at a higher volume than the land previously sustained. 
Yet Palaemon’s subsequent behavior and Roman attitudes towards his actions 
reveal that Roman growers must have operated on a radically different set of growing 
assumptions than our Chardonnay growers above. True, he improved the land’s yield, but 
no mention is made of the wine’s quality either before or after his improvements. Rather 
than use that improved yield to purchase more land or vines or to develop an enterprise in 
wine, Palaemon simply sold the land. There is no evidence that any Roman was inspired 
by Palaemon to attempt a similar effort. Pliny snipped that Palaemon was not motivated 
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by gentlemanly zeal but only by vanity (non virtute animi, sed vanitate primo)
40
 and was 
shocked at Seneca’s purchase because he was not a man generally accustomed to 
flummery.
41
 
Pliny’s objection apparently stemmed from his belief that such capital-intensive 
improvements were a waste of money, and we might remember his striking advice given 
elsewhere: “farming well is necessary, farming outstandingly is prodigal (bene colere 
necessarium est, optime damnosum).
42
 And farming well was linked with the product’s 
quantity, not its quality.
43
 Thus Varro, writing in the mid-1
st
 century, praised a certain 
Marcius Libo for having an estate that yielded 300 amphorae/iugerum (over 300 
hL/hectare).
44
 Perhaps more realistically, Columella praised an estate which produced 
160 amphorae/iugerum (170 hL/hectare).
45
 We can contrast this praise with the modern 
censure of over-growing grapes because of the corresponding decrease in quality: A 
French vineyard’s product with an appellation d’origine can be downgraded to vin de 
pays if its production exceeds the prescribed maximum of 2.5 tons per acre (equivalent to 
only 32 amphorae/iugerum).
46
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To summarize thus far: the combination of literary evidence, the productive 
capacity of Italy, and the predictions of a simple quality-quantity model all point in the 
same direction—the quality-quantity dichotomy that begin to develop in western Europe 
in the late Middle Ages and became its dominant feature through the 17
th
 and 18
th
 
centuries did not characterize Roman viticulture. Rather, the Roman agronomists make 
clear that the viticulturist should always aim to produce as much as possible under the 
constraints of climate, soil, and varietal. There is really very little evidence that Roman 
elites ever grew wine with an eye toward quality in the modern sense, the foundational 
split for Purcell’s narrative.  
 Under the umbrella of that broad distinction, we can draw two more contrasts, 
one in production and one in consumption. On the production side, let me advance a 
perhaps surprising proposition: the Romans did not have commercial vineyards in the 
modern sense of an agricultural enterprise dedicated to the growing of grapes and 
manufacture of wine. We see evidence for this proposition both in the setup of the 
vineyards themselves and in the way Romans used the profits accruing from them. 
Columella strongly advised against planting only one type of grape. Rather, he suggested: 
Sed illud etiam…dicendum est: uniusne an plurium generum vites 
habendae sint…sed et providentis est diversa quoque genera deponere. 
Neque enim numquam sic mitis ac temperatus est annus, ut nullo 
incommodo vexet aliquod vitis genus…at si varii generis vineta fecerimus, 
aliquid ex iis inviolatum erit quod fructum perferat…ea causa nos debet 
compellere…quod deinde proximum a primo; tum quod est tertiae notae 
vel quartae quoque. Eatenus velut athletarum quodam contenti simus 
tetradio. 
 
But this also must be addressed: whether vines of one or several varieties 
ought to be held…But it is characteristic of the provident man to set 
different types. For no year is so gentle and temperate that one type of 
vine is not troubled by some molestation in some way…and if we have 
made vineyards of varied type, there will be something unharmed from the 
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lot and which bears fruit…this reason forces us to that which is next to 
first-place, thence to that considered third or fourth. Thus let us be content 
in a foursome of athletes, as it were.
47
  
 
In contrast, French cru vineyards were specialized to an extent that Roman vineyards 
apparently were not. The Californian Haraszthy, whom we met above, when visiting 
Chateau Rauzan in Bordeaux noted, “I was really astonished how they could make any 
wine at all, the vines were so much affected by disease…the proprietors, however, take it 
very cooly, saying that they will make it all up next year.”48 This sentiment is precisely 
the opposite of that observed in Columella. But this makes sense; such a sentiment is only 
possible when one is producing wine not simply as a method of making money from 
agricultural produce but as its own enterprise.  
 Italy’s wine-growing hub provides not one example of an enterprise given over 
wholly or even predominately to wine production. Campania was famous for its wines, in 
particular Falernum, Massicum, and Surrentinum.  Many villas have been excavated from 
this region and “pas une seule villa qui n’ait produit du vin.”49 But these same villas also 
provide evidence of growing nearly every type of produce. The villa of Pisanella, for 
example, has preserved evidence of a winery with a lever-press and seventy-two dolia for 
storing wine, which suggests a vineyard of 13-20 hectares but also preserves evidence of 
olive growing (about 3000 trees) as well in addition to the usual subsistence crops.
50
 The 
Villa Regina preserves a cella vinaria with 18 dolia ranging from 200-700 liters and 
corresponds to a vineyard of 1.5-2.5 hectares, and the area around the vineyard had 
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plantings for figs, walnuts, peaches, apricots, almonds, olives, and pine.
51
 These two 
villas are typical: viticulture never emerged as a pursuit separate from the general pattern 
of agricultural diversification.  
 There is also little indication that profits from vineyards were generally reinvested 
in production. Remmius Palaemon, having improved his vineyard, sold it. Did he 
consider reinvesting his profits in it to maintain or even expand it as a profitable 
enterprise? It is impossible to say for sure, but it is doubtful. This pattern was not 
necessarily un-economic.
52
 Romans’ wealth was predominately in land, and viticulture is 
risky. It is unsurprising that most preferred to diversify their land portfolio and maintain a 
fairly steady return rather than engage in more speculative uses which could dramatically 
backfire. But that development was essential in later periods for the creation of vintage 
wines and the emergence of the quality-quantity schism.
53
   
One of the most interesting features in the development of the wine trade in the 
early modern period was the way in which consumer demand drove producers to grow 
wine for specific markets. During the Middle Ages, wines of Bordeaux, in particular the 
vins clairets, were popular in England.
54
 These wines were quickly fermented, usually for 
less than 48 hours, and similar in color to a contemporary rosé.
55
 For numerous reasons, 
wine from the Mediterranean, in particular from Spain and Portugal, became increasingly 
accessible from about 1400-1700.
56
 These wines tended to be much sweeter and more 
alcoholic than those produced in more northerly regions. Over time, sweet wines became 
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preferred, and Bordeaux growers began to age their wines longer on the skins to produce 
a fuller-bodied wine and to experiment with methods of increasing their wines’ alcohol. 
The reciprocal relationship between productive investment and taste was exemplified by 
Arnaud de Pontac, who sent his son to London to open an expensive restaurant serving 
his wines from Chateau Haut-Brion.
57
 
Roman Italy never witnessed a strong connection between the qualities consumers 
esteemed in wine and qualities sought by manufacturers. Romans certainly differentiated 
numerous wines and recognized that their quality was highly variable. For example, the 
Younger Pliny criticized a contemporary practice of serving wines of differing qualities 
at dinner parties corresponding to the rank of the guest,
58
 and this would seem to mark an 
extension of a well-established practice of using wine (along with other foods and 
objects) to establish and reinforce notions of rank.
59
 Petronius’ Trimalchio took absurd 
pride in serving a ca. 150-year old wine to his dinner guests and told them how lucky 
they are for “yesterday I served a not so good wine, and they were of much higher 
rank.”60 Tchernia is surely right to characterize such examples as showing a general rule, 
that “à un rang social different correspond une catégorie de vin différente.”61 
A Roman wishing to differentiate between his dinner guests by the wine served 
would have had plenty of choices. Pliny began his list of wines by noting that “no one 
could doubt that some wines are more pleasant to some, others to others and that even 
from the same vat a wine may surpass its twin somehow, whether from the container or 
from chance. For this reason, let every man set himself as judge of what is best” (genera 
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autem vini alia aliis gratiora esse quis dubitet aut non ex eodem lacu aliud praestantius 
altero germanitatem praecedere sive testa sive fortuito eventu quam ob rem de principatu 
se quisque iudicem statuet).
62
 He goes on to list 50 types of decent, Italian wines divided 
into four ranks, 38 foreign wines, 7 salted wines, 18 wines with resin, and three second-
rate wines, all of which are made by using the dross and lees, and 12 wines of 
“miraculous” properties.63  
But there was no apparent connection between the wines esteemed by consumers 
and those esteemed and discussed by producers. Pliny’s list of wines may seem peculiar 
to a modern reader, for it is basically a catalogue of different regions and the wines 
produced there. He ranks the quality of different regions but does not give any 
information that we would consider helpful. For example, he made no effort to link his 
list of wines with his list of vines (14.4). He mentioned some of the emperors’ preferred 
wines which reflected his and his readers’ curiosity about imperial habits, but he never—
even haphazardly—discussed general consumption preferences either by region or 
generally, let alone different wines’ respective, prevailing prices despite Romans’ 
knowledge that these prices could vary considerably.
64
 Not only do these observations 
reinforce the argument that wine was a regional affair but also demonstrates that it did 
not even occur to Pliny, who gives the lengthiest exposition of wines, to consider the 
possible relationship between wine production and consumption.  
In sum, wine production was basically uniform, differing primarily in scale but 
not in its fundamental goals and techniques. Some areas naturally produced better wines 
than others. These were praised, but there was no attempt to develop any form of 
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viticulture in the modern or pre-modern sense which could reproduce higher value wines 
or which reacted to consumer preference.  There were no crus; there were no 
appellations. Roman vintners were certainly eager to appropriate the surplus wealth that 
arose naturally from certain wines but made no effort to create it themselves. Unwin, 
describing the state of French wine production in the 18
th
 century says that “in a manner 
remarkably similar to the evolution of the Roman wine trade 1800 years previously, wine 
producers throughout France and Germany increasingly turned their attention to the 
production of low quality wines for the rapidly growing urban population.”65 Unlike their 
French and German counterparts, however, the Roman wine grower never considered any 
alternative.  
I have dealt with this question at some length not just because of its foundational 
importance but also because my contention completely opposes Purcell’s narrative, 
which (though offered tentatively) has entered the literature as an acceptable general 
framework. The comparison seemed prima facie reasonable given the many structural 
constraints on pre-modern trade, but it does not hold water. Roman farmers were not 
stupid: they took advantage of different terroirs and recognized that wine came in various 
qualities but never made an effort to produce high-quality wine systematically. Closely 
connected is my assertion that there was no such thing as a commercial vineyard in the 
modern sense. Therefore, speaking of wine production on a “large commercial scale” 
gives the wrong impression about the nature of the enterprise.
66
 Vineyards, whether 
producing a great deal of commercial surplus or not, were always part of one’s 
diversified, agricultural production. Yes, large landholders could and assuredly often did 
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produce a great deal of wine for sale, but these were not atomized,  commercial 
enterprises—there is no evidence that Roman wine-growers conceived of or ran their 
vineyards as pursuits separate from the totality of their agricultural holdings generally. 
The quality-quantity distinction, crucial in the development of European wine 
from the 1600s on, simply did not exist the Roman period. The question becomes, why 
did the shape of Rome’s wine trade differ so strikingly from that of later periods? 
Answering this will help us formulate a method for analyzing why Rome’s trade 
followed the contours it did. A full exposition of these differences is beyond the scope of 
this paper, so the following is limited to two variables I consider critical: differing 
environment and trade regulations.  
Differences between the Roman and Medieval Wine-Trade 
In different climactic conditions grapes and their wines can differ considerably. 
Climate and soil are among the most important factor in determining the quality of wine 
grown.
67
 Columella introduced his treatment of vines by acknowledging that “its growing 
pattern is not the same under every sky or on every soil nor is there only one variety; it is 
not easy to say which is the best of all, since practice teaches us that each is more or less 
fitted to its own region” (Neque enim omni caelo solove cultus idem, neque est unum 
stirpis eius genus: quodque praecipuum est ex omnibus non facile dictu est, cum suum 
cuique regioni magis aut minus aptum esse doceat usus.)
68
 More specifically, grapes 
thrive in regions where the average annual temperature is around 15
o 
C, winter minima of 
around 4
o 
C and summers are hot.
69
 Rainfall needs vary depending on the region’s 
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average temperatures, but in general 38-76 centimeters of rain is needed, the bulk of 
which should fall during the winter and early spring with dry summers and falls.
70
  
Grapes grown in hot climates will be less acidic and therefore more alcoholic 
(because the yeast has more available sugar to ferment) than vines planted in cooler 
climates. It was common in Roman Italy to train vines onto trees, in particular poplars 
and elms.
71
 In hot climates, this method keeps the grapes from over-ripening because the 
grapes are further removed from the hot soil and the shade from the trees keep the grapes 
cooler.
72
 Climate’s effect on grapes is a key background variable in the different 
development of wine in the medieval period and later.  
In contrast to the Roman period, the political center of gravity in medieval 
Western Europe was in the northwest.
73
 This change in Europe’s center of gravity had 
important implications for wine production.  The figure below shows the areas suitable 
for grape cultivation in Europe:
74
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Figure 4.1: Areas of Wine Production  
During the Roman period, the entirety of its economic and political core lay 
within this region. In the medieval period and later, that core straddled the edge of 
climactically suitable wine growing regions. The relative climactic favorability 
throughout the core of the Mediterranean wine growing regions meant that wine could be 
produced nearly everywhere comparatively easily and of a similar quality. This 
homogeneity meant that the wine trade was not motivated by vastly differing qualities of 
wine.
75
 But in medieval wines, significant inherent differences in quality played an 
important role in shaping the contours of tastes and trade. The greatest distinction was 
between the sweet wines from the south, first coming from Greece and its islands then, 
after Spain’s reconquest, from the Iberian Peninsula, and the lower alcoholic wines from 
the north.
76
 The difference went beyond taste: wines of higher alcoholic content could 
last longer without deterioration, and more Northern growers had to adapt their 
production to deal with southern competition in a fundamentally different type of wine.  
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The political unity of the Mediterranean under the Roman Empire also lowered 
some transaction costs in long-distance trade relative to those in later periods. In fact, 
there is a sense in which the expansion of the Roman Empire can be viewed as having 
established a (weak) de facto customs-union.
77
 It is certainly true that there was never any 
free-market area aside from certain privileged ports and individuals—for example Delos 
(in 167 BCE), shippers for the annona, supplies for the army and the emperor himself.
78
 
Nor was there any coordinated customs policy beyond some standardization of rates 
within the Empire.
79
 But the customs dues within the empire were very low: 2%, 2.5%, 
5% were the most common.
80
 These were much lower than the customs dues on the 
frontier which were an exceptionally high 25%.
81
 The fact that the Roman Empire had a 
common external tariff rate and that it was orders of magnitude higher than the prevailing 
rates within its borders justifies considering it a geographically expansive, weak customs 
union.
82
  
 The best description from the Roman period of the link between customs duties, 
trade, and profit comes from a declamation involving a stolen article not declared at 
customs:
83
  
Dic istud rei publicae… “aerarium populi Romani vectigalibus iniquis 
repletur, et spoliantur provinciae et sublatum commercium est.” … sed res 
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publica quoque…habet quod respondeat. Primum illud, necessaria esse 
vectigalia civitati. Exercitus stipendium accipiunt, bella cotidie geruntur 
adversus barbaras et bellicosissimas gentes, defendimus ripas et limites et 
litora…templa extruuntur, multum impendiorum sacra ducunt, aliquid et 
spectacula. Opus est vectigalibus. 
 
Tell this to the state… “The treasury of the Roman people is being filled 
by unjust revenues, the provinces are being stripped, and trade is taken 
away.”…but the state too has a response. First this, that revenues are 
necessary for the state. The armies get pay, wars are waged daily against 
barbarians and the fiercest of peoples; we defend the riverbanks, frontiers, 
and shores…temples are raised, festivals bring on great expense, as do 
spectacles. Revenues are needed. 
 
Merchants trading within the Roman Empire would know not only the prevailing, 
relatively narrow range of rates but also the process and laws applying to their passage. 
Ulpian, in part of a typical laudation of the praetor’s foresight, justified his special 
dealing with confiscations by publicani by saying “Someone may ask why this edict is 
issued, as if the praetor did not provide for thefts, losses, and forced seizures elsewhere. 
But he thought it right to issue an edict especially for the publicani because of the reality 
of the situation” (Dixerit aliquis: quid utique hoc edictum propositum est, quasi non et 
alibi praetor providerit furtis damnis vi raptis? Sed e re putavit et specialiter adversus 
publicanos edictum proponere)
84
 because, “everyone is aware of the brazenness and 
impudence of the collectors” (quanta audaciae, quanta temeritatis sint publicanorum 
factions).
85
 
Evidence for this regularization of customs regulations also appears in non-juristic 
sources. In that same speech of ps-Quintilian, the advocate for the publicani knew and 
expected his audience to know of a common rule: “Now, the law holds this, that we keep 
the object which has passed through and has not been declared” (nunc lex hoc continent, 
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ut rem teneamus quae translate est et professa non est).
86
 Another declamation involves a 
woman who has not declared her four-hundred pearls at customs. The premises given at 
the beginning again suggest a fairly standardized procedure: “Except for the apparatus of 
travel, let everything owe a 2.5% charge. Let the official be allowed to make a search. Let 
whatever someone will not have declared be forfeit. Let it not be allowed to touch a lady” 
(praeter instrumenta itineris omnes res quadragesimam publicano debeant. Publicano 
scrutari liceat. Quod quis professus non fuerit, perdat. Matronam ne liceat attingere).
87
 
Uniform rules effectively lower the transaction costs incurred by trade by decreasing 
information costs by limiting uncertainty arising from geographically variable 
regulations. The Roman government, doubtless aiming to limit opportunities for 
provincial corruption, was keen to preserve this modest degree of consistency among its 
customs procedures, at least with regard to customs on the frontiers and between 
provinces.  Thus Hermogenian stated that “it is not allowed for a governor, curator, or 
senate to establish or alter duties, either by addition or subtraction, without imperial 
permission” (vectigalia sine imperatorum praecepto neque praesidi neque curatori neque 
curiae constituere nec praecedentia reformare et his vel addere vel deminuere licet).
88
  
The case of Marcus Fonteius, an interesting character in the history of Rome’s 
wine trade, demonstrates why emperors strived to maintain some degree of uniformity. 
Marcus Fonteius was governor of Gallia Narbonensis probably from 76-74 BCE. He was 
accused by the Gauls before the Roman extortion-court (repetundae) of having illegally 
enriched himself, chiefly by the imposition of new and varied duties on wines, collected 
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by publicani stationed at new customs bureaus at Tolosa, Crodunum, Vulchalo, 
Cobiomachus, and Elesioduli.
89
  Cicero described the scheme as follows:
90
 
Crimen a Plaetorio, iudices, ita constitutum est, M. Fonteio non in Gallia 
primum venisse in mentem ut portorium vini institueret, sed hac inita iam 
ac proposita ratione Roma profectum. Itaque Titurium Tolosae quaternos 
denarios in singulas vini amphoras portori nomine exegisse; Croduni 
Porcium et Munium ternos <et> victoriatum, Vulchalone Servaeum binos 
et victoriatum; atque in his locis ab eis portorium esse exactum si qui 
Cobiomago--qui vicus inter Tolosam et Narbonem est--deverterentur 
neque Tolosam ire vellent; Elesiodulis C. Annium senos denarios ab eis 
qui ad hostem portarent exegisse. 
 
The accusation, judges, has been stated thus by Plaetorius: it did not occur 
to Marcus Fonteius for the first time in Gaul to establish a wine-duty but 
the plan was proposed when still at Rome. And so it is stated that at 
Tolosa, Titurius exacted four denarii per amphora of wine as a duty; at 
Crodunum, Porcius and Munius exacted three and a half; at Vulchalo, 
Servaeus took two and a half and that, in these places, duty was exacted by 
these men if anyone, not wishing to go to Tolosa, turned out at 
Cobiomagus (a town between Tolosa and Narbo) and that at Elesioduli 
Gaius Annius exacted six denarii from those who were carrying wine to 
the enemy.
 
 
 
This text presents several interesting features which can only be touched on here. 
First, the duties levied corroborate Diodorus’ claims that wine in Gaul fetched a high 
price. A tax comparable to later standards of 3-5% would imply an amphora value of 50-
130 denarii, several times more than the highest attested amphorae from early Imperial 
Italy. Second, these duties were flat rates, not ad valorem charges. On its own, this is not 
remarkable; although Roman duties were supposedly ad valorem they were often leveled 
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as if they were flat rate duties, a fact which has been attributed both as an effort to avoid 
disputes over value and the limited numeracy of many of the traders and officials.
91
  
Nevertheless, if the quality of the wine passing through greatly varied we would 
expect the duties charged to reflect this, since either Fonteius or the publicans must have 
arrived at the different rates by some method, though their rationale remains 
unrecoverable. But the Roman government apparently disapproved not only of this 
method of self-enrichment at the expense of its citizens (crimen et…magnum vectigal 
enim esse inpositum fructibus nostris dicitur)
92
 but, perhaps more importantly, the ad hoc 
installation of new customs bureaus, their variable charges, and the confusion it caused 
among those being charged and those profiting from it. As de Laet pointed out, “Il semble 
bien qu’après le procès de Fonteius, ces bureaux ont été supprimés; on n’en trouve plus 
trace à l’époque impériale.”93  
Fonteius’ scheme would not be exceptionable, however, in the commercial world 
of the post-Roman period, where the political and economic fragmentation of the 
European and Mediterranean world resulted in a bewildering array of customs variations, 
regulations and rights with profound effects on the shape of trade generally and on wine 
in particular.
94
 The following description, involving the rights of various traders in the 
Latin Levant, gives a taste of this range of rights and obligations:
95
  
Kings and lords continued well into the thirteenth century to make grants 
to European merchants or to reduce the dues they had to pay. In 202 
Plebanus of Botrun gave privileges to Pisa and in 1203 Bohemond IV of 
Tripoli made a grant to Genoa. In 1217 Guy of Jubail gave rights to the 
                                                          
91
 Duncan-Jones (2006). 
92
 Cic. Font. 20. 
93
 De Laet (1949: 83).  
94
 A sourcebook of translated, medieval documents relating to Mediterranean trade is provided by Lopez 
and Raymond (1990). 
95
 Baker (1973: 110). 
151 
 
Venetians; and in the early 1220s John of Ibelin issued an important 
series of charters to the Genoese, Venetians and Marseillais in a clear 
attempt to encourage commerce in his town of Beirut. Charters were also 
granted by Frederick I of Jerusalem and 
Bohemond V of Tripoli for Montpellier in 1229 and 1243 respectively; by 
Rohard of Haifa for Genoa in 1234, by the High Court of Jerusalem for 
Ancona in 1257 and by Bohemond VII of Tripoli for Venice in 1277. 
 
In addition, rights and privileges were highly changeable. Merchants could not 
necessarily depend on the same locations offering the same privileges and protections 
from year to year. So, for example, in the early 13
th
 century, the citizens of Bordeaux 
(controlled then by England) were exempted from the Great Custom, an export duty on 
products from the Crown’s property in Gascony, Poitou, and Bordeaux regions, while the 
rest of the Bordelais had to pay it, though at a reduced rate. Over time, the citizens of 
Bordeaux began, on their own, to arrogate the right of holding back wine from the Haut 
Pays, principally Bordelais, from being exported before November 11
th
, thus placing 
their owns wines at a considerable advantage.
96
  
 These duties introduced significant distortions in trade patterns. In 1782, French 
wines imported into England paid fifteen distinct duties while non-French wines paid 
thirteen, and the total duties of 1784 ranged from £45 19s 1d on Portuguese wines to £96 
4s 1d on French wines.
97
 The British parliament apparently became fed up with these 
accumulated tariffs, some of which were functionally obsolete, and in 1787 abolished the 
old duties and imposed one excise tax and one customs duty across the board.
98
  
 It takes little effort to imagine the cumulative effect of all these differing rules and 
regulations arising from changing political alliances and boundaries, local, and civic 
rivalries, when added to the natural, regional variation in fitness for wine production and 
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the types of wine produced. These variations introduced more severe trade distortions 
than existed within the Roman Empire. But these factors placed significant external 
pressures on wine growers and merchants to specialize in various types of wine which 
differed geographically, depending on the climate, the dominant market at which they 
were sold, and the trade regulations governing that commerce. If Fonteius’ behavior had 
been the norm rather than an exception, the Roman wine-trade likely would have 
developed in a radically different way.  
Thus, the “technical changes” and “change in attitudes” that prefigured the rise in 
the quality-quantity distinction in the early 17
th
 century did not arise out of a vacuum but 
were preconditioned by the preceding centuries’ political and economic fragmentation.99 
Perhaps paradoxically, the comparative political stability and regulatory homogeneity of 
the Roman period in conjunction with the relative climactic similarity of the littoral 
Mediterranean’s wine-growing regions removed two sources of external pressure to 
differentiate products. This lack of significant differentiation in the wines traded is yet 
another crucial distinction between Roman wine commerce and that of later periods.  
To sum up: we need to abandon any notion of Roman viticulture which renders it 
qualitatively equivalent to viticulture as it has developed over the last four-hundred years. 
Certainly the biology of the grape and the chemistry of wine-making lead to certain, 
ineluctable similarities, but the dominant feature of contemporary and pre-modern 
viticulture has been the production choice between high-quality, low production wine and 
low-quality high production wine, as Balzac’s vintner perfectly expresses. That split was 
foundational for the development of viticulture in the pre-modern period and, by 
extension, a critical development in the modern wine industry.  
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“Surplus-Producing Areas” and International Trade 
The preceding discussion has left us in a quandary: how are we to explain the 
development of the wine trade at Rome, the diffuse regions from which wine came, and 
its changing provenance over time. After all, if vineyard production was comparatively 
undifferentiated then we might wonder why, for example, any significant quantity of 
Spanish wine ever came to Rome when transport costs should have made its price much 
higher than basically similar wine from Italy. We cannot appeal to Purcell’s quality-
quantity distinction, nor can we appeal to regional economic and political variations 
which were crucial in the shaping medieval and early-modern wine trade.  But those 
analyses, though not providing answers, provoke questions. In particular, they direct us to 
investigate whether there was some other type of regional comparative difference that 
introduced disequilibria spurring trade; the second is whether the broader socio-political 
system introduced rules of the game which encouraged geographically diffuse trade in 
wine to occur. Providing this account requires using of some basic, formal economic 
trade models.  
Let us begin with a succinct description typifying ancient historians’ approach to 
trade:
100
  
The argument for substantial trade in commodities that has been 
elaborated by ancient historians should be extended to the whole of the 
preindustrial Mediterranean past: the proximity of surplus-producing 
areas to those in need of staples ought to have generated interregional 
trade throughout our period. 
 
This explanation is not unusual: Ancient historians’ trade-theory relies heavily on the 
existence and distribution patterns of surplus production.
101
 This has, I suppose, some 
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intuitive appeal and it may therefore come as a surprise that there is, so far as I know, no 
economic model of interregional trade
 
 that depends on (or even uses) any notion of 
surplus. On closer consideration, this makes sense because the existence of surplus 
product in one place but not another surely must depend on some differentiated 
underlying factor(s). Therefore we need to take a step back and briefly examine the 
models at our disposal to address questions concerning trade-flows in wine, at least in a 
general context, in order to identify the relevant variables.  
There are two trade models that we will use: the Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) Theory, 
which is the standard theoretical model of international trade; and the Gravity Model 
(GM), which is closely associated with New Economic Geography (NEG). Like any 
model, both have attractive features as well as drawbacks. HO is robustly theorized with 
a clear delineation of predictive variables and their relationships but has had mixed 
empirical success in its general form.
102
 GM has been criticized for being under-theorized 
but has been remarkably successful as an empirical exercise.  
 Basically, HO extends the Ricardian theory of comparative advantage to two 
factors of production (rather than Ricardo’s labor model). Under HO, a region’s autarchic 
factor endowments generate a comparative advantage in production that uses its 
relatively abundant factor. The model’s fairly numerous (and somewhat unrealistic) 
assumptions make it highly idealized; I bypass the details of the model here (readers 
                                                          
102
 Temin (2006a: 141-56) is the only example of which I know applying HO to ancient trade (in this case 
the “biblical” Near East). See O’Rourke and Williamson (1994: 892-916) on factor-price convergence in 
late 19
th
 century America. Ibid. (1999: 1-68) for European trade between 1400-1800; Clifton and Marxsen 
(1984: 32-8). For a survey of empirical tests, see Chacholiades (1978: 298-306). 
155 
 
interested in a full exposition can refer to the citations below) and simply give and then 
briefly explore the implications of its four fundamental theorems.
 103
   
The following are the four theorems under the two-factor, two- region model, 
constant- returns-to-scale model. 1) A region will export the commodity whose 
production relatively more intensively uses the relatively more abundant factor. 2) 
Complete specialization in production occurs if factor prices (factors are not generally 
considered mobile) remain unequal or incomplete specialization in production and the 
equalization of factor prices. 3) An increase in the supply of one factor raises the absolute 
output of the factor that uses that factor intensively (the Rybczynski Theorem). 4) A rise 
in the relative price of a good leads to a rise in the real rate of return for the factor used 
most intensively in producing that good and a corresponding decline in the return of the 
comparatively less intensively used factor (Stolper-Samuelson Theorem).
104
  
Proposition one simply means that, if a region (R) produces two products X and Y 
and the production of X is a function of capital and labor (Kx, Lx), then we would call X 
the relatively capital intensive product if Kx/Lx  > Ky/Ly. If R is better endowed in capital 
than in labor, it will export product X. The upshot of this proposition is that we need to 
try to understand the relative factor intensities necessary for a given product’s 
manufacture and to estimate regions’ respective factor endowments. Proposition two 
indicates that if there is not total specialization in a product then there must be some 
equalization of factor prices. In the Roman context, the relative lack of regional 
specialization in wine could suggest that a reasonably integrated, Mediterranean factor 
market existed. The Rybczynski theorem (proposition three) is interesting and, at first 
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glance, counterintuitive.  Imagine Roman Italy produced two products, textiles and 
grain—the latter being more labor intensive. If population increases (i.e., the labor factor 
increases) then the absolute production of the labor-intensive product (grain) will rise, 
and textile production will fall.
105
 The Stolper-Samuelson theorem (proposition four) is 
basically the price-equivalent version of the previous theorem; it suggests that not 
everyone benefits from trade equally; those who disproportionately control a relatively 
abundant factor benefit disproportionately from trade in products using it.  
Our first task therefore is to identify the relatively intense factor used in wine 
production. Since production in the ancient world as a percentage of GDP was 
fundamentally agrarian, it makes the most sense to compare it to a baseline agricultural 
product such as wheat.
106
 So far as I know the question of relative factor intensities has 
not been asked explicitly, but the following quote indicates that some ancient historians 
consider viticulture labor intensive: “What it [i.e., viticulture] offers, however…is the 
opportunity for the conversion of labour…into low-bulk high-value 
commodities…viticulture and wine-making turn labour-glut into storage and 
redistribution credit.”107  
I am unconvinced that this evaluation properly delineates the relative factors. The 
ancient agronomists (especially Columella) attribute most of the wine-growing cost to a 
combination of sunk costs and capital investment: vine-stocks, stakes, trenching, 
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drainage/irrigation,
108
 flooring, presses, storage vats, etc. Even the purchase or hire of a 
skilled vine-dresser would better be considered a sunk cost or, in some cases, an 
investment in human capital (training for example) rather than a labor factor. Indeed, the 
fundamental change in viticulture in the early 17
th
 century derived from redistribution 
and new investment patterns of capital, not from vastly changed labor patterns.
109
 
Likewise a recent article investigating the relationship between natural endowments 
versus production technologies on the quality of wine in contemporary Bordeaux 
production found that production technologies, which are highly capital dependent, are 
the decisive factor.
110
 In other words, viticulture is not relatively intensive in labor but 
uses capital comparatively intensively.   
To be blunt, our ability to test the HO model in the Roman world is crippled by 
the lack of any data. But there is one suggestive instance indicating that this model of 
wine production and its trade is broadly on the right track. Keith Hopkins emphasized 
how continuous war from about 250 BCE onwards led to a massive influx of booty.
111
 
Booty easily becomes financial capital, and the Rybczynski Theorem suggests that we 
should see a corresponding increase in capital-intensive output, for example, in wine as 
the factor used relatively intensively increases. I have already pointed out that it is not 
until the late 2
nd
 century BCE that we first hear of an Italian export-wine, known from a 
titulus on an amphora.
112
  
                                                          
108
 There is evidence, for example, of a drainage system on a vineyard from Fundi; Quilici Gigli (1987: 152-
66).  Horden and Purcell (2000: 219) consider this evidence of labor intensity because labor was used to 
install the drains, but this is confused—no physical capital investment materializes out of thin air and the 
point of production, while interesting from an organization standpoint, does not change the factor to 
which we assign it.  
109
 Unwin (1991: 268). 
110
 Gergaud and Ginsburgh (2008: 142-57). 
111
 Hopkins (1978: 8-12) emphasizes this in his Conquerors and Slaves model. 
112
 CIL XV 4554. 
158 
 
The first HO theorem states that a region with a comparative advantage in capital 
will export a capital-intensive product to a region with a different relative factor 
advantage. In this case, that factor should be labor since, in pre-industrial economic 
systems dominated by agriculture, land was a fairly undifferentiated factor. There are two 
tantalizing hints that precisely such a dynamic developed.  The first is from Diodorus 
Siculus, writing in the mid-1
st
 century BCE: 
διὸ καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν Ἰταλικῶν  ἐμπόρων διὰ τὴν συνήθη φιλαργυρίαν 
ἕρμαιον ἡγοῦνται τὴν τῶν Γαλατῶν φιλοινίαν. οὗτοι γὰρ διὰ μὲν τῶν 
πλωτῶν ποταμῶν πλοίοις, διὰ δὲ τῆς πεδιάδος χώρας ἁμάξαις κομίζοντες 
τὸν οἶνον, ἀντιλαμβάνουσι τιμῆς πλῆθος ἄπιστον· διδόντες γὰρ οἴνου 
κεράμιον ἀντιλαμβάνουσι παῖδα, τοῦ πόματος διάκονον ἀμειβόμενοι. 
 
For this reason, many Italian merchants consider the Gauls’ love of wine a 
godsend on account of their typical love for money. For these merchants, 
conveying wine by boat through the navigable rivers and on wagons 
through the plains generally fetch an unbelievable price. For in giving a jar 
of wine they receive a slave and trade a drink for a servant.
113
 
 
It would be ridiculous to use a stray passage from Diodorus, or any number of 
ancient authors, to substitute convincingly for our lack of usable statistics—how many 
merchants? How much wine? How many slaves? How voluminous a jar? These are all 
questions whose answers escape us.
114
 Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the broad 
contours of Diodorus’ description—an examination of a distribution map for Dressel 1 
amphorae (the first exported Italian wine vessel) shows a concentration in southern Gaul 
(modern Provence) and then along the rivers.
115
  
We can explore the implications of that trade in a rough but informative way. 
Tchernia estimated that late Republican Rome was shipping about 120,000 hectoliters of 
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wine annually to Gaul in 27 L Dressel 1 amphorae.
116
 Say that 50% (chosen arbitrarily) 
of that wine was used to trade for slaves. Hopkins’ table of average slave prices at Delphi 
shows a range of average prices between 100-53 BCE of 287-566 drachmae (ca. 460-900 
sesterces).
117
 Let us assume that Diodorus, even if ignorant of actual prices, at least 
accurately reflected their relationship with prices at other locations—that is, wine was 
dear, people cheap, and let us adopt a Gaul-slave (average) price of 450 HS and an 
average price for a wine amphora of 90 HS/amphora, that is, 5 amphorae per slave.
118
  
On these figures, those exports of wine could have purchased about 3,000 slaves 
per year.
119
 If this dynamic was in force for 50 years, 150,000 slaves entered Italy in 
exchange for wine. If it was 75 years, 225,000. If Diodorus’ figure were literally true, 
then wine purchased about 16,000 slaves per year, 75,0000 in 50 years and a million in 
75. Of course, if wine were so valuable, it is possible that well over 50% of produced 
wine was involved in the slave trade. One might also suspect that the “true” slave-price 
lay somewhere between Diodorus’ fairly unlikely contention and Hopkins’ Delphi prices. 
Either way, the HO model helps us identify the relative factor intensities that underpinned 
the wine/slave dynamic.  
The Stolper-Samuelson theorem is the price equivalent of the Rybczynski 
theorem and predicts that when the relative price of one good rises, the return to its 
intensive factor will also rise and that there will be a corresponding decrease in the return 
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to the other production factor and is “an exceedingly useful theorem.”120 In this case, if 
the value of Italian wine in Gaul was rising, then returns to its relatively intensive factor 
(capital) should also have risen. We cannot give any direct evidence for such an increase, 
but it was during this time that we see one of the few examples of senatorial interest in 
the wine trade. The sudden emergence of this collective and unusual interest is in line 
with a changing value in a factor disproportionately controlled by this same economic 
class.  
In book three of Cicero’s De Re Publica, one of Cicero’s interlocutors, Philus, is 
called upon to defend the notion that justice is determined by humans and is not a 
naturally endowed universal. Included in his examples is the following: “But we are the 
most just men, we who forbid the Transalpine peoples to sow the olive and the vine so 
that our olives and vines are worth more. This we are said to do prudently, not justly.”121 
The historical context underlying the passage is “extremely perplexing.”122 Traditionally 
scholars believed that this policy arose from Rome’s intervention on behalf of Massilia 
against local Ligurian tribes in 154 BCE,
123
 though Paterson argued that these are the 
same, vague transalpinae gentes which crossed the Julian Alps in 189 BCE and settled in 
north Italy, around the eventual site of Aquileia.
124
  
We need not get bogged down in the details, nor must we assume that the senate’s 
decree was designed as part of a cogent commercial policy. But given the different 
regional comparative advantages, depriving these transalpinae gentes from planting vines 
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(and olives) surely was in the senators’ mind when they imposed this rule. The senatorial 
class itself, as the dominant controller of capital, would have been experiencing the 
benefits of increasing returns to products intensively using that factor, for example, wine. 
Though the senators did not, of course, perceive this fact technically, they would have 
perceived the benefits. This may explain why Gallic wine commerce came to their 
attention and resulted in a law unparalleled in Roman legislation.
125
  
 The Heckscher-Ohlin model has helped us hypothesize the following: production 
of surplus wine is not a parameter of trade; wine is comparatively intense in capital, not 
labor; the wine trade in Gaul in the late Republic fits broadly into an HO-type model; the 
fact that not all Rome’s wine came from its immediate environs (i.e., peninsular Italy) 
implies some equalization of factor prices because no particular area developed complete 
specialization (this is from proposition two).
126
 Let us therefore pursue further this 
relationship between capital and wine production. Roman senators, after Augustus’ 
reformations, had to be worth at least one million sesterces and generally were worth at 
least eight million sesterces; some had fortunes over 200 million sesterces as, for 
example, did Seneca, Q. Vibius Crispus, and Sallustius Passienus.
127
 The estimated total 
GDP of the Roman Empire ranges from a low of about nine billion sesterces through the 
mid-teens and peaks with the estimates of Goldsmith and Scheidel/Friesen who estimate 
it at about 20 billion HS.
128
 If a senator’s average wealth was on the order of 4-16 million 
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HS and there were 600 senators, their total wealth was 4.8 billion sesterces and 
constituted 12.5%-50% of the Empire’s total wealth (adopting the upper GDP range), 
though certainly the upper range seems remarkably high. Regardless, if we wish to 
explore the effects of capital on an economic product, senators make a reasonable proxy 
for our lack of hard data since, by any measure, they had access to a large amount of 
available capital.   
We can therefore use the changing geographic distribution of senators as a rough 
stand-in for the geographic distribution of capital during the Roman Empire. The 
following table presents the distribution of senators’ provenances from the beginning of 
the Flavians’ reign in 69 CE to the end of the Severans’ in 238 CE.129 
 
Emperor Number 
of Known 
Senators 
Italian West East Africa 
Vespasian 178 148  21 6 3 
Domitian 163 125 29 7 2 
Trajan 152 100 29 20 3 
Hadrian 156 88 31 26 11 
Antoninus Pius 167 96 17 35 19 
Marcus Aurelius 180 98 8 49 25 
Commodus 114 63 4 31 16 
Septimius 
Severus/Caracalla 
479 204 41 162 72 
Elegabalus/Alexander 
Severus 
238 113 17 75 33 
Figure 4.2: Roman Senator Provenance  
                                                                                                                                                                             
figures of roughly 20 billion HS while Hopkins and Temin estimated it to be considerably lower, around 13-
14 billion HS.  
129
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Figure 4.3: Moving Percentage of Wine and Senators 
 
A look at this graph shows that over time, the origin of wine and the provenience 
of known senators were moving in the same direction and, in one case (those from 
western provinces) at a remarkably similar rate.  
Conclusions 
This analysis leaves little doubt that the vineyards’ location followed the senators’ 
provenance, or, more precisely, vineyards producing wine for export to Rome appeared 
in regions with comparative advantages in capital, but these advantages derived from 
unrelated socio-political externalities. Wine production chased capital but capital did not 
chase wine. This fact, not the quality-quantity distinction, was the fundamental engine of 
Roman wine commerce.  
That relation between wine production and broader patterns of capital distribution 
reminds one of the underexplored observation made by Duncan-Jones that, “we cannot 
make taut hypotheses about the effect of transportation costs on the price of wine from 
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overseas without knowing more about the trade patterns…that existed independent of the 
wine trade.”130 The previous analysis suggests that we should take this suggestion 
seriously. Compare, for example, the two pie charts below, the first showing the 
provenience of amphora-shards at Ostia in the 2
nd
 half of the first century CE, the second 
from 350-475 CE.  
  
Figure 4.4: Distribution of Amphora Provenance at Ostia 
  
We cannot, I think, explain why the later time-horizon suggests, perhaps counter-
intuitively, that Rome’s wine-supply had become increasingly bilateral. This question 
requires us to use a model that allows us to consider multi-lateral trade and reveals that 
the explanation is closely related again to broader socio-political external factors.  
We can use the Gravity Model (GM), the fundamental model of the so-called 
New Economic Geography, to show how this relationship between capital distribution 
and wine’s origin at Rome helps us make sense of the changing shape of Rome’s wine 
commerce within the Mediterranean economy writ large.
131
 The basic form of the gravity 
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equation is: Tij = (GDPi

GDPj

)/Dij

, where Tij represents bilateral trade between regions 
i and j, the numerators represent the regions’ respective economic sizes in terms of GDP, 
D is the distance between the two regions, with parameters 132 The key point to 
take away from the basic formula is that the scale of trade is directly proportional to the 
size of the trading partners and inversely proportional to the distance between them.
133
  
But the model in this form still expresses a bilateral relationship, and it uses easily 
separable economic variables. Though relatively easy to understand theoretically, it does 
not give us many variables we can isolate for analysis. There is, however, a micro-
economic version of this model (we can leave its derivation to the economists). The 
relationship it shows between variables makes it worth considering for us:
134
 Tij = 
YiEj[tij/(iPj)]
1-where Yi is region i’s total output, Ej is the share region i has in the 
expenditure of j, i and Pj are the regions’ respective price indices;  these price indices 
are usually considered multivariate resistance terms.
135
  
These resistance terms are simply the summation of all the bilateral trade costs. In 
other words, we can imagine that each region ships its produce to one international 
market and imports produce from one international market, and the costs depend on the 
aggregate of all bilateral trade costs— that is, “multilateral resistance thus embeds the 
effect of trade costs between third and fourth parties.”136 One interesting implication is 
that two trading partners in dense, centrally located networks within the international 
                                                                                                                                                                             
gravity model is derivable in fact from HO, so using this model here does not necessarily mark a dramatic 
departure from the previous analysis.  
132
 Van Bergeijk and Brakman (2010: 5).  
133
 Distance has been measured in a variety of ways. For a brief overview and bibliography, see Head and 
Mayer (2010: 167-176). 
134
 For a full derivation, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003); for a simplified derivation, van Bergeijk and 
Brakman (2010: 8-11). 
135
 Ibid. 11.  
136
 Anderson (2010: 72).  
166 
 
economy will generally have smaller bi-lateral trade than they would if they were on the 
periphery although each partner’s per capita GDP will be lower than if it were closer to 
the center.
137
 
This fact combined with inspection of the distribution charts above indicates that 
Italy in the 4
th
 century had become more peripheral in international trade. This prediction 
jibes with our broader knowledge of the general eastward shirt of Rome’s political center. 
It also, however, raises the likelihood that Italy’s real per-capita GDP fell between 100 
and 400, thus giving additional evidence to “decline” narratives of the 4th and 5th 
centuries in at least central and southern Italy.
138
 These analyses also remind us that, 
although wine was produced ubiquitously throughout the Mediterranean basin, the 
patterns of Rome’s wine supply were highly sensitive to seemingly unrelated changes.  
The quantity-quality schism which has defined the wine-growing sector for the 
last several centuries depends, as described above, on the opposite relationship, one 
where capital chases wine. In the Roman world, it never did so. Capital was invested to 
produce and sell as much wine as possible. There was never any effort to produce wines 
of quality beyond the natural quality endowed by a region’s climate, soil and basic 
aspects of careful production. Further, there were no strong links between consumers’ 
taste in wine and producers’ production.  
In my second chapter I argued that the commerce of wine at Rome, though driven 
by private enterprise and devoid of active state intervention, depended to an 
underappreciated extent on the consistent demand of the imperial court and senate. In this 
                                                          
137
 For example, it has been estimated that the distance from markets of bi-lateral trading partners 
Australia and New Zealand from the OECD average may adversely affect their per capita GDP by as much 
as 11%. For this and empirical studies of resistance, see Buolhol and de Serres (2010) 323-353. 
138
 Ward-Perkins (2005); Whittaker (1983: 163-80). 
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chapter, I hope to have shown that this wine production differed in important but hitherto 
unrecognized ways from its post-Roman counterparts and that these differences largely 
generated the broad contours of production. The conclusions reached here are in line, 
unsurprisingly, with my contention in Chapter One, that Roman elites demand for wine 
disproportionately influenced the nature of Rome’s demand for wine generally. We can 
see that both on the demand and production side, Rome’s wine commerce was 
disproportionately shaped by relatively few people who had little active interest in the 
results of their actions on the populace generally.  
The conclusions reached in this chapter also allow us to understand better why 
Roman jurisprudence never developed a body of efficient organization law for the 
creation of large integrated firms. Romans would have only changed their basic legal 
structure if there was significant pressure from the wealthy, politically powerful classes. 
As we have seen in this chapter, through the analysis of wine production, these classes’ 
productive activities never developed in a way that made integrating downstream firms 
attractive. They therefore never supplied the requisite pressure on the legal system to 
generate core, structural change. The jurists’ ability and desire to reduce the transaction 
costs associated with this least-best system may become all the more surprising and 
admirable.  
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Chapter V 
The Problem of Storage 
 “The Most Precious Gift to the Temperate and Rational Man…” 
Pliny’s letter in chapter two provided an entrée into examining Roman business 
law and risk in the marketplace generally. We concluded by showing that the jurists 
designed penalty-default rules engineered to minimize the risks inherent in wine’s 
uncertain and changeable quality. This risk depended both on the care producers took in 
making the wine but also how it was stored prior to the sale. For retailers, distributors, 
and consumers within the city of Rome, storage would have been a paramount problem: 
not only would sufficient and convenient space have had to be found but it would have 
had to minimize the chances of spoilage, particularly because little wine would have 
come to Rome during the dangerous winter season.
1
 Unfortunately we know precious 
little about wine storage at Rome. This chapter tries to remedy this situation but with the 
forewarning the scarcity and quality of our evidence often frustrates attempts at definite, 
detailed answers.  
Myriad products in massive quantities came to Roma caput mundi. The Romans 
themselves were aware of this. In his celebrated oration to Rome, Aelius Aristides 
described Rome as the world’s emporium. Every type of commerce occurs there, he said: 
one can see coming by land and by sea all things born by nature or worked by man all 
year round. Cargos from India and Arabia Felix, he marveled, reach such volumes that “it 
                                                          
1
 We might remember that Claudius had to offer insurance to shippers who would transport grain to 
Rome in the off-season (Suet. Div. Claud. 18). 
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seems likely that their trees are left bare” (Φόρτους. . . τοσούτους ὁρᾶν ἔξεστιν  ὥστε 
εἰκάζειν γυμνὰ τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς ἐκεῖ λελεῖφθαι τὰ δένδρα).2 The following description of 
the Horrea Galbana from excavations supervised by Rodolfo Lanciani in the late 19
th
 
century justifies Aristides’ encomium:  
Not long ago, I watched the excavation of one wing of the horrea, which 
some workmen were uncovering: of the four storerooms searched under 
my direction, the first contained huge tusks of ivory, forming a total 
volume of 675 cubic feet; the second contained a few bushels of lentils; the 
third, a bed of crystalline sand, used by stonecutters; the fourth was filled 
up with amphorae of various sizes.
3
 
 
The storage of wine, which was one of Rome’s staple foods along with grain and oil, 
whose price could be anywhere from paltry to exorbitant and whose chemistry rendered it 
particularly susceptible to spoilage and degradation, is of particular interest.  
The sheer area required to store Rome’s wine must have been immense based on 
Tchernia’s estimation that Rome annually consumed something on the order of 1.5 
million hectoliters of wine.
4
 This simple thought experiment illustrates what the number 
entails for the area needed for storage. The outdoor trapezoidal complex, styled as the 
magazzino annonario of Ostia (Reg. v. Is. xi. 5), currently holds remains of eighty-four 
buried dolia, though there were likely around one-hundred and ten originally. A dolium 
held anywhere from seven to ten hectoliters. This building then, of approximately 615m
2
, 
held from 770 Hl to 1100 Hl. Adopting that same volume to area proportion suggest that 
for Rome to store all its wine in such dolia would demand an area of .8–1.2 km2 (200-300 
acres). Of course Romans stored their wines in numerous vessels of different capacities; 
                                                          
2
 Ad Romam 10-13.  
3
 Lanciani (1888: 250).  
4
 Tchernia (1986).  
170 
 
however, that range gives a reasonable estimate for the area Rome’s stored wine would 
occupy if spread out flat.  
Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Cyrus Redding, journalist and author of a 
compendium of the world’s wines, wrote in rather turgid prose the following on storing 
wine:  
In treating of the cares of the wine-maker, allusion has been made to the 
diseases which the contents of his casks may sustain in the cellar before 
they go out of his hands, or are transferred to the market—in fact, while 
they are yet preparing for that purpose. The due care of wine in the hands 
of the mercantile purchaser, or in the custody of the private individual, 
remains to be noticed. He who has a good cellar well filled, cannot too 
soon make himself acquainted with its management, and with the history 
of that beverage which, taken in due moderation, may be reckoned among 
the most precious gifts of Heaven to the temperate and rational man.
5
 
 
Redding correctly recognized that, wherever there has been high volume wine trade, 
commercial cellars have been one of its important features. During the high Middle Ages, 
merchants went to great lengths to secure favorable wine cellars, and there still exist 
complaints of merchant vintners about English bailiffs steering them to poorly located 
cellars.
6
 These cellars’ importance went beyond storing wine. There, repairs of vessels, 
sales between merchants, and even eating and sleeping occurred as well.
7
 Wine storage 
facilities at Rome were also important and potentially highly profitable. A fragment of 
Varro (mid 1
st
 century BCE) states that “there are many at Rome who have built wine 
cellars for a profit” (aliquot Romae sunt qui cellas uinarias fructuis causa fecerunt).8 
                                                          
5
 Redding (1851: 325-26). 
6
 James and Veale & Veale (1971:76).  
7
 Ibid. 76-77; (1971: 138-39). Even today these issues arise in commercial wine cellars, which can be a 
lucrative business.A recent case in Illinois involved Heritage warehouse, which owned and operated a 
wine storage facility. Heritage not only purchased wines from vineyards around the world, it paid 
transportation fees including insurance, taxes, and customs. It even determined whether the 
transportation equipment was to be refrigerated or not. Collins v. Heritage Wine Cellars, Ltd. 2008. US 
district court for the Northern district of Illinois, Eastern division. 
8
 Men. 530. 
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 Unfortunately we are almost wholly ignorant where and how wine containers 
were stored. So far as I know, the only chapter length discussion of wine storage is 
chapter 5 of Dr. Edward Barry’s Observations Historical Critical and Medical on the 
Wines of the Ancients and the Analogy between Them and Modern Wines, published in 
1775. Except as an historical curiosity, the chapter is of little modern interest. Barry 
combines descriptions of cellae vinariae from Vitruvius, Pliny, Columella, and Varro and 
scraps of poetry combined with a somewhat bizarre theory of temperature’s effects on 
wine to give an arresting if less than elucidating account of Roman practice.
9
   
The limited modern discussion does not advance our understanding. The 
following nicely illustrates the problem: 
It is natural for us to want to move beyond a mere catalogue. . . and to ask 
further questions: what was stored, who was responsible, how was is it 
stored. . .An example of the problems raised by posing such questions can 
be seen in the case of wine or oil. . . The major problem which has of 
course preoccupied scholars has of course been grain…10 
 
The questions posed here provide a veritable program of study. Yet, after posing 
the question, the author immediately turns his attention to grain. Was the storage of wine 
similar to the storage of grain? We cannot dismiss the possibility out of hand. There are 
numerous references to storing wine in horrea in the juristic sources,
11
 so perhaps our 
task will turn out to be a relatively straightforward adaptation of the scholarship on grain 
storage. Yet quotes like the following should make us suspicious that storing the two 
products was basically identical: 
One final group of buildings in Ostia, quite unlike the horrea so far 
described, remains to be discussed. The buildings concerned each consist 
simply of a walled area, in which a number of great earthenware jars 
                                                          
9
 Barry (1775: 68-87). 
10
 Rickman (2002: 358-59). 
11
 E.g., D. 18.1.74, 33.7.7, 41.1.9.6; CJ 4.48.2. 
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were embedded in the ground almost up to their necks. . . [i]n Rome itself 
cellae vinariae might very often have been provided with such dolia 
defossa of their own . . .[t]he interest of the Ostian examples is that they 
show how in an area where the majority of inhabitants lived in insulae, 
without their own storage space, storage for liquids tended to be 
concentrated at specific points and that the storage capacity could be 
quite considerable.
12
 
 
 The volume of wine coming to Rome demanded ample storage space. The method 
of storing wine would have been intertwined with factors of transportation, security, 
distribution, and wine’s biochemistry. Any investigation wine storage ought to take these 
into account. Unfortunately there is little to go on. The earliest accounts are curiosities, 
and more recent scholarship has not offered a cogent account but limited itself to short, 
often platitudinous, pronouncements. Nevertheless, I will try to offer a correction and if 
my conclusions disappoint by their lack of certitude, it may be worth remembering the 
observation of theologian and logician Isaac Watts, who cautioned that, “There are a 
hundred things wherein we mortals . . . must be content with probability, where our best 
light and reasoning will reach no farther.” 
An Overview of Urban Storage 
 The study of perishable food storage in the city of Rome has focused 
predominately on horrea and has primarily limited itself to the study of grain. This 
product has received the most attention because Rome’s government intervened in its 
supply as early as the Gracchi, and we are comparatively better informed about its supply 
and distribution than other commodities. There have been two branches of horrea 
studies: material remains (i.e., archaeological remains, inscriptions, and topographical) 
and the study of how horrea were operated, which has primarily used juristic texts.  
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Scholarship on the former dates back to the late 19
th
/early 20
th
 century, and work by 
Lanciani, Calza, Gatti, Becatti, and Meiggs all deserve mention.
13
 On the latter, Alzon & 
Dumont’s Problèmes relatifs à la location des entrep ts en droit romain along with 
articles by Wubbe, Wacke, and Macqueron are essential.
14
 The only book length study of 
horrea, Rickman’s Roman Granaries and Store Buildings, treats both these subjects and 
remains the subject’s fundamental synthetic study.15 Material remains are more helpful 
for the present purpose of examining where and in what wine was stored. 
The most important early work and the one which launched modern horrea 
studies is Staccioli’s article, “Tipi di horrea nella documentazione della Forma Urbis.”16 
In that article, Staccioli examined buildings identifiable as horrea from the Severan 
Marble Plan and compared those representations with archaeological remains, mostly 
from Ostia.  His comparison led him to propose a tripartite typology of horrea. It is 
important to bear in mind, however, that Staccioli was first and foremost interested in 
Roman topography. His schema tries, therefore, to improve scholars’ ability to identify 
the purpose and location of unnamed and unplaced fragments of the Marble Plan. His 
article is not at all interested in the socio-economic functions of these building types nor 
in broader historical issues generally. Somewhat surprisingly, Rickman, whose work does 
try to place horrea in larger historical contexts, more or less adopts this typology, 
although he considers the most important distinction that between the corridor type and 
the courtyard type. Because Staccioli’s typology has dominated horrea scholarship, it is 
useful to outline briefly horrea characteristics and give a few examples.   
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 Calza and Nash (1960); Gatti (1885); Lanciani (1888), (1897); Meiggs (1960).  
14
 Alzon (1965); Macqueron (1979: 199-212); Wacke (1980: 299-324); Wubbe (1959: 508-20).  
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 Rickman (1971). 
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 Staccioli (1962: 1430-40).  
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The first type of horrea takes the form of a long corridor bordered by individual 
rooms along its length and with a wall surrounding three of the four sides.  The figure 
below presents an example of this type from the Marble Plan. In the center of the 
fragment, one observes a corridor with an opening on the bottom left with individual 
rooms along its length. It is comparable to the following small, unnamed horrea from 
Ostia (Reg. I Is. XIII. I).
 17
  
 
Figure 5.1: Unnamed Corridor Horrea  
 The second type of horrea has three rows of rooms rather than two, and the 
central corridor is widened into an (often colonnaded) central courtyard. Facing away 
from the courtyard along the outer walls are often tabernae as observed below. In 
addition these horrea could be multi-storied as the two triangles near the entrance below 
indicate. The Horrea di Hortensius in Ostia seems to have been of this type. 18  
                                                          
17
 After Pianta Marmorata (PM) 1960, plate 49 (Frag. 421).  
18
 After PM (1960) Pl. 36.   
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Figure 5.2: Courtyard Horrea  
 Staccioli’s third and final type is basically just a doubling of type two in which 
one finds two courtyards surrounded by rooms. The two courtyards are connected by 
interior passageways as the fragment below of the horrea Lolliana exemplifies:
 19
 
 
Figure 5.3: Horrea Lolliana 
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 After PM (1960) Pl. 25. 
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The premise that Ostian evidence can be used as a proxy for missing evidence 
from Rome underlies Staccioli’s types, as the figures above illustrate. Moreover, the 
method assumes that physical remains can be correlated with the Marble Plan. The case 
of insulae should caution us. One of the most common Ostian types of insulae is the so-
called Medianum, which appears nowhere on the Marble Plan.
20
  This is not to say that 
Ostian evidence cannot be used to discuss Rome. But it must be done carefully. The 
following section provides an overview of the evidence Ostia provides for storage 
generally and wine storage particularly.  
Ostia 
 During the reigns of Trajan and Hadrian the city of Ostia was substantially rebuilt 
and enlarged, and its urban fabric changed.
21
 Under Hadrian bricks became the dominant 
building materials for surfacing walls.
22
 The forum was built up with monumental 
architecture; the area to the north of the forum was rebuilt, its roads widened, and all 
earlier remains were swept away.
23
 Region II was substantially altered as were areas in 
the city’s southwest, and Ostia’s urban fabric changed in countless ways.24 By the reign 
of Antoninus Pius, Ostia’s transformation was largely complete. This rebuilding was 
concomitant with Trajan’s construction of Portus and the subsequent rerouting of much 
of Rome’s annonal grain from Puteoli.  
 Attention ought also to be paid to excavation processes and the concerns of the 
excavators in order to identify confounding variables for discussing Ostian horrea. The 
first excavations date to the early 19
th
 century, but did not begin seriously until, in 1885, 
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 Reynolds (1996: 168). 
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 Meiggs (1973: 64-78, 133-146).  
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 Meiggs (1973: 68). 
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 Pavolini (1983: 30), “pazzando il resto.” 
24
 Ibid. 
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P.E. Visconti, under papal dispensation from Pius IX, began a series of excavations that 
continued until Italian unification in 1871. The first scholarly treatment of Ostia was 
published in 1912.
25
 Over the next twenty years excavations proceeded rapidly under 
Guido Calza to such an extent that, by the early 1940s, approximately two-thirds of the 
city had been unearthed. However, these excavations typify some of the worst 
characteristics of early archaeology: rushed work, poor documentation, and dubious 
restorations.
26
 Moreover, the excavators were only interested in excavating to the 
Hadrianic levels; consequently, many features of the late-antique city and, in some cases, 
the earlier city were obliterated.  
In the years since archaeologists have become more careful, and there have been 
new studies of individual structures and of pre-Hadrianic stratigraphic levels. 
Nevertheless, the city’s excavated area is not much more expansive in area than in the 
1940s. Moreover, the buildings receiving attention tend to be those of either monumental 
or art historical interest: temples, baths, domus, insulae, etc. Relatively few have treated 
quotidian commercial architecture.
27
 On horrea in particular, little new has happened. A 
new project led by Catherine Virlouvet and Brigitte Marin does hope to re-evaluate and, 
in some cases, (re)excavate Ostian storehouses, but so far the group has only published 
some preliminary reports on the Grandi Horrea.
28
 
 Moreover, Ostia’s unexcavated regions are bunched along the ancient course of 
the Tiber, areas where we would expect to find commercial docks, loading zones, and 
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 Paschetto (1912). 
26
 Pavolini (1983: 36). 
27
 Though see Delaine (2005: 29-47). 
28
 For the preliminary report see Bukowiecki and Rousse (2007: 283-86). 
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buildings.
29
 There is some evidence of several more horrea on the Tiber’s right bank, 
which is thus far unexcavated.
30
 Rickman has called this area a potential Ostian 
“Trastevere” and claims it is, “an extra warning to us not to draw too many general 
conclusions about storage at Ostia from the evidence which happens to be available to 
us.”31  
We are further cautioned by a comparison with Rome, where twenty-seven horrea 
are known by name from epigraphic and literary sources.
32
 But Rome’s Regionary 
Catalogues (the Notitia and the Curiosum) record 290 horrea within the city of Rome. In 
other words only 10% of the Rome’s horrea are known at all. Further, distinguishing 
private, non-monumental horrea from tabernae or other small buildings is difficult. 
Differentiation at Ostia has relied, inter alia, on room size and the construction of rooms’ 
thresholds: identifiable horrea tended to have doors that pivoted out from the center 
whereas tabernae had grooves for sliding screens.
33
  
This method of identifying and differentiating horrea types is problematic. 
Thresholds are not always well preserved, and the early excavators, generally 
uninterested in these buildings, did not always record this information. The method also 
relies on an exceptionally homogenous view of the horrea type, which sacrifices 
potential complexity on the altar of epistemic closure. As we will see in reviewing the 
Ostian horrea, it is quite likely that we have only a small and unrepresentative sample of 
the city’s storage units. And unfortunately, these were not likely where wine was stored.  
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 These areas are in the Northwest of the city past the Via del Serapide, in Region I near the Horrea 
Epagathiana, an area directly to the North of the Grandi Horrea as well as an area in between it and the 
Piazzale delle Corporazioni, and in the city’s far East. See Coarelli (1996: 108-9). 
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 Pavolini (1986: 99); Heinzelmann (2001: 313-28) thinks there are around ten.  
31
 Rickman (2002: 356).  
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 LTUR s.v. horrea. 
33
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Review of the Identifiable Horrea 
 Rickman identifies eleven horrea of Ostia and presents a fairly brief outline of the 
magazine style storehouses at Portus.
34
 Subsequent excavation and geophysical survey 
allows us to identify, with variable degrees of certainty, several others.
35
 At Ostia, four 
are of the corridor variety and six of the courtyard variety. There are several 
“miscellaneous” types as well. It should be stressed, however, that only one of these 
warehouses is actually identified as such by contemporary evidence: the Horrea 
Epagathiana, whose name we know from an inscription. Though there is no need here for 
a detailed repetition, a brief survey is in order to clarify my disagreements with some of 
Rickman’s conclusions and set the stage for my subsequent interpretation.  
 There are four corridor-style horrea within the walls, none with any identifying 
inscription. Figures are provided below (for convenience, I refer to these, clockwise, as 1, 
2, 3, &4).
36
 Buildings 1 & 2 are not “to be compared with the great state warehouses” but 
are on a more modest scale.
37
 All except 4 date from the first half of the 2
nd
 century 
(Trajan/Hadrian); Number 4 was built entirely in opus reticulatum and therefore can be 
dated to the early 1
st
 century CE.
38
 
 Of these, none fit into what we would call a generally commercial urban context. 
1 is located on the western side of Semita dei Cippi, which intersects the Decumanus 
Maximus about 110m to the north. From there it continues as the Via dei Molini towards 
the river and past the Grandi Horrea on the east. Horrea 2 is also a small building 
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 Rickman (1971: 15-76, 123-32).  
35
 See Heinzelmann (2001: 313-328) and (2002: 103-121).  
36
 After Rickman (1971: 38, 40, 54, 59). Clockwise, these are located in Reg. I. Is. XIII. I, Reg III. Is. XVII.I, 
Reg. III. Is. II.6, & Reg. IV. Is. V. 12.  
37
 Rickman (1971: 40).  
38
 Rickman (1971: 59). 
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located at the western end of the Via degli Aurighi. Horrea 3 is to the SE of 2, near the 
intersection of the Via degli Aurighi and the Decumanus Maximus. It was, however, 
somewhat bigger than 1 and 2 (two-storied) and preserves evidence of locking devices on 
its interior cells. 4 was a very small horrea, isolated by the Hadrianic period. Surrounded 
by the Schola del Traiano, a bath, and several houses, it had no easy access. Though the 
building must have still been in use under the early Flavians, the builders clearly did not 
consider the building of any great importance.  
These buildings’ location makes them less than likely candidates for bulk storage 
for items arriving on the river. Horrea 1, though facing a larger street, was ca. 400m from 
the Tiber—a long walk and inefficient use of time for heavy goods unloaded at the quays.  
Horrea 2 was in a more decisively worse location for river traffic. The main, south 
entrance faced away from the river across the road from the “Case a giardino.” The 
building’s later, north entrance opened onto an alley with access to the Via del Serapide, 
which was narrow and presumably quite crowded. Like 1, 3 had good street access but 
was even further from the river. Moreover, its locking system might suggest that it 
catered to clients storing more valuable goods (or for longer periods) than, for example, 
grain. Horrea 4 was far from the river, but the lack of information on its original urban 
environment makes it difficult to say much more. It is difficult to ascribe any of these to 
river-oriented, bulk storage.
 39
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 After Rickman (1971) 38, 40, 54,59. 
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Figure 5.4: Ostian Corridor Horrea 
Rickman identifies seven courtyard style horrea. In addition, there are two more 
in the unexcavated, western part of Region III identified by geo-physical survey, whose 
location is indicated on the figure below.
40
   
 
Figure 5.5: Unexcavated Ostian Horrea 
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 After Heinzelmann (2001). 
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The figures below give the ground plans for the five best preserved Ostian 
courtyard horrea (from left to right: Horr. I.VIII.2, Epagathiana, horrea di Hortensius 
(V.XII.1), Horrea dell’Artemide (V.XI.VIII), and the Grandi Horrea II.IX.7)). 
 
Figure 5.6: Ostian Courtyard Horrea  
 Of these, the majority run parallel to the Tiber at a distance of ca. 100m from its 
banks, though presumably less from its wharves. The postulated horrea of Regio III more 
than likely had access to both the harbor to the northwest and to the navalia to their direct 
north.
41
 Further into the city are four horrea in various states of excavation in Regio V. 
Three run along the south edge of the Decumanus Maximus: the Horrea dell’Artemide, 
Horrea di Hortensius, and a mostly unexcavated but apparently fairly large horrea to its 
immediate east. Though further from the river, frontage onto the Decumanus would have 
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 On the harbor and navalia, see Heinzelmann & Martin (2002: 5-19).  
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made them fairly accessible, and the main entrance to the Horrea di Hortensius seems to 
communicate with the north end of the Via delle Corporazioni which terminated at the 
river.  
 The most poorly positioned horrea is a partially excavated one of Reg. V Is. I.2. It 
was fairly large: its two excavated outer walls measure 59 x 45m. It was situated at the 
far south end of the Semita dei Cippi at its intersection with the Cardo Maximus. The 
walls were primarily of opus reticulatum, and it has been therefore dated to the mid-1
st
 
century CE. The structure’s northwest corner preserves a curved wall in opus latericum, 
likely from the 4
th
 century, and which Heinzelmann has suggested formed the corner of a 
small amphitheater.
42
 The building was roughly contemporaneous with the first phase of 
the Grandi Horrea, and they are the earliest courtyard horrea for which we have 
evidence.   
But Ostia is unusual because it also furnishes examples of storage facilities 
beyond those two horrea types, a type which was used for storing wine: storage in dolia 
(buried and otherwise). Reference to these most often comes in agricultural contexts. 
Pliny, enumerating regional differences in storing wine, said that residents of milder 
climates often used buried dolia.
43
 There are quite a few examples of agricultural cellae 
vinariae which typify this procedure.
44
 Burying dolia offered several benefits. Most 
importantly, it kept the wine’s temperature reasonably constant, and underground storage 
kept the wine relatively cool. There are fewer examples of buried dolia in urban areas, 
but they assuredly existed. The jurist Paul says, “if dolia buried in horrea are not 
                                                          
42
 Bibliography on this horrea is difficult to come by because it has been scarcely excavated, but see the 
pictures, plan and summary written by Jan Baker at http://www.ostia-antica.org/regio5/1/1-2.htm.  
43
 NH 14.133: mitiores plagae doliiis condunt infodiuntque terrae tota aut ad portionem situs. 
44
 For examples, see especially Brun (2004).   
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excepted name by name, then they seem to be yielded in the sale of the horrea” (dolia in 
horreis defossa si non sint nominatim in venditione excepta, horreorum venditioni 
cessisse videri).
45
 Ostia provides three extant examples of this type of storage plus one 
known only through archaeological report.
46
  
 The first is the so-called Caseggiato dei Doli (Reg. I.IV.5):
 47
   
 
Figure 5.7: Caseggiato dei Doli   
It is a late Hadrianic or early Antonine structure, and in it are remains of thirty-five 
containers with an average capacity of forty amphorae (ca. 1,000 l).
48
  On the structure’s 
north side there are two open areas. It is tempting to think that these areas may have had 
equipment for maneuvering the dolia and its wine, but this is speculative without on-site 
investigation. There were two entrances into the structure, one on the north and one on 
the southwest leading to an alleyway behind several tabernae. To the south was an 
                                                          
45
 Dig. 18.1.76. 
46
 A fourth building was excavated in the 18
th
 century near the Horrea dei Mensores (Rickman 1971: 75). It 
is unfortunate that it no longer exists.  
47
 After Pavolini (1986: 78). 
48
 Rickman (1971: 75). 
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apartment complex. Neither the shops nor apartments seem to have had direct access to 
the wine.  
 In Regio III, on the Via di Annio, is another Hadrianic storage facility in which 
dolia have been discovered (III.XIV.3): 49 
 
Figure 5.8: Dolia Defossa (Via di Annio)   
There are remains of twenty-one dolia currently though it is likely that thirty-six dolia 
originally stood there, since other examples show a general preference for symmetrical 
arrangement. Interestingly, these were not true dolia defossa; their current position is due 
to the ground level’s rising, not to an original burial. The building’s purpose has been 
connected with the Caseggiato di Annio, adjacent to it and owned by Annius, who was a 
local merchant.
50
  
 The largest such storage area is next to the Horrea dell’Artemide (V.XI.5). 51  
                                                          
49
 After Pavolini (1983: 134). 
50
 Ibid. Annius was an oil-merchant in point of fact, which might suggest that wine was not the dolia’s 
principal item of storage, but this is tentative. Even if true it should not make any difference for including 
it here. 
51
 After Pavolini (1983: 217). 
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Figure 5.9: Dolia Defossa (V.XI.5)   
There were over a hundred dolia here, with a total storage capacity of 750 to 1000 hL. As 
in the previous two examples, the building itself was simply an open area. Access was 
apparently restricted to the north, though the area to the south with the staircase and 
columns is not totally excavated. Coming from the Portico del Monumento 
Repubblicano, a narrow alley led past a row of four tabernae and into a large hall (the 
division here into rooms dates to a later remodeling) and thence into the courtyard. It is 
possible that this complex was associated with the horrea next door, though the lack of 
any communication between the two renders this somewhat unlikely. It is more likely 
that the dolia were designed for longer term storage for local consumption.
52
 If we 
assume that half the dolia were used for wine and adopt a personal consumption estimate 
of .5 – 1 liter per day, then that volume of wine would supply 1,000-2,000 people for a 
year. That said, it is unlikely that local consumers accessed this store directly: not only 
was the courtyard not convenient to traffic but also the density of the dolia make it 
difficult to imagine how one reached the items stored in the middle dolia.  
                                                          
52
 This was Rickman’s interpretation as well, though based primarily on its distance from the Tiber.  
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 The final one was located on the bank of the Tiber in Regio I not far from the 
Horrea dei Mensores, perhaps in between the Piccolo Mercato and the Palazzo 
Imperiale, and excavated in the late 18
th
 century.
53
 Very little is known because the Tiber 
had already eroded the section’s north section. Also, the excavators dug a limited area 
and left much untouched to the south. Carcopino has given the only description of the 
building, of which the following is a summary.
54
 On the east, Carcopino identified a 
series of rooms which he identified as magazines based on their shape and dimensions 
and, to the west, a house about which details are completely lacking. The cellar was 
apparently accessible on two sides, on the river-side (north) and to the south. The only 
visual depiction comes from the 1925 Blue Guide and is the area labeled deposito di 
Olii.
55
 
 
Figure 5.10: Deposito di Olii  
These few nuggets of information are interesting for a few reasons. First, this 
storage facility may have been more closely tied to river traffic than the other three. That 
said, like the other three courtyards, this was perhaps closely allied with a non-
commercial building: a house. Thus, like the dolia defossa of Reg. I.IV.5 which were also 
north of the Decumanus, these apparently demanded little space and existed separately 
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 Rickman (1971: 75).  
54
 Carcopino (1909: 360-61).  
55
 The map found at, http://www.ostia-antica.org/dict/topics/excavations/excavations15.htm; the 
identification of this deposito from its geographic position along with Carcopino (1909: 361). 
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from Regio I’s large horrea. Finally, this site was relatively close to the area Coarelli 
considers the most likely location for Ostia’s Forum Vinarium, which he is inclined to 
situate somewhere in or north of the unexcavated area of Reg. I.XIV.
56
   
We can use the variation in storage facilities’ features to comment more broadly 
about urban storage in general. Janet Delaine, in a perceptive article published in 2005 on 
commercial architecture in Ostia argued that, “complexity and potential for multi-
functionality have emerged as key characteristics of many commercial spaces.”57 More 
importantly, she explicitly criticized Rickman’s hypothesis that courtyards in Ostian 
warehouses became more constricted over time due to increasing space constraints. She 
based her critique on an analysis of the ratios between horrea’s open and closed spaces in 
both the courtyard and corridor type.
58
 She then posited that the courtyard served a 
“specific function, vital to the identity and use of the building.”59 Adopting her definition 
of open and closed spaces, I push her analysis further. My argument shows that she was 
correct that warehouses’ organization of urban space was their defining feature, not the 
amount of space itself. Further, I argue that courtyard and corridor horrea should not be 
thought of as two variations of some horrea ur-type but as two fundamentally different 
storage methods.  
Delaine astutely realized that the relationship between closed space and open 
space in horrea is a defining (and measurable) feature. There are, however, more 
sophisticated statistical methods available for interpreting what these ratios mean. What 
we need is a method for directly comparing those measurements. My method was as 
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 Coarelli (1996). 
57
 Delaine (2005: 45). 
58
 Ibid. 41. 
59
 Ibid. 42. 
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follows: onto nine horrea—five courtyard style and four corridor60—I overlaid a grid, 
any point of which was definable by x/y coordinates. I then used a random number 
generator to generate, for each horrea, ten sets of coordinates. For each point, I 
determined whether it fell in an open, closed, or ambiguous space.
61
 Each assignment 
received a number: 1 if open, 2 if closed and 1.5 if ambiguous. For each space, the value 
of what might be called its Closed-Ratio (CR) was determined by summing those 
numbers. As a control and further point of comparison, I determined the same values for 
five areas of the Ostia.
62
 Thus, CR values range from 10 (perfectly open) to 20 (perfectly 
closed). The following table summarizes the results: 
 
Sample CR_City CR_Courtyard CR_Corrdidor 
1 15 13.5 18 
2 14.5 17 17 
3 17 15 18 
4 16.5 13 14.5 
5 15.5 15 17 
Mean 15.7 14.7 16.9 
Figure 5.11: Interior Spatial Distribution 
These raw numbers are unsurprising: the city taken wholly is neither radically 
open nor closed; courtyard style horrea are somewhat more open than the city generally, 
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 Piccolo Mercato, Horrea dell’Artemide, Horrea di Hortensius, Horrea Epagathiana, and that of Reg. I. 
VIII.2; for the corridor, Reg.III.XVII.1, III.II.6, IV.V.12, I.XIII.1. 
61
 Open spaces include courtyards, roads, porticos, etc. Closed spaces are anything narrowly defined by 
walls,  e.g., cellae, rooms of insulae and domus, etc.  
62
 Two from Reg. I, two from Reg. II, and I from Reg.III. I avoided areas that had large unexcavated areas 
because excavations tend to favor areas that have a high percentage of “closed” space, so there was too 
high a chance of sampling bias by indiscriminately using all regions of the city. The corridor-horrea of Reg. 
III.XVII.1 was sampled twice.  
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both of which are more open than corridor horrea. It is unclear from these data, however, 
whether these differences are particularly significant.We can make more precise the 
meaningfulness of the variation in spatial distribution recorded above by analyzing the 
significance of the difference between the variances.
63
 The results are summarized in the 
table below: 
 
Group F(Fisher Value =t
2
) Significance) 
All 3.26 .07 
City-Courtyard 1.41 .27 
City-Corridor 2.30 .17 
Courtyard-Corridor 5.37 .05 
Figure 5.12: Significance of Difference  
 
 This analysis allows us to generalize Delaine’s observation that the percentage of 
closed spaces on roads and caseggiati was not uniformly different from corridor style 
horrea.
64
 The lack of strong, statistically discernible distinction between the CR values 
for the city as a whole and corridor style horrea implies that the city itself must have 
offered a great deal of storage space in non-architecturally distinct forms. In other words, 
there is no statistically discernible distinction in the spatial variation of the buildings 
standardly identified as storage buildings. There were plenty of non-architecturally 
distinct locations within the city equally suitable for storage. The areas for dolia storage 
furnish just such an example. As we have seen, fairly impressive volumes could have 
                                                          
63
 We can compare the difference between these means by using a one-way ANOVA to test the null 
hypothesis that these three samples came from three populations with the same means as a way of 
comparing the underlying populations. For these three means, F(Fisher Value)=3.26 (equivalent to 
Student’s T-Test (F=t
2
)), which is significant at .075. In other words, there is good reason to suspect that 
the variance between those means results from a legitimate difference between the populations. 
64
 Delaine (2005: 41-42).  
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been stored in relatively small areas. The architecture of those areas was not singular but 
was a simple courtyard. If dolia had not been preserved in them, more-or-less in situ, it is 
unlikely we to have divined their function. To put it another way, Ostia’s urban grid 
offered numerous areas suitable for storage that were not architecturally distinct. 
Second, these numbers demonstrate how misleading it is to group horrea together 
by type since both courtyard style horrea and corridor horrea have, at least as far as their 
spatial proportions, more in common with the city at large than they do with each other. 
In fact, the difference between the CR ratios of courtyard and corridor horrea are the only 
one we can state at a 95% confidence level did not come from two populations with the 
same mean. In other words, Staccioli’s precedent of labeling these two building styles as 
two types of the same fundamental type was counterproductive.   
 Why then did these two architecturally distinct storage forms arise? Staccioli 
believed there had been an evolution from the corridor type to the courtyard type because 
two of the oldest extant horrea in Ostia are in the former style.
65
 This suggestion is 
unconvincing. As Rickman pointed out, the horrea Galbana of Rome is of the courtyard 
type and predates any Ostian horrea.
66
 Rickman tried to answer the question by 
determining whether Romans copied or adapted other, older Mediterranean powers’ 
solutions to storage.
67
 His approach is problematic because it tacitly assumes that a 
storage specific architectural form is required for effectively storing goods. The analysis 
above, however, shows that this is not so. An alternative hypothesis is to assume that both 
horrea forms were variations of the general urban grid, one which has become marginally 
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 Staccioli (1962 1438).  
66
 Rickman (1971: 148).  
67
 Ibid. 148-155. 
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(but not significantly) more closed and the other marginally (but not significantly) more 
open than the city at large and ask why this variation from the mean occurred. 
 Rickman provided plans for storage complexes outside of Rome and Ostia from 
Portus, Lepcis Magna, Constanza on the Danube, Myra and Patara in Asia Minor, and 
Djemila in modern Algeria, but these are all fairly late (postdating the large complexes at 
Rome), and none of them remotely resembles a courtyard horrea.
68
 An article from the 
late 2000s on early Roman horrea at Nauportus is instructive.
69
 The vicus of Nauportus 
lay on the Ljubljanica River and lay along trade routes between Northern Italy (Aquileia) 
and Danube regions to the north and east. The Roman settlement of Dolge Njive was 
situated on a river bend and was apparently an early Roman trading post dating to the 
early Augustan period.
70
 Geophysical survey in 2003 and 2004 produced the following:
71
 
Figure 5.13: Horrea at Nauportus 
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 Rickman (1971: 123-47). 
69
 Horvat (2008: 111-21). 
70
 Horvat (2008: 113). 
71
 After Horvat (2008: 115).  
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The basic ground plan is that of a central, slightly oblong market surrounded by 
storage cells and surrounded by a colonnade. At the southwest are eight rooms which 
have been identified as tabernae. The whole market area is surrounded by defensive 
walls with four towers, and, beyond the north gate, there were probably piers and wharf 
establishments. Horvat compares the rows of horrea here to corridor style horrea.
72
 This 
is an odd comparison. Though it is true that the horrea themselves are in rows, the 
market, taken wholly, looks strikingly like a courtyard style horrea.  This similarity raises 
the possibility that courtyard style horrea and this type of market arrangement were 
designed as solutions the same problem.  
In Ostia, the largest imperial horrea, the Grandi Horrea and Antoniniani, were 
likely instrumental in the organization and movement of the annona: Many of Ostia’s 
grain mills and bakeries congregated near the Grandi Horrea, and its open design must 
have facilitated local commerce as well.
73
 The open spaces may have held auctions for 
goods stored within.
74
 The famous leges horreorum from Rome both mentioned the 
leasor’s ability to rent intercolumnia.75  
This reference is somewhat mysterious: As Rickman points out, goods placed 
between a courtyard’s central columns would be unsafe and get in the way.76  Perhaps the 
columns are those of the portico and were rented separately because the area was partially 
sheltered from the elements. But we should not discount the possibility that the areas 
were not rented out for storage but for other commercial activities. After all, armaria 
                                                          
72
 Ibid. 116. 
73
 Bakker (2001: 179) argues that a portion of Ostia’s residents likely received bread and grain like Romans 
and the Grandi Horrea may have been associated with that too.  
74
 Delaine (2005: 41-2) 
75
 CIL 6.33860, 6.33747, 6.37795.  
76
 Rickman (1971: 197-98). 
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were rentable also, and these were generic storage cupboards but often associated with 
money.
77
 It is not amiss to think of courtyard horrea as a dedicated-to-storage forum in 
which a range of accompanying commercial activities occurred. 
Storage at Rome 
Ostia has demonstrated that storage should not be analyzed on the basis of overly 
schematic types but rather as an activity taking place throughout the city. Most 
characteristic types significantly differ from one another for reasons having less to do 
with the narrowly defined purpose of storage and more to do with the other commercial 
activities accompanying storage itself. We have also seen that wine storage, at least in 
dolia defossa, was of a different nature than goods kept in the various horrea. Here, I 
argue that wine in Rome was stored both in horrea and in cellae vinariae and that these 
cellae likely had fixed or semi-fixed dolia.  
Two words are used for describing storage complexes at Rome: horreum and 
cella. The distinction between these two words has not drawn much attention. Almeida-
Rodriguez suggests that, in literary contexts, cella refers generally to a private storeroom 
for a specific use but that, in epigraphic sources, cella is synonymous with a horreum for 
a specific good.
78
 His first assertion appears correct: as early as Plautus, domus are 
equipped with cellae for storing wine.
79
 In Cicero’s In Pisonem, it is a calumny to 
lambaste Piso for having no cella and therefore needing to buy his bread and wine from a 
bar (panis et vinum a propola atque de cupa).
80
 But this was not a hard distinction. 
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 E.g., Cic. Cael. 52; Cluent. 179.  
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 Rodriguez-Almeida (1984: 36). 
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 E.g., Mil. Glor. 852/853; Ibid. 857: Vos in cella vinaria Bacchanal facitis. 
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 Pis. 67.6. 
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Horace, for example, refers to amphorae of old wine standing in the house’s horreum.81 It 
is true that the distinction between horreum and cella in an urban context depends on 
whether it was dedicated to a specific good, but only partly: there are several examples of 
product-specific horrea. In Rome, for example, were the horrea Piperataria, Candelaria, 
and Chartaria. Dig. 33.7.7 refers to a legated horreum vinarium. A recently published 
inscription from North Africa records that the proconsul Macedo had his factotum Marius 
Victorianus build an (h)orreum oliarium adq(ue) frumentarium.
82
  
The combination of horrea et cellae was a formulaic phrase used to encompass all 
storage buildings. Cicero described Capua as the cella atque horreum Campani.
83
 
Manilius, describing how spica (an ear of grain) shelters its grains, claims that it 
furnishes (praebere) cellas et horrea. In the Theodosian Code, a fine of five pounds gold 
is to be levied upon anyone who vindicates for himself (sibimet. . .ausi fuerint vindicare) 
any supplies held by the bread-makers from the public or private storerooms (ex his 
horreis cellulisve).
84
 Thus Staccioli and those following him did not give a robust account 
of Rome’s areas for storage because they focused solely on horrea which conformed to a 
few basic architectural forms.  
Not only have cellae been ignored almost entirely but the analysis of horrea on 
the basis of a schematic typology has skewed our interpretation. For example, Rome’s 
Regionary Catalogues (the Notitia and Curiosum) list 290 horrea spread throughout the 
city of Rome. The Catalogues never use the word cella. But it is difficult to believe that 
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 Carm. 2.14.25. 
82
 AE 2002, 1670. The inscription is late (post 300), but I see no reason to believe that it is different from 
earlier word usage. 
83
 Leg. Agr. 2.89.7. Cf. also Paneg. 8.13, plena fuisse horrea, plenas cellas. 
84
 CTh. 14.15.4.1. Cellulae is synonymous with cella, as shown by CTh. 9.45.4.pr, which refers generically 
to temples’ cellulae as opposed to cellae.  
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Regio X, for example, had 48 horrea all of which were multi-roomed complexes 
corresponding to one of Staccioli’s types. It is more plausible to assume that the 
Catalogues’ word horrea included cellae as well.  
True, the lex horreorum of Q. Tinius Sacerdos did not list cellae as rentable units 
but listed horrea, apothecae, compendiaria, armaria, intercolumnia, and loca armaris.
85
 
But in Dig. 1.15.3.2 (Paul) states: “Break-ins generally occur in apartment complexes and 
storehouses, where people place the most precious part of their fortunes, when either the 
cella or cupboard or lockbox are broken…” (Effracturae fiunt plerumque in insulis in 
horreisque, ubi homines pretiosissimam partem fortunarum suarum reponunt, cum vel 
cella effringitur vel armarium vel arca…). Rickman suggests that cella here was 
equivalent to apothecae, and he may be correct,
86
 but Paul was speaking not simply of 
horrea but both of horrea and insulae. He used the word cellae because of it generalness: 
cellae were small storerooms found throughout the city’s landscape as opposed to 
apothecae, which seem to have been a more technical phrase if the inscription’s usage 
was typical.
87
 We need not push this evidence too far, but we can use it as the basis for 
the following hypothesis: the distinction between horrea and cellae did not depend on 
product specificity but on its architectural form and raises this question: were cellae 
stand-alone units or nestled within the general urban fabric? 
We can answer this question best by using excavation reports and the extant 
portions of the Severan Marble Plan. In contrast to Ostia, excavation of storage 
complexes in Rome is of poor value. Of the Rome’s large horrea, only the Horrea 
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 CIL VI 33860=ILS 5913. 
86
 Rickman (1971: 198).  
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 Apothecae do appear in the Digest, for example, 19.2.11 (Ulp) qui vinum. . . in apothecam deposuisset 
or 9.3.5.3 (Ulp) Horrearius aut conductor apothecae. In both cases, apotheca appears to have carried a 
more technical weight than cella in the passage adduced above.  
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Agrippiana courtyard was excavated and left open to the public.
88
 The Horrea 
Piperataria, attributed to Domitian by the Chronographer of 354 and obliterated by the 
Basilica of Constantine,
89
 was partly excavated by Lanciani in 1899
90
 but was only 
briefly published by Barosso in 1940,
91
 and its study has been “bedeviled by a 
misidentification in the early part of the century.”92 This is the sum of our archaeological 
knowledge of horrea within Rome.  
Scholars have turned to the Severan Marble Plan to make up for the deficiency in 
material remains.
 93
 The Marble Plan is, however, fraught with interpretative difficulties. 
The plan itself was commissioned by Septimius Severus in the third century, measured 
some 40 by 60 meters, was mounted on a wall of the Templum Pacis (currently the back 
wall of the church of SS. Cosmas and Damian in the Forum Romanum), and depicted a 
detailed (if not always accurate) visual depiction of the city in 1:240 scale.
94
 
Approximately 10% of the plan is still extant or known from Renaissance drawings, and 
about half of those fragments can be placed in their topographical context.
95
  
Numerous horrea appear on the plan, though the Horrea Lolliana is the only 
storehouse labeled as such.
96
 Both courtyard and corridor horrea are visible on the plan, 
but a third type, unknown at Ostia, is too.
 97
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 Rickman (1971: 87); Bauer and Pronti (1978: 132-46); Astolfi (1981: 33-48). 
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 MGH (1892: 146) Multae operae publicae fabricatae sunt. . . horrea piperataria ubi modo est basilica. 
Constantiniana.  
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 Lanciani (1900: 8-13). 
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 Barosso (1940: 58-62). 
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 Rickman (1971: 104). 
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 The most useful publications on the Marble Plan (FUR): Carettoni et al. (1960); Rodriguez-Almeida 
(1980); Reynolds (1996). The website http://formaurbis.stanford.edu is an invaluable resource.  
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 For a history of the plan, Carettoni et al. (1960: 25-31).  
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 Reynolds (1996: 15).  
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 E.g., fragments 24, 25, 33, 44, 92, 138, & 150. On the Horrea Lolliana, Carettoni et al. (1960, 83) and 
Rickman (1971, 109).  
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Figure 5.14: Roman Horrea Type  
This new type was not organized either around a central corridor or courtyard; rather, it 
consisted of single, outward-facing rooms.
98
 Pace Reynolds, there are no examples of 
this type from Ostia. In some cases, these types of rooms are found nearby other, larger 
storage complexes, for example, on fragment 421. And in the areas away from the 
wharves around the Tiber, they are the dominant type.
99
 The rooms, except for their 
tendency toward elongation, are indistinguishable from tabernae and other unidentifiable 
buildings on the Marble Plan. In fact, not only are the rooms indistinguishable but they 
also often back onto open courtyards whose purpose is unclear. Surely storage of goods 
must have been common, as the example below shows:
 100
                      
 
Figure 5.15: Roman non-Horrea storage facility  
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 FUR #594 after PM (1960) Pl.  
98
 Reynolds (1996: 183-84). 
99
 Reynolds (1996: 238). 
100
 FUR #137, 563 after PM (1060) pl., 37, 54.  
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These rooms seem, therefore, to be exactly the type of storage complexes whose 
existence we postulated on the basis of statistical analysis of Ostian warehouses and 
whose spatial relationships are indistinguishable from the urban fabric at large. A good 
example of the way any open urban space could be used for storage comes from BGU 
2.606, which relates that a certain Aurelius Polion rented some urban space which 
included a courtyard for cows and two adjoining rooms for storing fodder.
101
 I suspect 
that, in the phrase horrea et cellae, these single room for storage, scattered throughout the 
city, is what Romans had in mind with the latter word. 
 Although the largest horrea of Ostia did congregate near the river, it is misleading 
to conclude of that the city’s horrea were all concentrated in a “storage district.” This 
argument holds true for Rome as well. One way to test this is by examining the 
correlation between storage units and population density. If Rome had dedicated storage 
districts, we would hypothesize that they would tend to be away from its most densely 
populated areas. 
The Regionary Catalogues give raw numbers of horrea for the city of Rome. 
Rickman used these numbers to conclude that horrea were scattered throughout Rome 
and that their “differing density of distribution makes sense when the character of the 
individual regions” are taken into account.102 Reynolds pointed out that Rickman’s 
conclusions, while unexceptional in their general claims, were skewed because 
Rickman’s argument did not take into account Rome’s regions’ differing sizes. Reynolds 
therefore converts the Catalogues’ raw numbers into densities, which we can use to test 
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 Rickman (1971: 323-25).  
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our hypothesis.
103
 Here, I use densities of insulae and domus as proxies for population 
numbers. The next page presents a bar-graph of scaled densities (X-axis is Rome’s 14 
regions; Y is number of buildings).
104
 
 
Figure 5.16: Insulae, Domus, and Horrea Densities at Rome 
Visual inspection suggests that there is strong correlation between each region’s 
building numbers. Regression of the densities of Insulae and Domus onto Horrea 
confirms that these two factors have good predictive value for the number of horrea 
(R
2
=.78).
105
 We should not misinterpret this correlation to argue against the 
commonsense observation that a great deal of Rome’s storage occurred along the Tiber. It 
did; the Catalogues do not distinguish horrea by size, and it stands to reason that the 
Aventine and the southern trans Tiberim possessed Rome’s largest horrea. These met the 
organizational demands for Rome’s grain storage and distribution and may have been the 
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 Reynolds (1996: 237-39); for density tables, 414-417. 
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 Performed using Wessa, P. (2010), Free Statistics Software, Office for Research Development and 
Education, version 1.1.23-r6, URL http://www.wessa.net. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII XIII XIV
Ins
Dom
Horr
201 
 
first stop for other goods prior to their distribution throughout the city. This correlation 
does, however, bolster the contention that storage facilities were spread throughout the 
city in a fairly regular fashion. These urban storage units must have included facilities for 
storing wine, analogous to those of Ostia. It remains to be seen, however, whether urban 
cellae vinariae had any special, defining features.  
Varro wrote, in a fragment of unrecoverable context, “Aliquot Romae sunt qui 
cellas vinarias fructuis causa fecerunt.”—At Rome, there are many who built (or have 
built) cellae vinariae for profit.”106 This is the only literary reference to urban wine 
cellars. There are, however, numerous references to rural wine cellars in Cato, Varro, 
Columella and Pliny. Operating on the assumption that Varro chose the phrase cellae 
vinariae deliberately, examining other uses of cellae vinariae should be instructive. This 
inspection reveals that cellae vinariae have a single, defining characteristic: permanent 
installations for storing wine.  
In Varro’s agricultural writings, a cella vinaria was necessary for producing and 
storing wines. He praised villas which had, among other accoutrements, cellae vinariae 
of suitable size (ad modum agri aptam) and with a floor sloping into a vat (lacus) where 
new wine could ferment.
107
 Cato also treated cellae as both a place for production and 
long-term storage. He advised that a well-built villa should have a wine-cellar, oil-cellar, 
and many dolia.
108
 Likewise, the cella (here an oil-cellar)—which also includes a 
lacus
109—should be near a press-room (torcularium).110 Columella echoed those precepts 
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and added that these cellae should be dry and at a distance from baths, furnaces, and 
manure, all of which could cause the wine to spoil.
111
 Likewise D.32.93.4 (Scaev.), in a 
discussion on legacies, asked about dolia and cuppae which were fixed in the cellar (vasa 
vinaria, id est cuppae et dolia, quae in cella defixa sunt). Is there any evidence that 
Rome’s urban cellae vinariae were labeled thus because they also possessed permanent 
or semi-permanent installations for storing wine? 
Unfortunately, only five of Rome’s cellae vinariae are known by name, one 
through excavation and four through epigraphy. The Cella Civiciana is known only by a 
dedicatory inscription by its vilicus to Silvanus.
112
 Its identification as a cellar for wine 
relies, so far as I can tell, solely on Silvanus’ role as dedicatee. Likewise, the Cella 
Groesiana is known only from a dedication of a M. Scanianus Zosa to Sol, Luna, and 
Silvanus. The Cella Nigriniana is known from a fragmentary inscription and is assumed 
to have provided storage for wine because the inscription is flanked by pictures of two 
dolia.
113
 Unlike the first two cellae, both of which were found near the river in 
Trastevere, this cella was apparently situated away from the river, on the Quirinal to the 
west of Trajan’s markets.114 Last is the Cella Saeniana, known only from an inscription 
on the base of a statue of Liber Pater.
115
 
The single cella vinaria excavated is the cellae vinariae Nova et Arruntiana. The 
name is known from CIL VI 8826, which is a dedication to Liber Pater and Mercury by 
those who did business in the cellae vinariae Novae et Arruntianae Caesaris. During 
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excavations, begun in 1878 with the construction of new embankments along the Tiber, 
numerous fragments of dolia were found in general dispersion and rows of dolia were 
found in rows parallel to the columns of the portico.
116
 Unfortunately for the excavators, 
Rome’s water table had risen by the late 19th century from the Roman period, and these 
rooms were flooded up to their ceilings, and the water likely washed away more than it 
left behind.
117
 The following is its plan.
 118
  
 
Figure 5.17: Cellae vinariae Nova et Arruntina  
 
The complex consisted of two quite different parts. On the south was a two-story 
area with a courtyard and cells away from the river and, along the river, a group of 
double cells with a shared wall.
119
 To the east, one sees a large open area with the 
remains of a long, double portico. It was along this portico that the remains of the dolia 
were found.  On the one hand, we should be cautious in taking this one example as 
representative. In many ways, it was surely not. In the first place, by the time the 
inscription was written, the complex had become imperial property, and its activities 
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were sufficient to warrant its negotiatores to form a collegium. On the other hand, like 
the four examples from Ostia, this too apparently had more-or-less permanent features, 
that is, dolia installed under the portico (where the shade would help keep its contents 
cool). 
Non-imperial cella vinaria were likely much the same, though presumably 
smaller. And there is at least some circumstantial evidence reinforcing my contention that 
it was in such semi-permanent installations that much of Rome’s wine was stored. In 
1596, Andrea Bacci, physician to Pope Sixtus V and scholar of ancient medicine and 
science, while discussing the Roman practice of burying dolia for storing wine when the 
ground was soft enough, added parenthetically, “such as even to this day we see 
unearthed here and there outside the city’s walls—and of large capacity.” (. . . talia adhuc 
extra moenia urbis vidimus eruta aliqua, peramplo ventre.”120 Similarly, Lanciani tells of 
a number of excavations in which wine cellars were uncovered: 
Fresh excavations were opened in the same place along the northern slope 
in 1813 and they led to the discovery of other groups of amphorae set up 
against the walls of the caves in parallel lines Other amphorae came to 
light in 1868 together with the inscription of Tychicus near the gate of the 
Trinita de Monti This last find seems to indicate that wine cellars were 
established not only in a place naturally exposed to the tramontana and 
shaded from the sun but wherever the building of the substructures 
afforded an opportunity to create subterranean vaults under the terraces 
of the villa.
121
 
 
Lanciani tells of similar finds elsewhere, though caution must be taken about 
assuming that all amphoras found in neat rows were part of a wine cellar because the 
Romans often used amphorae in building walls. Though the example above was certainly 
from a residential wine cellar, his depiction reinforces our belief that wine storage 
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occurred throughout the city and often had permanent or semi-permanent wine-specific 
features.  
It is still unclear, however, how these cellae vinariae fit into the city’s wine 
distribution network and why they remained so scattered.  A late inscription—from the 
late 4
th
 century—may help explain these cellae’s role in the storage and distribution of 
wine at Rome. The fragmentary inscription, CIL VI 1785=31931 reads as follows: 
Austoribus in cupa una numm(i) xxx / tabulariis in singulis apocis 
numm(i) xx / exasciatori in cupa una numm(i) x / falancariis, qui de 
Ciconiis ad templum cupas / referre consuerunt numm(i) [---]. / custodibus 
cuparum [---] / df (sic) ampullis placuit ut post degustatio[nem] / 
possessori reddantur / professionariis de Ciconiis statim ut adveneret / 
vinum in una cupa numm(i) cxx. 
 
For the drainers 30 coins per barrel/For the bookkeepers 20 coins for each 
receipt/For the carpenters (?) 10 coins per barrel/For the “Falancarii”, who 
are accustomed to transport the barrels to the temple, […] coins. To the 
guardians of the barrels[…] With regards to the flasks, it is decreed that 
they be returned to their possessor after the tasting. To all those who make 
a declaration that wine should arrive immediately from the Ciconiae, 120 
coins per barrel.  
 
 The inscription was found in 1785 during some building on S. Silvester in capite 
and has been related to the management of the vina fiscalia which were first included as 
part of the annona during Aurelian’s reign and probably hung prominently within the 
aforementioned porticos of the templum Solis.
122
 Its immediate point was to enumerate 
the tariffs payable to various occupations connected with the transport and testing of 
fiscal wine. Interpretation is made difficult both by the vocabulary (Austores, exasciator, 
and professionarii are hapax legomena) and by the inscription’s syntactic compression.  
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Interpretations have differed,
123
 but it seems to describe a process something like 
the following: wine came on ships down (or up?) the Tiber on naves vinariae
124
 at which 
point the austores, an occupation likely connected etymologically with the verb hausere, 
drained and transferred the wine into new containers for transport. Wine was then 
transferred from the Ciconiae—likely on the Tiber in the north of the Campus 
Martius
125—and thence to the temple for tasting and measurement after which the 
emptied vessels were returned to the Ciconiae for refilling.  
 Vera’s interpretation differs from his predecessors’ (except Pena in part) in his 
interpretation of how the wine was distributed from the temple. The prevailing opinion 
has been that wine was not only transported to the templum Solis but also sold there. Vera 
points out that neither this inscription nor the passage cited from the Vita Aureliani 
mentioned sale of wine. Moreover, Symmachus averred that Rome’s caupones were held 
by the same public duties as its pistores.
 126
 Finally, we know that bread was distributed 
throughout the city in approximately 250 gradus and that, at Constantinople at least, oil 
in its 2300 mensae oleariae.
127
 Based on these comparisons, Vera persuasively concludes 
that single individuals did not come to the temple to purchase wine but that Rome’s 
caupones came there and that they sold the wine through the city’s many tabernae.  
 It is unlikely that Aurelian and his advisors invented this process. Rather, the 
method of storing and counting the fiscal wines most likely developed as an appendage 
grafted onto the process in place prior to Aurelian’s inclusion of wine in the annona 
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whereby most residents purchased wine through cauponae—remember Cicero’s censure 
of Piso for buying wine at bars. In fact, the temple’s porticoes, under which the fiscal 
wine was stored, seems nothing more than a centralized adaptation of the types of storage 
units for wine that preceded it. 
  Thus concludes this synoptic look at Roman storage. It might strike one that this 
organizational set-up was not terribly well thought-out. After all, storing wine in 
locations scattered throughout the city in between their arrival and their sale to retailers 
must have made aspects of storing, selling, and transporting wine less efficient than 
having a few central areas for storing and trading wine. The Romans were not, however, 
immune to these economic pressures. When Martial praised Domitian for cleaning up 
Rome, he specifically lauded his prohibition against wine-vessels chained to pillars on 
the street (nulla catenatis pila est praecincta lagonis).
128
 Though this ban was not 
economically motivated, it paints a vivid picture of how haphazardly wine was stored at 
Rome in the 1
st
 century. The next chapter uses the picture formed here as a basis for 
giving a more diachronic account of Roman wine storage and argues that there is of 
evidence of increased centralization between the 1
st
 century BCE and 3
rd
 CE.  
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Chapter VI 
Dynamism in the Roman Wine Trade 
Cellae and Horrea: Why the Distinction? 
In this dissertation’s first two chapters, we saw how Rome’s institutional 
environment influenced the operation of Rome’s wine supply. The previous two chapters 
have illustrated offered new interpretations understanding the motivations and actions of 
producers on estates and distributors in the city. This final chapter attempts to bring these 
institutional and operational threads together. This chapter builds closely on the 
investigation of wine storage at Rome in chapter four. It argues that despite our paltry 
evidence, there are traces of a change in storage practice over the first two centuries CE 
which should be attributed to a combination of commercial practice, technological 
change, and legal change.  
This chapter is somewhat discursive, so let me offer a brief overview. The chapter 
begins by suggesting that there is little evidence for storing wine within the city in horrea 
(as opposed to cellae vinariae) prior to the mid-1
st
 century CE but that there is increasing 
evidence of wine storage in horrea thereafter. I then argue that this change was likely 
connected to two factors. First, the increased security of goods stored in horrea as the 
technology of locking devices improved. Second, keys became more suitable for daily 
commercial use along with the commercial benefits generated by using the new, 
“courtyard-style” horrea. I then offer a formal model for storing goods which suggests 
that the ex ante distribution of risk between the storage-unit owner and the owner of the 
stored goods is the crucial variable determining what rent the former charges and at what 
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point the latter stops storing his goods. I then show that the jurists were aware of the 
changes in commercial practice and also changed the law to make that practice more 
efficient.  
There is comparatively little evidence for storing wine in large horrea prior to the 
first century. This partially stems from the randomness of textual preservation but cannot 
be attributed entirely to that. In Cicero’s De lege agraria he described Capua as the cella 
atque horrea Campani (cellar and storehouse of Campania).
1
 Campania, famous as 
Italy’s breadbasket, produced wine and grain. Perhaps tellingly, Cicero felt obligated to 
include both words, cella and horrea, to remind his audience of Campania’s two famous 
products: horrea alone would not do.
2
 A fragment of Varro, from the mid-1
st
 century 
BCE is suggestive. He stated, “haec aduentoribus accedunt: cellae, claues, claustra, 
carnaria, dolia” (These things pertain to travelers: cells, keys, locks, meat-racks, dolia).3 
Though an adventor should mean something like foreign visitor, it may also have 
overtones of travelling visitors dealing in money and commerce generally.
4
 This fragment 
also links merchants to cellars and dolia but adds a new variable: security—locks and 
keys.  
 Varro’s emphasis on the importance of security is unsurprising, especially when it 
comes to wine, a valuable commodity and attractive to thieves. Though the larger 
containers would have been too heavy to move in their entirety, it would have been 
relatively easy to pour off unguarded wine into smaller containers, and the Digest 
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preserves several examples reflecting that concern. Paul, for example, raised concerns 
involving theft of wine from a navis vinaria and amphorae stolen from a storeroom.
5
  
 This was not merely legalistic hypothesizing, for similar concerns appear in 
papyri. For example, P.Col.10.255 records a contract between a land-owner and tenants 
written during the reign of Marcus Aurelius and explicitly enjoined that, after the vintage, 
the tenants would be responsible for moving and guarding the new wine until it could be 
locked up (οἶνον ἀπὸ γλεύκους νέον ἄδολον παρ]ὰ ληνὸν εἰς ὃν [π]α ρέξει ὁ μεμισ θ κὼς 
κενώματα μέτρῳ οἰνικῷ κοτυλῶν δεκαεννέα [ἅπερ λαβόντα τὸν οἶνον συνθήσουσι] 
μετακεινή[σουσ]ι καὶ παραφυ λάξουσι ἄχρι ἐγ κ λεισμοῦ.) Thieves would be eager to take 
advantage of unguarded wine.  
The jurists recognized this problem. But the remedies available for one whose 
wine was stolen were not sufficiently robust. First, it was incumbent on the wine owner 
to know exactly how much wine was stolen, not always feasible. Ulpian was the most 
explicit on this point, asserting that “if there is an action on theft of wine, it is necessary 
to be stated how many amphoras were taken away. If it was vessels taken away, the 
number must be stated” (sed et si de vino furti agatur, necesse est dici, quot amphorae 
subreptae sint. Si vasa subrepta sint, numerus erit dicendus.)
6
 The seeming redundancy 
of amphorae and vasa suggests that Ulpian was using the word amphora as a generic 
measurement rather than a physical container whereas vasa referred to a vessel of non-
standardized size.
7
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Ulpian likely included amphorae and vasa because wine was often stored in dolia 
or other large containers, only a portion of which would be stolen. This distinction also 
occurs in D. 47.2.21.5-6 (Paul). Paul raised the following question: if a measure of wine 
(or grain or water) is stolen from a larger whole, for example, from a full horreum or 
from a vat of wine, should the thief be held by an action only for the amount stolen or for 
the entire stock.
8
 Paul thought the former view better, and he criticized the opposing 
opinion as overly harsh (durum est dicere totius furtum fieri.). Paul went on to claim that, 
if individual containers were stolen, the action was definitely on them and not for the 
whole stock.
9
  
The requirement that it was necessary to know how much had been stolen and that 
an action was limited to this amount was not to the wine-storer’s advantage. First, a 
victim of theft would have to know how much was stolen. If the wine was kept in dolia 
or vats, this may not have been easy. Second, the value of the wine stolen (on which the 
action could be brought) may have been much less than the damage inflicted on the wine. 
For example, a thief’s illegal removal of five amphorae of wine from a dolium could 
greatly reduce the wine’s life expectancy by exposing it to air or introducing corrupting 
elements therein. In addition, the value of the stolen wine was based on the wine’s market 
value rather than the expected (and often higher) value to the individual merchant.
10
 
These limiting factors may have rendered the substantial costs of litigation generally 
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unattractive to wine merchants. We would expect them to have placed considerable effort 
in ex ante protection of their wine rather than relying on ex post compensation through 
punitive damages. In short, perhaps the most important action a merchant could take to 
protect his wine was to limit the number of people who had access to it. 
 This was a chief factor making urban cellae vinariae more attractive for storage 
than horrea. The urban setting of cellae provided some protection. In contrast to the 
Ostian horrea, which, though guarded, also had entrances with easy street access, the 
courtyards with dolia had few entrance points and these were away from the street.
11
 
Anyone’s entrance would have been noticed: at the magazzino annonario, entrance 
required walking through several anterooms. Storage courts at Rome had, as the pictures 
in the previous chapter showed, similarly limited access. In contrast, the level of security 
provided by horrea was, at least until the late 1
st
 century, less than ideal for storing wine 
because of the lack of security. 
It is true that warehouse operators had some degree of liability for the products 
stored within, but this was legally and practically insufficient for merchants storing 
valuable goods such as wine. The jurists gave some attention to how this notion of 
custodia applied to storehouses. D. 19.2.60.9 (Labeo) gave the following: Rerum 
custodiam, quam horrearius conductoribus praestare deberet, locatorem totorum 
horreorum horreario praestare non debere puto, nisi si in locando aliter convenerit. (“I 
do not think that the lessor of a whole horrea needs to furnish custody, which a 
horrearius must furnish to renters, unless it was agreed differently in the rental in the 
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lease”).12 The pertinent question here is: what was the nature of the custodia quae 
horrearius conductoribus praestare deberet? 
From our perspective, there is a strangely subjective element in the Roman notion 
of custodia.
13
 The word itself may simply mean care and “the borrower will only be 
liable if he fails in this.”14 Even if that is correct, it is not immediately clear what counts 
as adequate care. The jurists make it plain that acts of vis maior—fire, flood, and armed 
robbery—do not count as failures to provide custodia.15 Buckland argues that custodia, in 
classical law, encompassed liability for all but the aforesaid exceptions.
16
 This is 
essentially the view taken by Zimmermann, who argues that custodia included much 
more than cases where there was culpa but was “the strictest conceivable standard of 
liability short of unmitigated no-fault liability.”17 
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 There is debate over how many parties participated in horrea rental; this debate is tangential to the 
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(Ulpian) nautae caupones stabularii quod cuiusque salvum fore receperint nisi restituent, in eos iudicium 
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that absolute liability to the point that, by Gaius’ time, it became indistinguishable from general custodia. 
And it is fairly clear that this general custodia was required of horrearii. See Zimmermann (1996: 515) on 
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How this was actually applied is difficult to ascertain. The lex horreorum 
Caesaris is the only one of the leges horreorum to preserve mention of custodia, but it is 
badly damaged. It reads:
18
 
[in his h]orreis / . . . . . . . [C]aesaris Aug. loc / [horrea compendi]ar. 
armaria et loca / . . . . . . . . rar. ex hac die et ex / [kal. Ianuaris]. Lex 
horreorum. / . . . . . . . [aliu]dve quid ante idus Dec. pensione solute 
renuntiet. Qui non / [renuntiaverit . . . . . . . pro i]nsequente anno non 
transegerit, tanti habebit, quanti eius gener. / [horreum armariumve eo 
anno ibi locari solebit, si modo ali locatum n]on erit. Quisquis in his 
horreis conductum habet, elocandi et / [substituendi ius non habebit . . . . . 
. . cu]stodia non praestabitur. Quae in his horreis invecta inlata / [erunt, 
pignori erunt horreario si quis pro pensionib]us satis ei [non fece]rit. 
Quisquis in his horreis conductum habet et sua / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . fuer.  venia. [Qui]squis in his horreis conduct. habet, pensione solute 
chirogr. / . . . . . . [Quisquis habens conductu]m horreum su[a ibi] 
reliquer. et custodi non adsignaver., horrearius sine culpa erit. 
 
In these storerooms…of Caesar Augustus are leased rooms, safe-deposits, 
small storage areas…from this day and from the Kalends of January. The 
rules of the storehouse…Let him renew his lease after the rent is paid 
before the Ides of December. Anyone who has not renewed will have their 
lease renewed for the subsequent year for the same amount as before 
provided it has not been rented to someone else. Whoever has made a 
rental in these storerooms will not have the right of subletting…security 
(custodia) will not be furnished. Whatever will be brought into and stored 
in these storerooms will be security to the horrearius in case someone 
does not make enough rental payments. Whoever has made a rental in 
these storerooms and…permission. Whoever has made a rental in these 
storerooms will receive a receipt for paid rent…If someone has rented a 
storeroom and left his things there and has not assigned a guard to them, 
the horrearius will not be at fault.  
 
The clause prior to the word custodia is unclear, but the most plausible 
reconstruction is that of Mitteis, followed by Rickman, of something like auri 
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argentive.
19
 This has a good parallel in D. 19.2.60.6 (Labeo), which hypothesized a 
horrearius who refused to accept at his own risk (suo periculo) gold, silver, or pearls.
20
 
Mommsen’s restoration of invectorum in haec horrea is implausible, both on the grounds 
of common sense and because the final clause gives a specific instance in which the 
horrearius will not be liable for damages. There would be no need to specify this if the 
regulations abnegated custodia for everything stored therein. For precious metals and 
jewelry, some horrearii must have believed that it would be impossible to extract enough 
additional rent to compensate for the high potential liability incurred.  
It is therefore probable that horrearii had liability for exogenous harm done to 
goods stored within (with the standard exceptions for cases of vis maior). But wine, 
unlike precious metals, was also subject to endogenous depreciation, which could be 
severe enough to render the product worthless. The horrearius was almost certainly not 
responsible for loss arising from wine’s propensity to acetify or turn musty—to change 
its nature sua sponte.  
In sum, the ancient evidence indicates that wine was, for a time, largely stored in 
cellae vinariae, not horrea. But storing wine in self-contained, more secure units was not 
necessarily the most convenient system for facilitating commercial transactions in wine. 
For example, there is evidence of a link between Rome’s supply of wine and auctions. 
There were considerable advantages to holding auctions in centralized places with ready 
access to the products offered for sale. The method of storing wine in cellae scattered 
                                                          
19
 Rickman (1971: 200), citing Mitteis (1912: 259). This is contra Mommsen who read invectorum in haec 
horrea. But if the horrearius denied liability for all and sundry then the final clause, which eschewed culpa 
for items not assigned a guard, seems pointlessly redundant.  
20
 Locator horrei propositum habuit se aurum argentum margaritam non recipere suo periculo: deinde cum 
sciret has res inferri, passus est. Proinde eum futurum tibi obligatum dixi, ac si propositum fuit, remissum 
videtur. 
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throughout the city was likely a sub-optimal storage system for the dominant method of 
selling wine.  
Four inscriptions from Rome mention freedmen of a Caucilius family, several of 
whom are identified as argentarii de foro vinario.
21
 Argentarii were, approximately 
translated, bankers; one of their main places of business was at auctions where they 
facilitated the purchase between buyer and seller by advancing the former a loan.
22
 The 
Caucilius family was involved in the wine trade itself and was not simply operating out 
of the forum vinarium: In CIL 6.9181b, Publius Caucilius Eros is called a coactor 
vinarius de foro vinario (a wine-collector at the forum vinarium). Financial coactores 
were, as their name suggests, responsible for collecting the money from buyers and 
passing it on to sellers. Publius, coactor, was connected with the argentarii and thus 
represents an example of a fairly sophisticated and perhaps unusual hierarchy.
23
  
That auctions were common in Roman commodity markets generally and the 
wine market in particular is not surprising. Unfortunately, auctions in the Roman world 
have been understudied generally and almost wholly ignored in economic histories.
24
 
Very briefly, auctions should be thought of as a mode of generating efficient resource 
                                                          
21
 CIL 6. 9181abc, 9182. 
22
 Andreau (1999: 39).  
23
 Andreau (ibid.) believes that only a minority of coactores were part of an organizational hierarchy in 
which they were slaves, freedmen, or employed of argentarii (though Ps-Acron ad Hor. Sat. 1.6.86 stated 
that coactores were employed by argentarii). However common the set-up was, apparently it occurred 
here.  One possibility is that these argentarii vinarii specialized in advancing loans to wine-merchants 
buying wine from traders bringing wine into the port or city. Our coactor could have been responsible for 
ensuring the proper transfer of wine from one party to another, but the inscriptions are simply too devoid 
of context to allow us to pick from any number of plausible reconstructions.  
24
 Singular is Rauh (1989: 451-71) on auctioneers’ importance to the Roman economy. De Ligt (1994), who 
has provided by far the best historical account of temporary markets in the Roman world has little to say 
on auctions (though see pp. 51, 114, 208). On their role in finance, see García Morcillo (2008: 257-75); 
Andreau (1987: 70, 163).  
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allocation in imperfect markets.
25
 In many situations, it can be difficult to ascertain the 
competitive price of a good or service; in such cases, auction forms can serve as 
mechanisms for buyers to reveal prices to one another (though it is not always easy to 
determine how similar auction prices are to competitive prices
26
). In most models the 
number of bidders is a chief factor in determining the competitiveness of the auction.
27
 
The reliance on auctions in the city of Rome is unsurprising given the extremely 
imperfect informational markets. The execution of auctions in public centers increased 
their competitiveness by encouraging the greatest number of bidders possible.  
The development of courtyard style horrea in the 1
st
 century added a further 
benefit: it allowed commodity auctions to take place in close proximity to the products 
themselves. This allowed for more rapid and secure transfer of possession, decreased the 
risk for the buyer, who could presumably visually inspect the product beforehand, and 
therefore raised the overall sale-prices. Wine-sellers, however, were at a disadvantage by 
not generally storing their wine in these horrea, though with poor internal security there 
was little choice. But by the early third century we find the emperor Severus Alexander 
issuing a rescript, concerning singulae amphorae vini…in horreis (individual amphorae 
of wine in a horrea).
28
 What changed? 
A Simple Model of Storage 
Severus identified the transfer of keys (claves traditae) as the decisive factor in 
determining when the sale of wine was complete. In Varro’s aforementioned fragment, 
                                                          
25
 Vickrey (1961: 8-37) is the locus classicus. The bibliography on the economics of auctions is vast: see in 
particular Riley and Samuelson (1981: 381-92); Milgrom (1989: 3–22); Klemperer (2000). See Kagel (1995: 
1-86) for a survey of the literature through the mid-90s.  
26
 Milgrom and Weber (1982) 1090. 
27
 Klemperer (2000) 171.   
28
 CJ 4.48.2 (Severus Alexander).  
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portable locks were mentioned as defining possessions of a travelling merchant 
(adventor).
29
 In Severus’ rescript, we are clearly dealing with permanent locks to horrea 
storerooms with transferrable keys. This change points us in a new direction. 
Understanding why security in the form of locks apparently shifted from merchant to 
warehouse operator requires us to introduce a model for understanding storage more 
generally.  
Consider a perfect-knowledge economy in which there are merchants who store 
goods and warehouse operators who lease space within the storage area. Assume that a 
merchant can choose to store or sell his good and an operator can choose whether to lease 
his storage unit. Let V be the time dependent value of the good being stored such that V0 
is its initial value
 
and Vt  is its value at time t. Let V
* 
be the value of the item at the time 
when the merchant prefers sale instead of storage. Let r be the good’s total depreciation 
rate (i.e., it includes both endogenous and exogenous rates). Let be the good’s 
appreciation rate. Let Cs  be the cost of storing the good, equal to the cost of guarding it, 
Co,  plus a constant , which is the additional charge by which the operator achieves a 
profit. Vt will then be given by: Vt =Vt-1(1+r)- Cs,t.
30
  
The game’s shape will vary depending on what ex ante conditions hold. If or 
r then V0=V
*
 and the merchant will not store his good. If >0, r=0, then          
 , and the merchant can always achieve greater expected profit by continuing to store his 
good. The latter case is, in the real world, impossible; therefore storage will occur when 
>0 and >r. Both variables are positive. Further: while is linearly positive over the 
                                                          
29
 Sat. Men. 263. 
30
 Proof (by induction): V1=V0+V0t-V0rt-Cst=1 and V1=V0(1+r)-Cs,t.   
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range of t, the endogenous rate of depreciation dictates that r increases exponentially.
31
 
Therefore, there is a finite range tm. . . tn over which >r and that     
{     }  ( 
 )  r*. In graphical form (r* is|  |).  Ceteris paribus, a merchant will 
stop storing a good at the equilibrium point between its appreciation and depreciation 
rates.
32
  
 
Figure 6.1: Appreciation-Depreciation Equilibrium 
Let us turn now to the other variable in our formula, Cs: the cost of storage. 
Because operators were to some degree liable for damages to the goods stored in their 
warehouses, Cs will depend on the relative rates of both and r (see note above for 
explanation), and Cs will therefore be monotonically related to V.
33
 Therefore, let us 
name a variable R, which is the rent charged by the operator at time t and which can be 
described by the function, f(Cs)=R,  which is monotonically increasing with Cs. 
                                                          
31
 We can appeal to observation here: an opened bottle of wine has little chance of spoiling the 1st day, 
more the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
, and by the end of a week a nearly 100% chance of having gone bad. This flatness of 
the curve varies from product to product, but all are exponential. In addition, during the time over which 
the good’s value is increasing in accordance with , there is increasing incentive for theft (exogenous risk) 
which adds to the exponential shape of r. 
32
 Note that this model does assume merchants are risk neutral and have perfect knowledge of the 
respective rates. 
33
 In the real world, the costs of determining V at all points over t are prohibitively costly. This takes us into 
the realm of imperfect knowledge games. These are much more complicated to model; as this chapter will 
show, assumption of perfect knowledge still yields a model robust enough to have predictive value. 
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We further note that both and r will cause Cs to increase when the operator is 
liable for both exogenous product value loss (theft for example) and endogenous 
depreciation (say, spoilage). If the operator is liable for endogenous depreciation, the Cs 
curve will also be exponential and shifted to the left of the r curve. If the operator is 
liable for exogenous damage, the curve will be roughly linear and shifted downward from 
r.
34
 In the latter case, only will cause Cs to rise. In other words, operators’ ex ante 
liability for stored products is an important consideration because it results in two, 
differently shaped cost curves. Shown graphically: 
 
Figure 6.2: Risk allocation curve for storage  
Consider the point where Cs(r+intersects After this point, the marginal cost of 
rent to the merchant exceeds the marginal increase of the good and he will sell. Note, 
however, that tm<t
*
. Therefore, Vt,m<V
*
, and the merchant sells his goods at a sub-
optimum level. Now consider the value of R of Cs( at t
*
. As figure 15 illustrates, 
R(Cs)<R(Cs(r+); in other words, the operator could charge higher rent at this point by 
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 The operator must discount  in calculating storage rent because the merchant is still paying r and would 
obviously not pay rent greater than Vt-1(1+ -r).  
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accepting a portion of r. This distinction shows how crucial the ex ante risk allocation 
between merchant and operator is. If the operator accepts all the endogenous risk, the 
buyer must sell at a V< V
*
 but if the merchant accepts all the endogenous risk then the 
operator will accept a rent R<R
*
.  
The allocation of r will be the primary issue at stake in contractual arrangements 
for storage. But this true if and only if         (Rr’ - R )>(Cr’-C) and (Vt -Vtm) > (Cr’- 
C+r). In other words, we should expect both operators and sellers to be residual claimants 
of r only when the additional rent an operator gains by accepting partial ownership of r 
exceeds the additional costs he incurs and where the additional value gained by merchant 
by accepting partial ownership of r exceeds the lower risk-costs he incurs by selling at a 
point where the operator accepts full liability. Between the time of Varro and the rescript 
of Severus Alexander, it is my belief that the technological development of locking 
devices along with the evolution of juristic thought changed the value of r, such that it 
became profitable for horrea owners to become partial residual claimants on r by 
supplying the locks and for merchants to forgo some degree of security in order to benefit 
from the more commercially convenient, centralized horrea. 
Locking Devices: Technological Development 
Locking devices are so ubiquitous today that it is easy to take them and the 
technology upon which they rely for granted. Yet in the Greek and Early Roman period, 
locks were mysterious enough that they were symbols of divinity.
35
 Temples and city 
gates were some of the earliest structures to be fitted with locks, and the keys themselves 
could be of great symbolic (and literal) weight: A 5
th
 century BCE key from the temple of 
                                                          
35
 For example, the three-bodies Hecate in the Capitoline museum. Ovid (Fast. 1.99) depicted Janus as 
holding a rod in one hand and a key in the other.   
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Artemis Hemera in Arcadia was over forty cm long and was made to look like a snake, a 
design having nothing to do with utility.
36
 The religious importance of keys lasted 
through the Roman period and is still the sign of the Papacy.  
There is little evidence of keys used in non-domestic or religious settings prior to 
the 1
st
 century BCE, and there is no evidence until the late 1
st
 /early 2
nd
 CE of horrea 
with locks for individual rooms (as opposed to the building as a whole). This is 
unsurprising: to be effective security for commercial purposes, locking devices had to be 
sufficiently difficult to break and their keys had to be unique and reasonably portable. 
There is no evidence that these conditions existed at Rome until the 1
st
 century BCE. By 
examining this development, we can see that conditions gradually changed in a way that 
provided a necessary though not sufficient condition for allowing merchants to store wine 
in horrea.   
At least as early as 200 BCE keys were used in a variety of domestic settings. 
Pliny gave the following example as evidence of old Roman morality: “Fabius Pictor 
wrote in his Annals that a matron was starved to death by her own family because she had 
unsealed the receptacle in which were the keys to the wine cellar.”37 A mid-second 
century BCE fragment of the comic author Titinius makes reference to an arca sine clavi, 
implying that chests with locking devices were reasonably well know by that time.
38
 
More or less contemporaneously, Cato advised his readers that a villa’s oil cellar should 
be fitted with two sets of locks.
39
  
                                                          
36
 For a photograph see Guaitoli (1996: 22).  
37
 NH. 14.89: “Fabius Pictor in annalibus suis scripsit matronam, quod loculos in quibus erant claves cellae 
vinariae resignavisset, a suis inedia mori coactam.” 
38
 Com. 178: quid habes nisi unam arcam sine clavi. 
39
 Agr. 13.2  
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There is evidence that by the 1
st
 century BCE, storage buildings themselves could 
be locked. Cicero lambasted the policy which had given Clodius “all private and public 
grain, all the grain-producing provinces, all contractors, and all the keys to the horrea.”40 
There are two Ostian horrea that preserve evidence of locking devices: the Horrea 
Epagathiana and the corridor-horrea of Reg. III.II.6. In the former, the main entrance, 
the side entrance on the north, and the interior staircase all had locking devices—
probably (in essence) crossbars anchored in the wall and secured by padlocks.
41
 The 
interior rooms apparently had a similar locking system as well. The latter horrea, though 
smaller, evidently had the same sort of locking system on its main doors.
42
  
Ostia provides limited evidence that this was the general rule. The small horrea of 
Reg. IV.V.12 consisted of six small cells, four of whose thresholds remain today. All four 
were originally of the same type and included two pivot holes, a central bolt hole, and a 
check for restraining the doors’ motion. The far northwest room’s threshold, however, 
was changed at a later date when a groove was cut at its front for placing shutters, 
commonly used for securing retail establishments.
43
 It is unclear why this was done. 
Perhaps the warehouse’s function changed, though this room does not seem convenient 
for retail trade. Regardless, this threshold’s transformation provides evidence that the 
rooms’ original doors were not secure enough to meet later needs so that shutters later 
had to be installed.  
The remains of the grandi horrea also indicate that, at least in its early (pre-2
nd
 
century) phases, the individual rooms did not have permanent locking devices and that 
                                                          
40
 Dom. 25:  “...omne frumentum privatum et publicum, omnis provincias frumentarias, omnis mancipes, 
omnis horreorum clavis lege tua tradidisti.” 
41
 See Rickman (1971: 33-35) for a description of these locks and their operation.  
42
 Rickman (1971: 55). 
43
 Rickman (1971: 60-61); for shudders, Carcopino and Rowell (1992).  
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their general security may have been poor. Our understanding of this building is, as 
discussed above, tempered by its complicated building phases and our admittedly 
imperfect knowledge of them. However, the south rooms’ preserved thresholds are 
peculiar because the block on which the thresholds rest is wider than the opening for the 
doors.
44
 Calza argued that this shows that the doorways were narrowed in a later building 
phase.
45
  Rickman was skeptical because, “. . . for this to be true we should have to 
imagine that the rooms previously had had no doors at all, since there is only one set of 
pivot holes and bolt hole in each case, namely that for the narrow doorway.”46 He gives 
no alternative explanation for this peculiarity. It is not clear to me that we can dismiss 
Calza’s interpretation out of hand. The contemporaneous and better preserved horrea 
Epagathiana, which was probably of the specialized safe-deposit type mentioned in the 
Digest,
47
 did have individual rooms with locks. But it may be risky to generalize from 
this building, since it is “distinct from anything else yet found in Ostia” and likely served 
a considerably different purpose than horrea used for storing commodities.
48
 These 
developments certainly made horrea more secure, but not enough for storing wine for the 
reason given above: too many people had potential access to the individual storerooms. 
This degree of security, in which the buildings themselves had locks but not the 
individual units, would have suited cellae vinariae reasonably well. These urban cellae 
would have needed only one set of lock(s)—that on a door or gate blocking access to the 
interior room, courtyard, or staircase. The number of locking devices and their 
complexity was commensurate with the number of people with access to the area. For 
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 Rickman (1971: 48).  
45
 Calza (1921: 376). 
46
 Rickman (1971: 48).  
47
 D. 1.15.3.2. 
48
 Rickman (1971: 37).  
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example, P.Princ. 3.153 preserves the instructions of an unnamed party who was “to take 
the key to a gate-house in which were stored 27 jars of wine of various sizes.”49 This 
gate-house was not part of a larger storage unit, and one lock controlled by those who 
controlled the wine within was clearly sufficient.   
 Though we are wholly ignorant of the details of this practice, the plausible broad 
contours are fairly easy to infer. Presumably the unit’s owner supplied the locking device 
but (naturally) the person to whom the wine belonged, presuming he was a different 
person, would have kept the key. Such an arrangement would serve both parties’ 
interests. First, it was clearly in the wine-owner’s interest to have ready access to his 
product, and this required possessing the key. Second, handing over the key to the wine 
owner may have relieved the storage unit’s owner from some custodial responsibility: 
Papinian, for example, told of a dying father who gave his daughter keys and a ring 
custodiae causa.
50
 And the fragment of Varro cited above, which linked cellae and 
claustra, is surely relevant (Sat. Men. 263). 
By the early 1
st
 century CE, horrea were commonly equipped with exterior locks, 
but there is little evidence that their interior rooms were similarly secure. But by the reign 
of Severus, we have an example of wine stored under lock and key in a horrea. We 
should not treat this example as aberrant: D. 1.15.3.2 (Paul) states, “Break-ins are 
common in insulae and horrea, where people store the most valuable part of their 
fortunes, when a room, a locker, or a chest is broken into.” (Effracturae fiunt plerumque 
                                                          
49
 ἀνοιξάτωσαν τὸ σκρίνιον καὶ δότωσάν σοι τὸ παρακλείδιον τοῦ πυλῶνος 5κ᾽ ἔσται ἐν τῷ πυλῶνι οἴνου 
(τετρά)χ(οα) ιθ (δί)χ(οα) η ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ἀγωγίῳ ἠνέχθη σοι (τετρά)χ(οα) σπη χ(αίρειν). In this case, a 
gatehouse was functionally equivalent to a cella. 
50
 D. 31.77.21 : Pater pluribus filiis heredibus institutis moriens claves et anulum custodiae causa maiori 
natu filiae tradidit et libertum eidem filiae, qui praesens erat, res quas sub cura sua habuit adsignare 
iussit. Commune filiorum negotium gestum intellegebatur nec ob eam rem apud arbitrum divisionis 
praecipuam causam filiae fore. 
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in insulis in horreisque, ubi homines pretiosissimam partem fortunarum suarum 
reponunt, cum vel cella effringitur vel armarium vel arca). The linking of the cella with 
armarium and arca clearly indicates that the cella is locked. Moreover, it is difficult to 
believe anyone was so stupid as to store pretiosissimam partem fortunarum in an 
unlocked cella.  
To trace this development requires a brief excursus on the development of keys. 
This will demonstrate how lock-technology became increasingly suitable for mercantile 
use. Keys were an ancient technology which developed significantly during the Roman 
period.
51
 They changed in two ways: new technology developed, in particular the rotary 
lock, and existing technologies became more sophisticated, more widely disseminated, 
and, by extension, almost certainly cheaper.  
Two common and ancient lock types would not have been suitable at all. The first 
and simplest was the latch lifter. They were usually long (ca. 35 cm) and had a gentle 
curve at their ends. The curved end passed through a hole in the door, and the key’s tip 
would catch a bolt, after which the person outside the door would pull a rope to remove 
the bolt within. Simple and often wooden, they were common throughout the Roman 
period.
52
 The simple tumbler lock was the other type. Keys for this device were either T- 
or L-shaped and came in various sizes. The key lifted the lock’s tumblers, but (as in the 
latch lifting type) the bolt probably had to be removed manually with a cord by the 
person standing without.
53
 It is unlikely that these two types were sophisticated enough to 
provide sufficient security for use in an urban, commercial setting. 
                                                          
51
 Greene (2008: 813).  
52
 Manning (1988: 88).  
53
 Ibid. 
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Three types of locking mechanisms were, one would suspect, of value for 
commercial security. The first is also a tumbler lock but, as opposed to the one above, the 
key itself removed the bolt. The lock had tumblers arranged in patterns (Z-shaped, L-
shaped, and curved are common), and the key had teeth arranged in the same pattern, 
which allowed it to catch the tumblers and remove the bolt (and were called in Latin a 
clavis Laconica).
54
 These certainly provided more security than those above because of 
the often high number of tumblers but presented some drawbacks. A bolt of suitable 
length and weight to secure a door required a fairly large key: keys of this type are 
commonly between 15 and 25 cm,
55
 and two hands may have been required to operate 
it.
56
 This type was cumbersome but potentially effective.  
Rotary locks were an invention of the Roman period and are similar to modern 
locks. As opposed to the tumbler locks above, whose security is provided by increasing 
numbers of tumblers in complicated patterns, rotary locks could have only one tumbler 
held down by a spring; wards in the lock block access except to a key cut with aligning 
grooves. The key rotates in the lock, and, as it does so, raises the tumbler and releases the 
bolt, which the key then moves to the side.
57
 First used for chests and jewelry boxes, they 
were widespread by the 2
nd
 century CE,
58
 and they were used on doors.
59
 Both tumbler 
and rotary locks existed simultaneously by the 1
st
 century CE, and both could have 
secured doors reasonably well.  
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 Ciurletti (1996: 76).  
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 E.g., Manning catalogue (1985: 92-94); Bassi (1996: 87. Figs. 24.2, .3, 25.1).  
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 Cavada (1996: 96).  
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 Manning (1985: 94).  
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 As shown by the size of several rotary keys in the British Museum; Manning (1985: 94, pl. 41). 
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The final type of locking device which may have been commercially important 
was the padlock. The Romans’ most common variety was a barb-spring padlock.60 The 
lock is fairly simple: it consists of a padlock case and a bolt. The bolt has springs which 
project from its tip. When it is pushed into the padlock, the springs compress (allowing it 
to slide in). Once it is inserted, however, the springs release. This makes withdrawing it 
impossible. The bolt could be attached to a chain, much like a bicycle lock, for securing 
objects or doors if they were provided with anchors for the chains.  
The opening for the key is at the padlock’s other end. An L-shaped key is 
inserted, which has a square opening at its end. This allows it to slip over the springs, 
compressing them, and makes bolt removal possible.
61
 The barb-spring lock’s security 
was compromised by the fact that the keys were fairly modular, though there was 
variation in their length and in how many springs their bits were fitted for. Romans in 
need of more secure portable locks had recourse to rotary-locked padlocks. Though these 
were apparently less common then the barb-spring type, “the finest and most elaborate 
forms… [of rotary locks]…are seen in a series of padlocks such as those from Caerleon 
and Fishbourne.”62 These locking mechanisms existed simultaneously by the 1st century 
CE and lasted throughout the Roman period. These types did not supersede one another 
in an evolutionary fashion but show the availability of locks of increasingly secure 
design. 
We can, however, use key-length as proxy data for their utilitarian use and 
suitability for commercial activity. My premises are, I hope, unexceptionable: shorter-key 
length is more suitable for daily use than longer and increasing uniformity in key size 
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 Manning (1985: 95-97); Ciurletti (1996: 80-81).  
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 Manning (1985: 95). 
62
 Manning (1985: 94).  
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suggests increasing standardization likely stemming from increased use. I tested this 
hypothesis by using the 61 keys at the British Museum.
63
 Keys are presented in the table 
from simplest (and oldest forms) to complex: 
 
 
Type Average (cm) 
Latch-Lifter 22.9 6.5 
Simple-Tumbler 13.5 4 
Slide-Tumbler 8.9 3 
Rotary 9.7 3.5 
Figure 6.3: Average Key Lengths 
 
Visual inspection of these numbers shows that keys’ average size generally 
decreased and perhaps more importantly that the standard deviation in size decreased too. 
Further, we can test whether the mean lengths for latch-lifter tumbler lock, which I doubt 
was suitable for secure, urban storage, and for the slide-tumbler lock, which probably 
was, could have come from two populations with the same mean. Testing the null 
hypothesis (Mann-Whitney rank-sum test) shows the difference is highly significant. In 
other words, the type of keys suitable for commercial storage are of significantly different 
size than the others, and this size helped make them practical to use commercially. This 
bolsters the contention that keys became increasingly appropriate for commercial storage 
over time. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a technology does not ensure or necessarily make 
more likely its widespread use.
64
 The discovery, acceptance, and dissemination of 
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 Catalogue is Manning (1986: 88-94); scale pictures are to be found in plates 37-43.  
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technologies is contingent on psychology, economic and structural conditions, and 
random chance.
65
 In the case of locks, we are dealing with the improvement of an already 
existing technology. When Finley, who was generally skeptical of narratives tracing 
large-scale changes in ancient technology, conceded that “there was more [technical 
development], provided we avoid the mistake of hunting solely for great radical 
inventions and we also look at developments within the limits of the traditional 
techniques,” this change in locking devices was the type of development he had in 
mind.
66
 
But changed technologies are not adopted ex vacuo. Motivating factors are 
necessary. The growing importance of horrea, not for their storage facilities per se but for 
the concomitant commercial activities occuring therein, provided such a factor. Growing 
urbanization, long-distance trade in valuable goods, and the development of increasingly 
sophisticated mercantilism generally applied pressure toward centralized commercial 
venues. At the beginning, wine—a comparatively valuable product subject to theft and 
spoilage—could not take advantage of this new commercial possibility. With the 
improvement of locking devices, horrea storage became more attractive. Though 
improved technology was a necessary condition for bringing about this change, it was not 
a sufficient condition.  
Locking Devices: Legal Developments 
Improved locks would have made storing wine in horrea a more feasible option 
for merchants, but the development itself was not a sufficient condition for its adoption. 
In order to explain why merchants implemented this technology, another explanatory 
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factor is necessary. In this case, the development of juristic rulings concomitant with that 
technological development provided one. There are three relevant texts: 
1) Si iusserim venditorem procuratori rem tradere, cum ea in praesentia 
sit, videri mihi traditam Priscus ait, idemque esse, si nummos debitorem 
iusserim alii dare. Non est enim corpore et tactu necesse adprehendere 
possessionem, sed etiam oculis et affectu argumento esse eas res, quae 
propter magnitudinem ponderis moveri non possunt, ut columnas, nam 
pro traditis eas haberi, si in re praesenti consenserint: et vina tradita 
videri, cum claves cellae vinariae emptori traditae fuerint. 
 
If I order a seller to hand over an object to a procurator when it is present, 
Priscus says it is obviously handed over to me and that the same thing 
holds if I order a debtor to give money to another. For it is not necessary 
to take possession physically, but it can also be done by sight and 
inclination and that the following things, which are unable to be moved 
because of their great weight, are proof. For example, columns are 
considered delivered if the parties make agreement in sight of the thing. 
And wine is obviously delivered when keys to the wine cellar are handed 
over to the buyer.
67
  
  
 This first passage is Paul’s and quotes the jurist Priscus (Priscus ait…). Priscus 
could be one of two jurists: Neratius Priscus, who flourished under the reign of Trajan 
and (with Celsus) was the last head of the Proculian school, or Iavolenus Priscus, a 
Sabinian who was a contemporary to Neratius.
68
 Though the jurist’s identity is not 
crucial, we may agree with Lenel that Priscus here is more likely to be the former.
69
 
Either way, the text should date to the early 2
nd
 century CE, about 50-75 years after our 
earliest evidence for interior locking devices in warehouses at Ostia. 
 This text is doubly refracted both by the Paul’s excerption and by the compilers 
themselves, and has doubtless considerably compressed the logic of the argument here. 
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Nevertheless, the text seems fairly sound. Of suggested emendations, only the deletion of 
non est . . .affectu merits consideration: the switch from oratio oblique to the direct 
necesse est construction and then back to indirect speech is awkward and not strictly 
grammatical; it gives the impression of being a parenthetical addition to Priscus’ original 
quote.
70
 But there is nothing to make us doubt the text in general.  
 The passage’s most interesting feature comes in the final lines: why does Priscus 
use columns and wine as his two examples? A column could weigh up to several tons and 
was extremely difficult to move. It makes sense that jurists may have been willing to 
begin extending the range of accepted traditiones for such immoveable objects. Though 
an amphora of wine would certainly have been heavy, upwards of a hundred pounds in 
many cases, they were transportable as numerous funerary reliefs testify.
71
 It would be 
incredible if Neratius seriously believed those two items to be comparable. And surely he 
did not. As argued, now perhaps ad taedium, the defining feature of a cella vinaria, both 
in rural and urban contexts, was its permanent installations, above all, dolia, often buried. 
And a filled and buried dolium was, if anything, more immobile than a column. 
As argued above, keys to cellae vinariae were common by the time Priscus wrote, 
and this is likely an example of a jurist reacting to real-world practice. Beside whatever 
general familiarity a resident of Rome might have with contemporary practice, Priscus 
himself, if this is Neratius Priscus as is likely, displayed some knowledge of wine 
elsewhere. In his fourth book of rules he claimed that rural servitudes can be created both 
for storing fruits in a neighboring villa and stakes for the vines (pedamenta ad vineam), a 
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relatively specific example.
72
 It is all the more interesting that Neratius was the first jurist 
to consider the issue because there is good evidence that he was generally knowledgeable 
about wine manufacture and also considered problems relating the technological 
development of presses.
73
  
Egyptian papyri mention keys in commercial or quasi-commercial storage 
contexts fairly frequently and demonstrate that keys were used for commercial purposes 
both during and before the jurists were writing. They also suggest why the use of keys 
piqued Priscus’ interest: their mobility was used to simplify commercial transactions. As 
early as 190 BCE and long predating any juristic text, we have a pithy letter from a 
certain Apollonios to Dikaios, which concerns both a key and a warehouse: 
Ἀπολλώνιος Δικαί ι χαίρειν. ἀγνώμ ν γέγονας μὴ οὐκ ἀποστείλας 
Σαραπί να τὸν παρὰ σοῦ κομίζοντα τὴν κλεῖδα τοῦ Πετεαρμώτιος 
ταμιείου, καθότι ἐτάξ . οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐξαπόστειλον αὐτὸν πρὸς 
ἡμᾶς. ἔρρ σο. 
Apollonios to Dikaios, greetings. You were senseless not to send Sarapion 
the key to the “Petearmotis” warehouse as I directed. Naturally please 
send it now.
74
 
From 103 CE, roughly contemporaneous with Priscus’ opinion, we have a letter 
from a Lucius Bellenus Gemellus, who wrote to his son complaining of having bought a 
rotten bale of hay—“no better than dung” (λελυμένον ὡς σκύβαλον). In preparation for 
settling accounts with the seller, he enjoined his son to inform him where he put the 
notice of payment for the hay and contract for a loan and then to send him the key for 
their storage location.
75
 Another and somewhat later papyri (late 2
nd
/early 3
rd
 century) 
contains the instructions to a woman, Didyma, from her brother to get the key to a largish 
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panarium from a slave (…καὶ παρὰ Κάρπου τοῦ δ ο λου Κλέωνος κόμισαι τὸ τοῦ 
παναρίου κλειδίον.)76 
There is no particular reason why keys’ mobility should have caught Priscus’ eye 
unless their mobility raised an interesting or problematic legal point. The passage gives 
the answer: the jurist wanted to know whether traditio of wine in a cellar could be 
effected by transfer of the key to the cellar rather than by the wine itself. Likely, the 
practice I posited above of selling wine to a retailer through handing over the key to the 
cella raised the issue. We need not be unhealthily suspicious of this claim. Even Watson, 
the supreme skeptic of jurists’ reaction to real issues, conceded that they showed an 
“astonishing concentration on conditions at Rome.”77  
Priscus’ response allowed a symbolic, metonymous transfer (the key for the 
good), which Buckland characterizes as a subset of a type of traditio brevi manu. This 
decision makes sense and is the first legal sanctification of this type of delivery. This 
development on its own would not have changed anything about wine storage and sale at 
Rome; remember, our model predicts that additional value to storage would have to 
accrue to offset the product’s endogenous risk. But the precedent solidified the legal 
standing of a commercial practice and changed the rules of the game in a way that shifted 
the calculus of how to store wine.   
 The next two texts, D. 18.1.74 (Papinian) and D. 41.1.9.6 (Gaius), postdate 
Priscus’ ruling by approximately half a century and suggest that changes were occurring 
in the physical structure of horrea as well as in methods of commercial transactions: 
2) Clavibus traditis ita mercium in horreis conditarum possessio tradita 
videtur, si claves apud horrea traditae sint: quo facto confestim emptor 
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dominium et possessionem adipiscitur, etsi non aperuerit horrea: quod si 
venditoris merces non fuerunt, usucapio confestim inchoabitur. (D. 
18.1.74, Papinian) 
  
When keys are handed over, possession of the merchandise laid up in the 
horrea seems handed over, if the keys are handed over at the horrea. 
When this is done, the buyer immediately gains ownership and possession, 
even if he does not open the horrea. But if the goods were not the 
vendor’s, usucaption begins immediately. 
 
3) Item si quis merces in horreo repositas vendiderit, simul atque claves 
horrei tradiderit emptori, transfert proprietatem mercium ad emptorem. 
(D. 41.1.9.6 Gaius) 
 
Likewise if someone sells merchandise deposited in a horreum, as soon as 
he hands over the keys of the horreum to the buyer, he transfers ownership 
of the merchandise to the buyer. 
 
Both these texts resemble Paul/Priscus: both take up the question of the status of 
goods delivered by transferring a key. Both texts deal with horrea, and—surely in 
connection—extend the question from wine in a cella vinaria to any good (merces). 
There is one noticeable difference: Papinian stipulates that the traditio must take place at 
the horrea itself. Gaius makes no such restriction. We can offer solutions to why both 
have extended Priscus’ judgment and whence that difference arose by trying to 
reconstruct the conditions behind these judgments. 
First, it is more likely than not that these texts were also reacting to contemporary 
practice, at least in general. Papinian’s opinion on goods which did not belong to the 
seller is suggestive: the lex horreorum Caesaris stipulated that one’s lease would renew 
automatically annually unless the storeroom had already been assigned to someone else. 
If, however, the storeroom had been rented out to another it is quite likely that the 
previous occupant’s goods were still there, and their legal status was problematic.78 
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Papinian’s ruling, we might note, offered much greater flexibility to the warehouse 
owner/manager than to the individual renters.
79
 In any event, Papinian’s concern with this 
question suggests that he had reasonably good knowledge of the problems arising from 
normal warehouse management.   
Basic knowledge of storage operation generated Papinian’s concern with merces 
non venditoris and increases the likelihood that his entire discussion originated from 
familiarity with contemporary practice. Moreover, the question of merces non venditoris 
applied to goods stored in individual storage rooms and removes the admittedly remote 
possibility that Papinian was considering the traditio of the entire building rather than of 
property within individual units. The question remains though, what caused this 
situation? 
Inward-looking legal debate is not a satisfactory explanation. In the first place, it 
is difficult to see why the problem presented by Papinian and Gaius, different only in the 
generalization of the merchandise and the specification of horrea rather than cella, 
should have been fundamentally different or more interesting than the situation 
considered by Priscus.  
The jurists had a marked preference for physical transfer of property, and it was 
not until Justinian that delivery of documents of title, for example, was treated as a valid 
traditio.
80
 Priscus’ precedent, which recognized a symbolic yet corporeal transfer of 
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property, made the commercial activities, for which many horrea were explicitly 
designed, more efficient.  
Lest anyone begin to think that this process, by which items would be stored in a 
horrea, sold at the horrea, and the key transferred thereby effecting instantaneous 
delivery, is too elaborate, I offer the following example as evidence of the maneuvers 
Romans apparently undertook in commercial transactions. We have three documents 
relating to a cast of characters from mid-summer of 37 CE at Puteoli. These documents 
are part of the Tabulae Sulpiciorum, a group of wax tablets recording some of the 
business operations of the Sulpicii¸ a family from Puteoli. Somewhat later they were re-
copied for mysterious reasons at Pompeii, and fortuitously preserved more or less legibly 
by the eruption of Vesuvius.
81
  
This short story has a confusion of characters, so bear with me. A horrearius 
named Gaius Novius Cypaerus had a freedman, Gaius Novius Eunus who was a grain 
merchant (a “mercator frumentarius”) and a slave Diognetus, who was involved in 
running the horrea.
82
 On the 18
th
 on June, Eunus borrowed (mutuum) 10,000 HS from 
Evenus Primianus, a freedman of the former emperor Tiberius. Primianus, however, was 
out of town and his slave Hesychus executed the loan, guaranteed by the 7,000 modii 
(around 47 tons) of Alexandrian grain and about 26 tons of other assorted grains and 
legumes, which Eunus was storing in the horreis Bassianis. Later that same day, 
Hesychus and Eunus made went to the horrea where Eunus’ goods were stored. There, 
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Hesychus leased cella number twelve in which was stored the pledged Alexandrian grain 
to Eunus at a nominal 1 HS per month.
 83
  
Such detailed information about day-to-day business practice anywhere in the 
Roman world is vanishingly rare. The relationship between the characters and the method 
by which an essentially fictional (though legally important) transfer of cella 12’s lease 
was used as a method of guaranteeing a loan shows how creatively Romans used and 
combined relatively straightforward processes to engage in complicated commercial 
transactions. I cannot refrain from noting that there is no hint in any of these documents 
that the horrea rooms had keys, nor from pointing out how much easier this whole 
transaction would have been if Eunus simply could have transferred possession of the 
grain by giving him a key to cell 12 rather than by having to draw up an entirely new 
rental contract at the warehouse. 
The failure to explain what conditions led the jurists to offer these decisions has 
led to some confusion over the main substantive difference between Gaius’ and 
Papinian’s decisions: the latter specified that the transfer of keys must take place at the 
horrea (apud horrea) whereas the former averred that possession changed hands 
whenever the keys did (simul atque…emptorem). This difference was significant enough 
to tempt Riccobono to add the words apud horrea after emptori to Gaius’ text to make it 
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cohere with Papinian’s, thereby suggesting that the best solution to a problem is simply to 
write it out of existence.
84
  
Rickman at least considered the problem more broadly, but his failure to 
recognize that horrea design depended a great deal on the commercial transactions taking 
place therein led him to become confused in trying to explain Papinian’s restriction:  
The insoluble question is therefore whether the horrearius kept the only 
keys to the cellae in his office, to which the depositors came when they 
wanted entry, or whether the horrearius simply kept duplicate keys or 
some master key which would allow him entrance, while the depositors 
held their own keys to locked cellae. I think the latter is more likely, but 
the former would give a practical, as well as a legal, reason why the 
handing over of the keys had originally to be carried out at the warehouse 
itself.
85
 
 
We can immediately rule out the suggestion that the horrearius had “some master key.” 
A skeleton key is designed to bypass the wards on a warded lock, usually by filing away 
the key’s bits, and thus rotate the latch. It is doubtful that the Romans knew how to do 
this (I know of no example of any discovery or mention of such a key), and the remains 
of the interior locks found at Ostian storehouses are lever-locks. Because lever locks 
depend on a key with a unique pattern of male/female bits and holes, a master key is 
impossible to make.
86
 
It is, however, likely that the warehouse operator kept duplicate keys, which are 
easy to make from the original by using wax and wood. Besides being intuitively 
probable, Egyptian rental agreements commonly stipulated that the renter was not to 
change the existing doors or keys, as in Chr.Wilck.192, in which the renter agrees “to 
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return the vault in clean condition with its existing doors and locks” (παραδόσθαι τὸν 
θ[η]σαυρὸν ἀ[π]ὸ πάσ[ης] ἀκ[α]θαρσίας σὺν ταῖς ἐφεστώσαις θύραισι καὶ κλ[ει]σὶ).87 
Similarly, the fragmentary lex for the horrea Ummidiana at Rome preserves, in its second 
clause, the words aedificaverit and ei refigendi and therefore probably banned changes to 
the storage units, a fact strongly suggesting that merchants did not supply the locking 
devices on warehouses’ interior doors.88 
The lessor and lessee’s dual possession of interior keys confounds Rickman 
because he could not conceive of any reason why there was a legal stipulation that the 
transfer of keys had to occur at the warehouse under those conditions and is forced to 
adopt a conclusion which he himself states was not “practical.” To solve this problem, he 
claimed that, “in classical Roman law it appears that delivery of keys away from the 
warehouse did not satisfy this requirement [i.e., for a proper traditio]. Later ‘symbolic 
traditio’ seems to have allowed the transfer of the keys at any place, not necessarily the 
warehouse itself.”89 This alleged chronological development between Papinian and Gaius 
is fanciful: the two were only a generation apart, and it is bizarre to use one as embodying 
“classical Roman law” in contrast to the other, especially since Rickman used Papinian, 
who marginally postdated Gaius, as his classical example.  
If we hold in mind the broader commercial context that necessitated this ruling 
then Papinian’s stipulation makes sense both for legal and pragmatic reasons. Legally, 
any traditio needed a proper reason (iusta causa), such as a sale, gift, legacy, etc. There 
has to be agreement both on the object delivered and the intent to deliver it.
90
 In some 
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sense this was true of symbolic delivery too: there had to be a reason why it occurred by 
“eyes and inclination” rather than corporally, and Priscus stated that items of great weight 
constituted such a case (propter magnitudinem ponderis; D. 41.2.1.21).  
Papinian’s ruling extended the reason but not significantly. The logic 
underpinning his decision seems to be on the basis of convenience: a sale occurred at the 
warehouse for merchandise which would be readily identifiable. To have allowed a key’s 
delivery to stand in for a more elaborate process that would have achieved the same result 
seconded Priscus’ judgment and extended it only by allowing that symbolic transfer was 
acceptable not only for items impossible to move but for items inconvenient to transfer 
where the context for transfer made confusion about identifying the objects unlikely.
91
  
The logic underlying this opinion is similar to that found in D. 41.2.51 
(Iavolenus): 
Quarundam rerum animo possessionem apisci nos ait Labeo: veluti si 
acervum lignorum emero et eum venditor tollere me iusserit, simul atque 
custodiam posuissem, traditus mihi videtur. Idem iuris esse vino vendito, 
cum universae amphorae vini simul essent. Sed videamus, inquit, ne haec 
ipsa corporis traditio sit, quia nihil interest, utrum mihi an et cuilibet 
iusserim custodia tradatur. In eo puto hanc quaestionem consistere, an, 
etiamsi corpore acervus aut amphorae adprehensae non sunt, nihilo minus 
traditae videantur: nihil video interesse, utrum ipse acervum an mandato 
meo aliquis custodiat: utrubique animi quodam genere possessio erit 
aestimanda. 
 
Labeo says that we achieve possession of some things by inclination. For 
example, if I buy a cord of wood and the vendor bids me to take it away 
then as soon as I place guardianship on it we can regard delivery as having 
occurred. Likewise when wine is sold, when all the jars are together at the 
same time. But let us see, he says, whether this is not a physical delivery 
because there it does not matter whether guardianship is given to me or 
even to someone else. It is here that a question exits: although the cord or 
amphorae are not physically apprehended, are they nevertheless to be 
taken as delivered? I see no difference whether I myself guard the wood or 
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someone at my bidding: in both cases possession will have to be judged by 
some sort of intention.  
 
This discussion makes no mention of keys specifically but clearly keys, as a form of 
custodia, should fall under the scope of this opinion. Nor is the judgment at odds with 
those relating to keys narrowly: Javolenus agreed that establishing custodia, which one 
could certainly do with a lock, was sufficient for transferring possession. In fact, it could 
have been some such logic that led to Gaius’ opinion which offered a significantly more 
expansive range of possibilities for transfer of possession by key. 
Allowing the transfer of keys to take place anywhere made possible new methods 
of transferring property but also would have raised new problems. For example, imagine 
the following scenario: Stichus has grain in a warehouse at Rome which he sells to 
Sextus in Pompeii. If Gaius’ opinion had force, then Stichus would have been able to 
deliver his goods on the spot by handing over the key. It is easy to think of possible 
problems: what if Sextus came to Rome a month later and found the grain had spoiled? It 
would have been impossible to determine whether the spoilage had occurred before or 
after the traditio. Either way, Papinian’s and Gaius’ texts reflect an actual distinction in 
juristic opinion and do not result from textual corruption, but it is unclear which prevailed 
(though my hunch is the former).  
To review: from the 1
st
 century BCE through the first two centuries CE, locks 
became cheaper, more secure, and therefore more suitable for use in warehouses. 
Horrearii saw them as an inexpensive method to increase the security they offered while 
decreasing their reliance on human guards. Over the same time, the law developed so as 
to allow commercial transactions within these warehouses to become more convenient. It 
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is this concurrent technological and legal development which allows us to explain why, 
by the time of Severus Alexander’s rescript in the 223, we find wine in a horreum.  
The open spaces at horrea may have been long used as a place for buying and 
selling wine, but I seriously doubt whether most merchants would store their wine there 
before locks became common on the interior cells. As locks became common, however, 
merchants’ calculus would have changed: the additional value obtained by the 
convenience of storing the product where sale occurred and transferring it on the spot 
must have made amphorae of wine an increasingly common sight at Rome’s large 
warehouses.  
Thus in 223, the emperor, Severus Alexander, responded to a petition concerning 
such wine: 
Imperator Alexander Severus. Cum convenit, ut singulae amphorae vini 
certo pretio veneant, antequam tradantur, imperfecta etiam tunc 
venditione periculum vini mutati emptoris, qui moram mensurae faciendae 
non interposuit, non fuit.  
1 . Cum autem universum quod in horreis erat postea venisse sine 
mensura et claves emptoribus traditas adlegas, perfecta venditione quod 
vino mutato damnum accidit, ad emptorem pertinet.  
2 . Haec omnia locum habent non solum si vinum, sed etiam si oleum vel 
frumentum vel his similia venierint et ea aut deteriora aut penitus 
corrupta fuerint. * ALEX. A. GARGILIO IULIANO. A 223 PP. V K. 
APRIL. MAXIMO II ET AELIANO CONSS.  (CJ 4.48.2) 
 
Since there is agreement that individual amphorae of wine are sold at a 
definite price, before they are handed over, since even then the sale is 
imperfect, the risk for changed wine was not the buyer’s, who did not 
interpose a delay in making measurement. (1) But since you allege that the 
entirety of what was in the storehouses was afterward sold without 
measure and that the keys were handed over to the buyers, since the sale is 
perfect, whatever loss occurs because of changed wine accrues to the 
buyer. (2) All this has a place not only if wine is sold but also oil or grain 
or things similar to these and they deteriorated or spoiled inside. 
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As usual, we have here a tiny sliver of the situation, devoid not only of 
background context and details but also of crucial aspects of the petition, for example, 
whether the buyers or sellers brought the suit. In broad outline, some amphorae were sold 
at a set price per amphora (this is the only reasonable interpretation of singulae 
amphorae). Sometime thereafter the wine went bad, and a dispute arose whether the loss 
belonged to the buyer or seller: the buyer apparently argued that the wine’s spoilage 
nullified the deal. Severus ruled in favor of the seller for two reasons: the wine was sold 
in its entirety (universum) without measure and keys were given to the buyer. In its most 
basic elements, this decision reaffirmed those of the antecedent juristic consensus that 
traditio had occurred when keys were handed over.
92
 But this rescript has some puzzling 
details which we can use to better reconstruct the situation underlying this case. 
First, the sale had two distinct phases—I see no other way to interpret postea 
except as marking section one as temporally later than the principium. Initially the seller 
was going to sell wine per amphora, but at some point later all the stored wine was sold at 
once. The price per amphora was set, but the number to be sold was not. There is a 
difficulty here: if individual amphorae of wine were being sold, there should have been 
no need of measuring the wine, yet this feature receives a great deal of attention. True, 
Ulpian stated that prior to measuring wine, the sale was incomplete and any risk of 
damage was the seller’s (priusquam enim admetiatur vinum proper quasi nondum venit) 
but adds an exception: the seller does not incur that risk if the transaction was for single 
amphorae or dolia (…sed forte <vendidit> amphoras vel etiam singular dolia).93 He did 
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not give his reason for this opinion explicitly (or it has not come down to us), but the 
reason is clear enough: these containers came in a range of sizes of fairly consistent 
volume so that both buyer and seller had a fairly good idea how much wine was 
contained within them.  
Gaius gave a fuller description of sale by amphora:  
Quod si vinum ita venierit, ut in singulas amphoras…certum pretium 
diceretur, quaeritur, quando videatur emptio perfici…Sabinus et Cassius 
tunc perfici emptionem existimant, cum adnumerata…sint, quia venditio 
quasi sub hac condicione videtur fieri. 
 
But if wine is sold by a definite price for individual amphorae…it is asked 
when the purchase is completed…Sabinus and Cassius judged the 
purchase complete when they are counted out because the sale is made as 
if on this condition.
94
 
 
The relationship between singulae amphorae, universum, and sine mensura is 
problematic because it implies the seller did not know how many amphorae he had. That 
is, if the seller had, say, 50 amphorae of wine, selling the wine universum would simply 
mean selling all 50 jars and the added information that the sale was sine mensura would 
make no sense. Therer is a problem of language too: if the amphorae were to be counted, 
the Latin should read mora numerandae faciendae, not mensurae faciendae. The solution 
becomes fairly easy, however, if measuring by amphora referred to measurement by a 
standard volume rather than to sale of corporeal amphoras.   
We can find supporting evidence bolsetering this solution’s plausibility elsewhere 
in the Digest. Proculus, at D. 33.6.15 on the status of legacies of wines and their 
containers, points us to the solution. He says, “For we pour wine into amphoras and jars 
with the intention that it remain there until it is poured out to use and we certainly sell it 
with the amphoras as jars. But we place it in dolia for another reason, clearly so that we 
                                                          
94
 D. 18.1.35.5. 
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may later draw it off into amphorae or jars or that it may be sold without the dolia 
themselves.”95 I suspect that Severus’ seller was never storing his wine in actual 
amphorae but was keeping it in bulk—in dolia or a cisterna vini (whose existence is 
attested only by Paul),
96
 waiting for it to be sold and drawn off in amphorae as Proculus 
described.  He agreed to sell wine from this bulk at a set price per amphora (likely within 
the horrea itself), but measurement never occured. Afterwards (postea), however, the 
deal was changed; the entire stock was sold at one fell swoop without measuring by 
amphora (sine mensura).
97
 The key for the area the wine was stored was handed over and 
the sale was deemed complete even though the buyer, like Papinian’s, did not apparently 
first open the horrea and make sure the wine was acceptable.  
“Keys to the Kingdom of God…” 
We can see, therefore, the influence of law and technology on the storage of wine 
at Rome. The situation behind Severus’ rescript suggests a horreum, which, like a cella 
vinaria, had permanent installations for storing wine—one is immediately reminded of 
the single mention of a horreum vinarium with wine, casks, equipment, and managers of 
D. 33.7.7.
98
 This horreum had apparently taken over not only the locking mechanisms, 
which had become increasingly common over the prior century and a half, but also the 
business practices of sale and traditio by key which the legal decisions stemming from 
that development allowed.  
                                                          
95
 Vinum enim in amphoras et cados hac mente diffundimus, ut in his sit, donec usus causa probetur, et 
scilicet id vendimus cum his amphoris et cadis: in dolia autem alia mente coicimus, scilicet ut ex his postea 
vel in amphoras et cados diffundamus vel sine ipsis doliis veneat. 
96
 D. 47.2.21.5. 
97
 In other words, the sale was changed to one cum aversione, a bulk sale (Jakab 2005: 87-110). 
98
 Horreum vinarium cum vino et vasis et instrumento et institoribus. 
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It is doubtful that these developments affected the wine industry except at Rome 
or perhaps one or two other very large cities. After all, most cities imported much less 
wine over much less distance. Moreover, a great deal of Roman wine, starting in the mid 
1
st
 century and then especially after Trajan, came through portus; the development of 
warehouses making possible onsite delivery would have been especially attractive—
wines, like “Titius’ and held both in the city and at Portus” must have been common 
indeed.
99
  
Over the last two chapters, we have argued that Romans employed a range of 
storage facilities, and their use was predicated on the relationship between rents and 
appreciation/depreciation rates. From the 1
st
 century BCE to the 3
rd
 CE, law and 
technology developed in tandem so as to alter the calculus of wine merchants looking to 
store wine, and these developments almost certainly made the storage and distribution of 
wine to retailers in the city of Rome more efficient by streamlining the process of sale 
and transfer.  
It is of course impossible to say just how common this method of using key-
transfer to complete sales of stored goods became but image and even the legal language 
found its way into a work of a very different context. In his defense of fasting, Tertullian 
said: 
Et si claues macelli tibi tradidit permittens esui omnia ad constituendam 
idolothytorum exceptionem, non tamen in macello regnum dei inclusit. 
Nec enim, inquit, esus aut potus est dei regnum… 
 
And if he delivered to you the keys of a meat-market, thereby allowing 
everything to be eaten for establishing the defense of idols, still he did not 
include the kingdom of god in the meat-market, for, he said, food and 
drink is not the kingdom of heaven…”100  
                                                          
99
 D. 34.2.30. 
100
 De Ieiunio adversus psychicos 15.5. 
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At the end, there were more things on heaven and earth than were dreamed of 
even in juristic philosophy.  
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Chapter VII 
Conclusions 
 
The city of Rome was, by any measure, a phenomenal consumer of wine: we can 
reasonably estimate the city’s annual consumption of being on the order of 2-2.5 million 
Hl, enough wine to fill eighty to a hundred Olympic sized pools. Yet until the reign of 
Aurelian, Rome’s emperors made no effort to guide or manipulate the city’s wine market 
as they did for grain and olive oil, the other two staples forming the Mediterranean triad. 
For all intents and purposes, Rome’s wine supply was market driven, but, as with all 
ancient economic markets, there were severe distortions which raised the cost of using 
the market itself. Among these we can list, for example, asymmetrical information costs 
and availability, highly variable and often expensive transportation rates, Rome’s unique 
body of organization law, and problems inherent to the chemistry of wine itself.  
Surprisingly, there has been no major study of how, given those constraints, 
Rome’s wine market operated so successfully. Rather, most prior histories of the Roman 
wine trade have used the wine-trade as a proxy for engaging in broader arguments and 
polemic about the nature of the Roman economy generally. I have deliberately steered 
away from these debates, preferring rather to write about wine-commerce as a subject 
deserving its own study and not merely as a handmaiden to such broader, theoretical 
debates.  
My approach is modern in technique, though this methodological modernism does 
not generally lead to conclusions showing similarities between Rome’s wine trade and 
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that of later periods. This feature is unusual for a work of Roman economic history where 
, quite often, the historians most inclined to use modern theory are also those most 
inclined to search for similarities between ancient and modern economies. My studies 
show how economic theory is an equally powerful tool for explaining unique 
characteristics of Roman economic activity generally and the wine-trade in particular.  
Chapter two surveys previous histories of Rome’s wine trade; evaluates the 
sources available for its study; and argues that the traditional debate among Roman 
economic historians over the degree to which ancient economic activity was market 
driven or was “embedded” in non-market behavior is a false dichotomy. True, the direct 
and indirect involvement of Rome’s upper classes in the wine market was likely 
responsible for 5-20% of Rome’s annual imports of wine. An unknowable amount of this 
wine would have been produced on that class’s own estates and, in some sense, never 
entered a general wine market. Prima facie, this could lead one to believe that much of 
Rome’s wine supply depended on a non-market system.  
But, on closer consideration, it is apparent that even internal supply still affected 
the general market for wine. One who produces wine for his own consumption is 
choosing not to buy wine on the open market thereby affecting the market’s total supply 
and wine’s corresponding market price. Moreover, the shape of Rome’s upper class’s 
demand for wine surely differed considerably from the general populace’s, whose 
disposable income available for purchase would have fluctuated considerably more. The 
presence at Rome of this wealthy class may have made Rome a more attractive market 
for wine merchants than even other large, Mediterranean cities like Antioch, Carthage, or 
Alexandria.   
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Therefore, to found a study of wine commerce either as purely market driven or 
purely embedded in non-economic activity is counterproductive. Rather, I adopt the 
premises of New Institutional Economics (NIE), the now typical body of theory for 
analyzing the relationship between economic activity and the institutions in which they 
occur. NIE posits that using the market incurs transactions costs and, at times, these costs 
can become prohibitive and may lead economic actors to seek alternative 
organizational/governance regimes (such as firms). This approach adopts most of the 
premises of neoclassical economics but relaxes some in an effort to understand why the 
firm, the black-box of neoclassical economics, exists, its limits, and its operation. For 
example, neoclassical utility theory is still necessary for analyzing individual preference 
and decision making, but actors’ decisions and available actions are circumscribed or 
even constrained by their institutional setting, which sets the rules of game. These rules 
may differ considerably over time and place. Therefore, analyzing institutions can help us 
understand how economic activity occurred and how it differed from comparable activity 
in other places and times.   
More specifically, legal rules, both formal and informal, are crucial factors in 
setting the rules of the game. Increasing attention, both among historical and 
development economists, has been given in the last twenty years to studying how 
differing legal frameworks give rise to radically different modes of economic behavior 
and development. For this reason, the rules laid out in Justinian’s Digest, particularly 
those dealing with wine, are the linchpin of my study. In addition to its narrow focus on 
wine, this dissertation should be seen also as a test case, showing that transaction cost 
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economics reveals hidden patterns in economic activities from all time periods, including 
from ancient Rome. 
Chapter three begins by observing that although contemporary and historical wine 
industries show a marked tendency toward vertical integration, there is little evidence of 
significantly integrated Roman wine firms. To explain this peculiarity, I argue that 
Rome’s (de facto) body of organizational law lacked certain features crucial for the 
historical development of large integrated firms with multiple owners in later periods, 
namely, entity shielding/affirmative asset partitioning. Attempting to contract for this 
feature without organization law generates considerable problems of moral hazard and 
therefore incurs prohibitively high transaction costs. This important feature of modern 
businesses requires the existence of codified law which the Romans lacked. For this 
reason, Roman wine commerce was not well integrated between different sectors—the 
firm which grew grapes in Spain was unlikely to also manage distribution of wine at 
Rome.  
Therefore, the Roman wine trade was dependent on contractual relationships to a 
remarkably high degree. Moreover, the jurists were willing to engage with problems 
particular to the wine industry’s standards of trade. In particular, I argue that the 
contractual default rule for degustatio, which, of all the elements relating the sale of 
wine, received far and away the most juristic attention, belongs to a class of penalty-
default rules which can be more efficient than market mimicking default rules when 
significant transaction costs arise from incomplete contracting and high court costs. At 
the same time, the jurists were minimalists: there is no evidence, for example, that they 
dealt with the crafting of warranties, a feature which can operate efficiently through 
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private-ordered arrangements. Thus, while Roman law did not develop in a way favorable 
for large wine firms to develop, the jurists consistently and consciously tried lower the 
transaction costs associated with wine-sale.  
Chapter four examines wine production in light of the previous two chapters’ 
findings. I argue that distinction between growing wines of quality versus wines in 
quantity was not the fundamental decision facing the Roman wine producer as it was in 
early modern France. In contrast, Roman growers always attempted to produce the most 
wine possible. For this reason, Roman wine production never really became a sector 
separated from agricultural production generally. The uniformity of Roman wine 
production owed something to the comparative uniformity of trade regulations and 
customs dues, as opposed to the medieval Mediterranean. I then use the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model of international trade to suggest that the changing provenance of wine consumed at 
Rome largely stemmed from the changing distribution of capital in the Roman world. I 
conclude that wine chased capital but not vice versa, quite the opposite of how the 
modern wine sector developed.  
Chapter five examines wine storage and distribution within the city of Rome. We 
are very poorly informed about storage and distribution within the city of Rome, and 
much of our data relies on architectural remains from Ostia, Rome’s Marble Plan, and 
plausible conjecture. I argue that studies of storage units overly rely on Staccioli’s 
typology of horrea, which proves fairly inutile for determining where and how wine was 
stored. There is good circumstantial evidence that much wine was not stored in either of 
Staccioli’s two horrea types but rather in non-architecturally distinct, scattered urban 
spaces in which were buried voluminous storage vessels (dolia). Finally, I argue that 
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these storage units were likely associated with retail shops like taverns and that Rome’s 
general population acquired most of its wine through such retailers. I agree with Vera that 
when Aurelian added wine to the annona in the late 3
rd
 century, the wines were 
purchased at the templum Solis by retailers (not private consumers). Further, this was not 
a new development but simply adapted the already existing method of distribution.     
Chapter six shows that the operation of Rome’s wine commerce was not static but 
evolved and that wine merchants and institutions recipricolly affected one another. This 
chapter observes that there seemed to be some tendency over the first two centuries CE 
for Romans to begin storing wine in horrea in addition to the venues described in chapter 
four. I argue that two related developments led to this change: security within these 
horrea became better as interior locking devices and keys became more suitable to daily 
commerce, and the jurists became increasingly willing to extend their notion of a valid 
traditio to include handing over the key to a locked storeroom rather than handing over 
the sold goods themselves. I argue that we have here a rare example of commercial 
practice, law, and technological change operating in tandem and influencing each other 
so as to make the storage and distribution of wine in Rome more efficient.  
The chain of supply that could transform a grape on a vine in Spain into wine sold 
at a tavern in Rome was one of considerable dynamism and energy. By linking vintners, 
potters, merchants, shippers, tavern keeprs, and, ultimately, wine-drinkers, the 
commercial network existing to slake Rome’s thirst for wine spanned the Mediterranean 
and, for several centuries, worked well enough to meet the demands of a city of a million 
people without direct governmental intervention.   
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As this commercial network grew to such an extent, it became increasingly reliant 
on the institutional settings in which it operated. Among the most important of these was 
the formal legal setting. This was particularily important because the Rome’s lack of a 
general body of organizational law favorable to the creation of vertically integrated, 
multi-owned corporate forms largely constrained the different sectors of the Roman wine 
trade for a significant degree of integration. In contrast, it apparently relied to a 
remarkably high extent on contractual relationships. Rome’s jurists showed remarkable 
sensitivity to the contours and needs of Rome’s wine trade and deliberately tried to tailor 
rules enhancing its efficient operation.  
But the importance of face-to-face, contractual relationships between different 
sectors means that a good deal of detail about the day-to-day operation of the actors who 
participated in the wine-trade remains difficult to ascertain and often invisible. Moreover, 
for reasons both theoretic and pragmatic, this study has emphasized the importance of 
formal contractual and enforcement mechanisms but we can be sure that privately-
ordered agreements and penalty mechanisms would have been critically important too.
1
 
There are therefore myriad questions and problems left to be explored in refining, 
expanding, and perhaps challenging the image I have drawn here of Rome’s wine-trade. 
But I am comforted that, in the end, “dissertations, however inconclusive, may amuse 
individuals of fortune not unprofitably who have leisure to bestow upon speculations of a 
similar nature.” 2 
  
                                                          
1
 Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast (1994: 745-776) on the importance of private enforcement of contracts 
among medieval merchant guilds; see also Bernstein (1992: 115-57) and (2001:  1724-90). 
2
 Redding (1851: 19). 
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